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LOOKING AT COMMUNITIES AND MARKETS 
Lan Gao* 
INTRODUCTION 
The dominant discourse on civil rights in the United States has 
been a discourse on and critique of political rather than economic 
institutions,1 public rather than private lawmaking.2 To the extent 
* VISiting Associate Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law; Associate 
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. For their comments I thank Professors 
Charles Clotfelter, Neil Cohen, James Fanto, Bailey Kuklin, Norman Poser, Lany 
Solan, Anthony Sebok, Spencer Weber Waller, and Steve Winter. I am also especially 
grateful for the extensive and penetrating criticism I received from Professors Arthur 
Pinto, Thomas Rowe, Jr., and William Van Alstyne. I'd like to express my 
appreciation to the participants of the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics 
at Georgetown University Law Center for their comments, especially Professors Viet 
Dinh, Steven Salop, Warren Schwartz, and Jane Stromseth, and the faculty at Duke 
University School of Law, to whom I presented this Article at a faculty workshop. The 
Article was supported by a summer research stipend granted by Dean Joan Wexler 
and Brooklyn Law School. 
1 Since Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), in which the Supreme Court held that "separate but 
equal" facilities did not violate the constitutional requirement of equal protection, the 
struggle for civil rights has been primarily a struggle to eradicate de jure barriers to 
political equality under the law. 
American legal culture and tradition generally accept "that there is a crucial dif. 
ference between civil and political rights on the one hand and social and economic 
rights on the other. The American system guarantees civil and political rights-but it 
does not guarantee those social and economic rights described in the United Nations' 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair 
Shakrs and Social Engineers, 99 HAR.v. L. REv. 1312, 1326 (1986). 
2 By state or public lawmaking, I mean the process by which centralized law is 
made, for example, the top-down enactment of statutes or the issuance of regulations 
and decrees. The source of law is the state. For a discussion of the relationship be-
tween the sovereign and society, see H.L.A HART, THE CoNCEPT OF LAw 49-76 
(1961); for a discussion of the "habit of obedience" to the sovereign, see 1 JoHN Aus. 
TIN, LEGIURES oN JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY oF PosiTIVE LAw 220-24 (Robert 
Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1885). 
As Weyrauch and Bell noted, "[e]ven if we recognize contracts as a form of pri-
vate lawmaking, it is assumed that we make formal agreements essentially with dele-
gated state power." Walter Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous 
Lawmaking: The Case of the "Gypsies", 103 YALE LJ. 323, 326 (1993). For example, Hart 
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that economic issues surface, they have been subsumed under and 
incorporated into the traditional civil rights model of public law, 
which has produced two prevailing strands of thought: first, equal 
treatment or antidiscrimination, that is, treating like people alike,3 
and second, affirmative action, that is, when equal treatment alone is 
explained that "many of the features which puzzle us in the institutions of contract or 
property are clarified by thinking of the operations of making a contract or transfer-
ring property as the exercise of limited legislative powers by individuals." I d. at 326 
n.4 (citing HART, supra, at 94). "According to these notions, the legitimacy oflawmak-
ing depends on the authority of the state, or at least on the degree to which the state 
tolerates private lawmaking." Id. at 326. 
Private lawmaking, on the other hand, arises from an array of autonomous insti-
tutions, communities, and groups. During the Middle Ages in Europe and prior to 
the rise of a central authority, private associations had a significant degree of auton-
omy to make rules and to conduct themselves in accordance with the custom of their 
associations. See Weyrauch & Bell, supra, at 327 n.6, for a discussion of sources that 
deal with the internal ordering of associations as well as those of "aggregated units 
that are characterized by little or no commonality of purpose." 
The informal lawmaking of medieval private guilds can be seen in its modern 
version "whenever people join in groups, associations, or institutions to pursue com-
mon objectives." ld. at 327. Private lawmaking is analogous to the process by which 
decentralized law is made, through the bottom-up emergence of norms and customs 
that percolate from a structure of private ordering. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Decen-
tralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law 
Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643 (1996). 
For a defense of an evolutionary approach to lawmaking, see FRIEDRICH CHARLES 
voN SAVIGNY, OF THE VoCATION OF OuR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND juRISPRUDENCE 
(Arno Press 1975) (Abraham Hayward trans., London 1831). Savigny attacked a pro-
posal to adopt one unified code of laws for all the German principalities, a proposal 
arising out of the view that "all law, in its concrete form, is founded upon the express 
enactments of the supreme power." I d. at 20-21. According to Savigny, law "is first 
developed by custom ... next by jurisprudence,-everywhere, therefore, by internal 
silently-operating powers, not by the arbitrary will of a law-giver." Id. at 30. 
The terms "public" and "private" law have been used more frequently in other 
contexts and have also carried a variety of other meanings. Because the public/pri-
vate distinction emerged from the notion that there is a separate and distinct private 
order, private law was deemed law that protected "pre-political rights .... Private law, 
then, was that part of the legal system protecting the private ordering; public law 
consisted of government compulsions restricting private freedom." Daniel A. Farber 
& PhilipP. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New 
Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REv. 875, 886 (1991). Under that definition, property law, 
tort law, and contract law may be considered examples of private law, and labor law 
and constitutional law public law. See id. at 886-87. 
3 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h (1994 & Supp. II 1997). Racial discrimina-
tion in the following areas are prohibited: denial of equal protection-voting is cov-
ered by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-74e (1994) (Subch. I); public accommodations (Subch. 
II); public facilities (Subch. III); public schools (Subch. IV); federally assisted pro-
grams (Subch. V); government employment (Subch. VI). 
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deemed insufficient and the state adopts affirmative action to correct 
discrimination. 4 Despite these conceptual differences, in both in-
stances the theoretical underpinning of the civil rights movement has 
been the concept of"equaljustice under law,''5 and hence the empha-
sis on public rather than private lawmaking, legislation, and litiga-
tion-rather than community and norms or "habits, customs, and 
ethics."6 
4 Issued in 1965, Executive Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R, 1965 Supp. 167 (1965), 
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. at 538-41 (1994), required government agencies 
and private contractors to adopt "affirmative action" and "ensure ... that employees 
are treated during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin." 
5 Abram, supra note 1, at 1312. For an account of the "equal opportunity" versus 
"affirmative action" split within the civil rights movement, ·see Paul Brest, The Supreme 
Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. 
REv. 1, 2-3 (1976). For a critique of both the "equal opportunity" and "affirmative 
action" strands as both inadequate and anachronistic to current realities, see Anthony 
D. Taibi, Racial Justice in the Age of the Global Economy: Community Empowerment and 
Global Strategy, 44 DUKE LJ. 928, 931 (1995) ("[C]ivil rights ideologies, rather than 
constituting a critique of liberal social relations and institutions, are instead an ex-
pression of them."). 
6 FRANcrs FUKUYAMA, TRUST 5 (1996). For the purpose of this Article, culture 
can be defined as "systems of shared ideas, systems of concepts and rules and mean-
ings that underlie and are expressed in the ways that humans live." RoGER M. KEES-
ING, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY: A CoNTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 518 (2d ed. 1981). 
Anthropologists have attempted different approaches to defining the essence of cul-
ture. See FRANK R VIVELO, CuLTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY: A HANDBOOK 10 (1978) 
(describing multiple definitions of culture). Most agree, however, that culture affects 
one's values, perceptions, beliefs, and conduct. See, e.g., AL. KRoEBER, ANTHROPOL-
OGY: CuLTURE PATTERNS AND PROCESSES 1 (1948); Stella Ting-Tooney, Toward a Theory 
of Conflict and Culture, in CoMMUNICATION, CULTURE AND ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESSES 
(William B. Gudykunst et al. eds., 1985). Anthropologists have within the last two 
decades refined their understanding of culture away from a notion of a fixed, static 
set of beliefs, values, behavior, and institutions and more toward a redefinition of 
culture as a flexible and evolutionary system, itself a process of persistent contestation 
over its own internal meanings, produced and reproduced over time, unbounded 
rather than bounded. See, e.g., jAMES CLIFFoRD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE 
(1988); GEORGE MARcus & MICHAEL FISHER, WRITING CuLTURE (1986). Culture con-
sists of many evolving and interactive aspects and is not just the sum of habitual 
practices." JoHN CoMAROFF &JEAN CoMAROFF, ETHNOGRAPHY AND THE HISTORICAL IM-
AGINATION 27 (1992). 
As I discuss later, those from a common culture with an intricate network of 
shared cultural norms and ethical systems are more likely to create with and for each 
other "moral communities because their shared languages of good and evil give their 
members a common moral life" and facilitate the creation of trust among members. 
FUKUYAMA, supra, at 36. The existence of a common cultural system in a close-knit 
ethnically homogeneous community makes it more likely for a community market 
among community members to be established. 
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As economic difficulties increase and lower-income communities 
suffer a disproportionate impact of job losses and other social disloca-
tions,7 economic issues are becoming increasingly paramount in our 
national debates.8 Because access to capital is a crucial factor in the 
operation of small businesses, which in tum is essential to community 
economic development, studies have indicated that firms which are 
able to have their capital requirements met are more likely to survive 
than firms which have no access to capital.9 More precisely, debt in-
puts in particular constitute a significant factor in the increased viabil-
ity of white-owned businesses.10 
Where economic disparities have been noted, attempts at rectifi-
cation have been filtered primarily through the traditional public law 
methodology of the civil rights model.l1 For example, in response to 
the claim of credit discrimination, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act12 
(ECOA) was enacted in accordance with the prevailing norms of 
7 See NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA (1994). 
8 In 1993, white households had a net worth of$45,740, about ten times that of 
black households, which had a net worth of $4,418, and Hispanic households, with a 
net worth of $4,656. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTIC BRIEF: AsSET OWNERSHIP OF 
HousEHOLDS 1993 (issued November 1995). In 1988, the median net worth for white 
households was $43,279, and the median net worth for Mrican American households 
and Hispanic households was $4,169 and $5,524.3, respectively. See Gualberto Me-
dina, Minarity Access to Capita~ STANDARD & PooR's REVIEW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL 
SERVICES, May 19, 1993, at 95. In 1989, the median net worth for white households 
was $58,500 and $4,000 for nonwhite households. See id. 
Minority-owned firms accounted for 11% of the total number of individual pro-
prietorships, partnerships, and Subchapter S corporations in the United States and 
6% of their gross receipts in 1992. See 1992 EcoNOMIC CENsus: SuRVEY OF MINORTIY-
0WNED BusiNESS ENTERPRISES at 5; see also Thomas S. Mulligan, Understanding the Riots: 
Six Months Later, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1992, at JJl. In South Central Los Angeles, a 
predominantly Mrican American area, only 8,646 South Central residents, or 4.2% of 
the total working population, identified themselves as self-employed in the 1990 U.S. 
Census. The self-employment rate countywide was 7.9%. The absence of businesses 
in the area has resulted in "leakage," that is, residents spending more money outside 
rather than inside the community. See id. 
9 See Medina, supra note 8, at 97. 
10 A 1993 study reported that while white applicants were able to obtain between 
$1.91 and $2.09 in debt capital for every dollar of equity capital provided by the loan 
applicants, black applicants were able to obtain only $.69 to $.74 in debt capital for 
the same dollar offered as equity capital. See id. 
11 There have been some attempts in the civil rights movement, for example, the 
Reverend jesse Jackson's Operation Push and Minister Farrakhan's Nation of Islam, 
to address on a concerted and systematic basis the issue of economic, as opposed to 
civil, rights. 
12 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691£ (1994 & Supp. II 1997). See also Regulation B, 12 
C.F.R. § 202 (1993), which was issued pursuant to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. 
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equal treatment and antidiscrimination to ensure that financial insti-
tutions treat like applicants alike, without resort to unacceptable, dis-
criminatory criteria,IS and that all applicants have an equal 
opportunity to compete for credit.14 By contrast, the Community Re-
investment Act (CRA) 15 takes the affirmative action route by directing 
banks to serve low-income neighborhoods within their areas of opera-
tion to ensure actual lending by financial institutions in such 
communities. 
Both the ECOA and the CRA16 emerge from the traditional civil 
rights model, which emphasizes public lawmaking as a remedy for dis-
crimination, despite the fact that there may be nonracial, economi-
cally motivated reasons as well. The public law model, in other words, 
presumes that inadequate credit is caused primarily, if not exclusively, 
by racially discriminatory lending practices and proposes to rectify the 
problem by transposing the articulation oflegal rights, legal remedies, 
and legal sanctions into the arena of economics. These efforts may be 
laudable attempts to ensure fair lending, equal access to credit, and in 
the case of the CRA, affirmative lending and investment in local com-
munities. They constitute, however, only a partial picture because 
they fail to address the economics of lending in the open market and 
the high transaction costs that are also responsible, in many cases, for 
13 See 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (a) (1994). The ECOA was originally concerned only with 
sex and marital status. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 
§ 701(a), 88 Stat. 1521, 1521(1974). A 1976 amendment expanded the Act's scope to 
include race and other characteristics. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amend-
ments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, § 701(a), 90 Stat. 251, 251. 
14 The ECOA is also designed to achieve a level playing field of information. See, 
e.g., 12 C.F.R § 202.9(a) (1993) (requiring creditors to notify credit applicants within 
30 days of any action taken pursuant to the credit application and additionally to 
provide an explanation for a denial of credit). 
15 See Pub. L. No. 95-128,91 Stat. 1147 (1977) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 2901-2907 (1994 & Supp. II 1997)). . 
16 My analysis of the limits faced by public lawmaking is focused more on the 
CRA than the ECOA. Unlike the CRA, the ECOA's statutory scheme is process-ori-
ented, not result-oriented, and does not involve the state in a substantive inquiry into 
banking decisions. 
The CRA has been criticized as being vague and ambiguous. See Michael 
Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: Market-Oriented Alternative to the 
Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REv.1561, 1561 (1995). For criticism of the 
CRA as promoting an outdated "ideology oflocalism" out of step with the globaliza-
tion of financial markets, see Jonathan R Macey & Geoffrey Miller, The Community 
Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REv. 291,303-12 (1993), and as pro-
moting credit quotas and wealth redistribution, see Peter P. Swire, Safe Harbors and a 
Proposal to Improve the Community Reinvestment Act, 79 VA. L. REv. 349, 351 (1993). 
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the reluctance of banks to lend to certain borrowers and certain 
communities. 
The lack of sufficient lending to members of lower-income com-
munities has been caused by both discrimination and/ or market im-
perfections. Although there is little doubt that the public law 
framework is necessary to remedy discriminatory lending caused by 
racial animus, it has been less effective at correcting economically ra-
tional lending behavior caused by market forces. Lenders need accu-
rate information about borrowers' creditworthiness before lending. 
Without an efficient infrastructure to correct the problems posed by 
information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers and to pro-
vide accurate information exchange, the transaction costs banks incur 
to screen, monitor, and enforce loans are too burdensome to make 
the transaction economically worthwhile. Neither the ECOA nor the 
CRA is effective at providing the requisite exchange mechanisms that 
constitute the preconditions necessary to create a market. 
This Article examines how the private law framework of immi-
grant communities utilizes communal cohesiveness not only to bypass 
formal barriers in the open market but also to establish a market-
what I call a "community market"-by contracting back into a com-
munity arrangement where every member contributes a set amount of 
money into a rotating credit association at set times, until all have had 
a chance to collect. As I discuss below, a rotating credit association 
functions only if every member who has already claimed her share 
does not default by defecting but rather continues to contribute until 
the final rotation when every member has had a chance to collect. 
Part I of this Article briefly explores the role of capital and credit 
in economic development and discusses efforts in the United States to 
regulate the formal market for credit, through the public civil rights 
framework of the ECOA and the CRA. Second, applying Coase's the-
ory of transaction costs17 to the problem of institutional finance, Part I 
also examines the information and monitoring costs incurred by 
17 See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcoNOMICA 386, 390-98 (1937); 
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). Coase's Theorem 
introduces the notion of transaction costs (generally "the costs of effecting a transfer 
of rights") into economic and legal arrangements and poses the question of how to 
minimize such costs. See RicHARD A. PosNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 30 (2d ed. 
1977). Coase stated that legal decisions and law have no consequence on economic 
output, assuming no transaction costs. For example, no matter what the assignment 
of legal rights to a property is, it will be used by the producer who can most maximize 
the net income from production (unless transaction costs outweigh potential benefits 
derived from transacting to reassign the rights) because the initial owner of the right 
will bargain it away to a more efficient producer in exchange for a share of the in-
come that the more efficient producer can achieve. See id. 
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banks and evaluates the extent to which the traditional rights-based, 
public law approach of the ECOA and the CRA is an adequate mecha-
nism for altering economically rational lending behavior. I do not 
claim that laws enacted to regulate the formal market for credit are 
wholly ineffective or unnecessary or that public law itself is generally 
irrelevant. Part I serves solely to provide a contrast to my main point 
in Part III, which illustrates how private law responds to and over-
comes market-based barriers that exist in the formal economy. 
Part II studies a parallel sector of community contracts that exists 
in immigrant communities. It provides a conceptual framework to ex-
amine the relationship between the open market and the community 
market and to distinguish the community market from other types of 
markets, such as informal markets. The community market, as I call 
it, arises to accommodate and promote certain activities that the open 
market cannot. In essence, the question is one of market formation: 
where a market for certain exchanges between lenders and marginal 
borrowers does not exist in the open market because of high transac-
tion costs, what are the preconditions to the emergence of an alterna-
tive, community market that is better equipped to accommodate such 
exchanges? 
Part II also draws on norms of solidarity, community, trust, and 
other elements central to the communitarian debate and asks how the 
customary practices of various ethnic communities provide the requi-
site informational infrastructure, thereby facilitating the emergence 
of a market where lenders and borrowers can contract for credit. In 
this respect, the community market formed by a community whose 
members cannot contract with formal banks on the open market is a 
market that combines market principles of allocative efficiency with 
community principles of identity and cohesiveness. As Part II main-
Because there is always some transaction cost, the question becomes which insti-
tutional or legal arrangement best minimizes transaction costs. The questions posed 
have included the following. First, which governance institution, the state or the mar-
ket, is more efficient for the optimal allocation of economic resources? Second, given 
market failures caused by opportunism, asymmetry of information, and other nega-
tive externalities, markets are not always more efficient; under certain circumstances, 
government intervention (antitrust laws, for instance) may be necessary to ensure that 
markets can indeed function in a way that most closely resembles the classic model. 
Third, given the fact that both state and market arrangements suffer from transaction 
costs and cannot create perfect competition, what is the second-best choice-public 
or private ordering? 
Coasian theory of transaction costs has been applied to a variety of institutional 
settings. In this Article, I focus on one type of private, informal arrangement-rotat-
ing credit associations and their ability to overcome transaction costs faced by formal 
lenders. See infra Part III.B. 
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tains, a community market is about community as well as market and 
thus illustrates how a community's repository of norms and practices 
can lay the foundation for exchanges that value both community 
bonds and wealth maximization. 
The Article's central points and arguments are in Part III. Here, 
I study a host of unorthodox but highly effective arrangements organ-
ized by entities outside the mainstream of conventional banking struc-
tures, for example, immigrants' rotating savings and credit 
associations such as the Korean "kye," the Chinese and Vietnamese 
"hui," the Japanese "tanamoshi," the Cambodian "thong thing," the 
Mexican "cundina," the Ethiopian "ekub," and West Indian "esusu." 
Immigrants who have neither the resources nor the credit history de-
manded by banking institutions in the formal economy rely on com-
munity mechanisms by contributing a set amount of money into a 
lending circle, which rotates as loans among members on the basis of 
need, lottery, or bid. This community-based financial sector, as Part 
III argues, maintains its effectiveness through a bottom-up informa-
tion exchange mechanism that lowers the screening, monitoring, en-
forcement, and other transaction costs associated with formal 
institutional lending. Part III looks at how rotating credit associations 
constitute an instance where communitarian-based norms, which em-
phasize community as opposed to individual commitments, combine 
with market behaviors to marshal kinship and ethnic affinities in ways 
that both preserve their moral and social bases and further transac-
tions that improve economic efficiency. 
The central paradox can be stated as follows: how and why can 
marginal borrowers deemed uncreditworthy by a formal financial sec-
tor fully backed by public laws, such as contract and other formal col-
lection procedures, be relied upon to repay loans provided by a 
community financial sector ungoverned by any public laws? Part III 
examines how norms, social structure, and the production of "social 
capital"18 promote economic exchanges without the state's threat of 
force or sanction. 
18 Robert Putnam has studied how civic organizations strengthen a society's sense 
of cooperation, trust, and reciprocity-elements called "social capital" -and how so-
cial capital is crucial for the success of certain political and economic institutions. See 
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WoRK: CIVIc TRADmoNs IN MoDERN ITALY 
167 (1993). Different forms of associations and networks are capable of generating 
social capital to different degrees. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's De-
clining Social Capita~ 6]. DEMOCRACY 65, 76 (1995); see also JAMES S. CoLEMAN, FouNDA· 
TIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 302-07 (1990) ("Social capital ... is created when the 
relations among persons change in ways that facilitate action."); irl at 304; FuKUYAMA, 
supra note 6, at 26 ("Social capital is a capability that arises from the prevalence of 
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From the conclusion drawn in this Article that a community or-
dering of credit associations functions as an alternative to open mar-
ket transactions by providing exchange mechanisms necessary for the 
emergence of an alternative market, Part IV moves beyond the 'juris-
dictional" question 19-which market, community economy, or open 
market economy-and addresses the substantive question of how best 
to promote such wealth-enhancing community norms. Part IV asks 
how and to what extent public law should define the boundary be-
tween the formal, open market sector and the community-based sec-
tor. First, Part IV argues that where efficient social norms are 
produced by private groups, courts faced with adjudicating disputes 
among group members who ignore the group's "no judicial recourse" 
norm by initiating suit should either dismiss such cases under what I 
call a theory of "community nonjusticiability''20 or, in those limited 
circumstances where judicial resolution is appropriate, take the case 
but resolve such community-based disputes by deferring to existing 
group norms. 
This proposal is eminently defensible because of the positive in-
centive structure that gives rise to and governs rotating credit associa-
tions. This incentive structure derives from an aggregation of 
interests that is particular to rotating credit associations and that also 
distinguishes it from other alternative credit institutions, such as loan 
sharks. Borrowers and lenders who transact on the open market or 
through loan sharks for credit do so as disaggregated entities. By con-
trast, a rotating credit association functions on the basis of aggrega-
tion of interests between borrowers and lenders, precisely because the 
lender is the borrower. As a result, the incentive structure is one that 
maximizes group and individual welfare while minimizing the possibil-
ity of defection and exploitation, as well as other forms of abuse. 
trust in a society or in certain parts of it. It can be embodied in the smallest and most 
basic social group, the family as well as the largest of all groups, the nation, and in all 
the other groups in between. Social capital differs from other forms of human capital 
insofar as it is usually created and transmitted through cultural mechanisms like reli-
gion, tradition, or historical habit."). 
19 See Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1745, 1747 
(1996) (critiquing the overexpenditure of scholarly resources on the question ofjuris-
diction-"which institution-court, legislature, or community-is best able to set 
norms" -and proposing that the question be redirected to "what those norms should 
be"). 
20 I thank Professor Viet Dinh for suggesting and coining the term. Community 
nonjusticiability means judges faced with a case arising out of a rotating credit associa-
tion dispute would decline to hear the case. See infra notes 228-34 and accompanying 
text. 
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Second, Part IV studies the linkages that should be promoted be-
tween the two sectors and argues that where conventional banking 
arrangements can be modified to incorporate nonlegal norms and 
other innovative measures that minimize the costs of lending, such 
modifications should be encouraged. 
Economists have focused primarily on the notion of rational 
choice as the motivating factor for economic behavior-hence the 
emphasis on aggregate data such as prices and quantities-and have 
excluded from systematic consideration an individual's social interac-
tions and psychological motivations, "especially when moral consider-
ations dominate choice."21 My conclusion, however, is that the notion 
of the "rational profit maximizer" is itself contextually or culturally 
situated. While the opportunity to contract for credit in the open mar-
ket is limited because a rational cost/benefit analysis on the part of 
lenders would lead to a suboptimal availability of credit for certain 
borrowers, a different result follows when the parties leave the open 
market to establish an alternative market-by contracting back into a 
community market of status-based relationships. 
In sum, this Article explores how imperfections in the formal 
market can be remedied through the establishment of a separate com-
munity market that relies on an infrastructure of community informa-
tion exchange to enable borrowers to contract with lenders with 
minimal transaction costs. The Article thus addresses issues of market 
imperfections, alternative market formation, and participation in the 
social, moral, and civic life of a community. By examining rotating 
credit associations, the Article studies an instance in which communi-
tarian practice, which values cooperation and commitment, intersects 
with markets, which value wealth maximization and allocative effi-
ciency. My aim is to study how the claims of community are them-
selves intertwined with economic efficiency-in other words, how 
social capital may aid in the creation of economic capital. 
I. AN INADEQUATE Pusuc LAw MonEL 
A. State Regulation of the Formal Market for Credit 
Development economics22 has recognized, since its inception in 
the 1950s, that the essential problem for lesser-developed countries 
21 Shira B. Lewin, Economics and Psychology: Lessons for Our Own Day from the Early 
Twentieth Century, 34]. EcoN. LIT. 1293, 1293 (1996). 
22 The term "development economics" originated with economic historian Alfred 
Sauvy. See DIANA HuNT, EcoNOMIC THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT: AN ANALYSIS oF CoM-
PETING PARADIGMS 80 n.l (1989). It was established as a subdiscipline of economics 
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lies in the vicious cycle of poverty caused by a scarcity of capital and an 
inadequate level of savings, which generates a continuing scarcity of 
capital and conversely, a continued inability to save and invest.23 Low 
wages, caused partially by a large pool of surplus and unskilled labor 
in the oversized agrarian sector, impede savings, which in turn im-
pede capital formation, accumulation, and investment. 24 
A similar problem exists in the economically undeveloped urban 
areas of the United States. Those who are poor do not make enough 
to save and thus cannot invest in asset accumulation or other econom-
ically productive activities. Hence the quintessential problem: how to 
achieve a surplus of capital for those who have no surplus or, where 
savings are low, how to induce capital markets to extend credit to 
those who have no capital or asset base.25 Setting aside the issue of 
discrimination, the high risks which banks may incur due to the ab-
sence of capital-and-asset collateral alone can result in patterns of 
suboptimal lending referred to by some economists as "rational red-
lining."26 The essential dilemma can be characterized in the follow-
and was designed to address the. condition of economic undevelopment of the lesser 
developed nations. See id. at 7. 
23 See, e.g., RAGNAR NuRKSE, PROBLEMS OF CA.PrrAL FoRMATION IN UNDERDEVEL-
OPED CoUNTRIES 57 (1953). 
24 See W. Arthur Lewis, Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour, in 
PARADIGMS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 59, 72 (&yani KaUth ed., 1994) ("The central 
problem in the theory of economic development is to understand the process by 
which a community which was previously saving and investing 4 or 5 percent of its 
national income or less, converts itself into an economy where voluntary saving is 
running at about 12 to 15 percent of national income or more."). 
25 See Edward L. Hudgins, Why the World Bank Should Read Its Own Report, HERI-
TAGE FoUNDATION REPORTS, Sept. 22, 1989, No. 727. ("The existence of savings and 
credit allows households to enjoy the immediate buyouts of various goods and services 
by borrowing against future earnings. For businesses, credit is crucial. Short-term 
credit is essential for merchants to keep inventories at levels to keep customer de-
mand. Longer term credit is important not only for establishing productive enter-
prises but also for expansion, purchases of new equipment and machinery, research 
and development of new products, and modernization of the production process for 
maximum efficiency."). 
26 The term "redlining" originates from the practice of demarcating certain sus-
pect neighborhoods by the drawing of a red line and refusing to extend loans to those 
located within the redlined zones. 
"Rational redlining" may be caused by high transaction costs involved in identify-
ing and monitoring certain types of loans which may result in a lender's decision to 
exclude certain areas. By contrast, "irrational redlining" refers to redlining resulting 
from racial and ethnic discrimination. See JACK M. GUTTENTAG & SusAN M. WACHTER, 
REDLINING AND PuBuc PouCY 13-14 (1980). Even if banks could identify low-risk 
from high-risk borrowers who are either uncreditworthy or who lack collateral, the 
theory of "rational redlining" suggests that "banks may rationally decline to lend in 
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ing manner: because those who are poor cannot save enough to 
accumulate assets, they have too little to qualify for credit. Given the 
prevailing standards of conventional banking practices, even in the 
absence of lending discrimination, those who need money the most 
are those who can borrow the least. 
Since the 1970s and in recent years, especially since the distur-
bances in 1992 in South Central Los Angeles, the availability of credit 
has become an issue linked with the economic viability of lower-in-
come communities in the United States.27 Hence, a host oflegislative 
actions has been pursued to regulate the market for credit and to ad-
dress the concem that the financial industry is engaged in individual 
credit discrimination as well as community or geographic redlining.28 
In accordance with the equal opportunity, antidiscrimination norms 
of the civil rights era, the ECOA was enacted in 1974 to ensure non-
discrimination, for example, by prohibiting lenders from requesting, 
and presumably acting on, improper information conceming certain 
characteristics of an applicant in either the application or the evalua-
tion process. 
A different strategy was pursued with the passage of the CRA in 
1977. Departing from the equality of opportunity, procedural faimess, 
and antidiscrimination norms typified by the ECOA, the CRA, passed 
as Title VIII of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1977, was 
enacted in accordance with the outcome-oriented norms of affirma-
tive action. The prevailing concem behind the CRA is not credit dis-
crimination against individual applicants but rather geographic 
redlining and disinvestment.29 Under the CRA, the state adopts reme-
dial action to reverse neighborhood disinvestment by imposing on in-
sured depository institutions the "continuing and affirmative obligation 
to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which [they 
are] chartered,"30 which includes "low-and moderate-income neigh-
borhoods, consistent with the safe and sound operations of such 
institution [s] ."31 
low-income neighborhoods, where the costs to a bank of acquiring credit-related in-
formation may well be high and the benefit low." Klausner, supra note 16, at 
1567-68; see also GUTTENTAG & WACI-ITER, supra, at 7-12. 
27 See Current Status of the Community Reinvestment Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Hous. and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 
102d Cong. 1-2 (1992) (statement of Sen. Alan Cranston, Chairman, Subcomm. on 
Hous. and Urban Affairs). 
28 See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. 
29 See generally Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 298. 
30 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (a)(3) (1994). 
31 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
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Yet as I discuss in the second part of this Section, the underlying 
difficulty lies ultimately with a basic dilemma that is essentially unrec-
tifiable by civil rights regulations. Where the market for credit is 
marred by market imperfections, law that fails to address the underly-
ing economic reasons that cause suboptimal lending will be only par-
tially effective at altering the lending behaviors of financial 
institutions at issue. The high transaction costs banks must incur to 
identify sound borrowers among a pool of marginal borrowers have 
resulted in the absence of a market for such exchanges among lenders 
and borrowers. Neither the ECOA nor the CRA can create a market 
when lenders acting pursuant to a rational cost-benefit analysis believe 
it to be nonviable. 
B. Market Impeifections and Transaction Costs 
Given the absence of a ready market for loans between particular 
borrowers and lenders, both the ECOA and the CRA, designed to 
prod banks into lending when they otherwise would not, can be 
viewed essentially as efforts to put into place a market for seemingly 
questionable and marginally profitable loans. The CRA, in particular, 
pushes banks to reinvest in local communities and extend credit to 
borrowers under circumstances that may be directly antithetical to 
fundamental economic norms, which may or may not be discrimina-
Federal bank regulations monitor CRA by assigning each bank a CRA rating of 
either "outstanding," "satisfactory," "needs to improve," or "substantial compliance." 
12 U.S.C. § 2906(b) (2) (1994). A bank that fails in its obligation to meet "the credit 
needs of its entire community," § 2903(a) (1) (1994), would be faced with a low CRA 
rating. Federal regulators would then be required to take these ratings into consider-
ation when a bank or its holding company applies to acquire deposit facilities, which 
may result in delay or outright denial of acquisition, merger, branching, or relocation 
requests. See §§ 2902-03. In 1989, pursuant to the Financial Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989, § 1212, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, 527 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2902, 2906 (1994)), amendments to the CRA mandated 
public disclosure of and public access to government CRA evaluations, including data 
on loans that was either denied or withdrawn. See 12 U.S.C. § 2906. 
New regulations emphasize result rather than process, see Community Reinvest-
ment Act Regulations, '60 Fed. Reg. 22,156 (1995), and focus on an actual lending test 
(as opposed to the bank's efforts alone) designed to measure the volume as well as 
dispersion of a bank's lending activity in low-income neighborhoods in its area of 
operation. See 12 C.F.R. § 228.22(a) (1998) (stating that the lending test "evaluates a 
bank's record of helping to meet the credit needs of its assessment areas through its 
lending activities"). 
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tory. "[T] he CRA aims to alter a general pattem in the allocation of 
credit that does not depend on the presence of discrimination."32 
Indeed, "The objectionable pattem [of suboptimal lending] 
could be observed in a market in which there is no discrimination."33 
A similar pattem of lending and outward credit flow characterizes the 
behavior of minority-owned banks as well. In 1992, for example, two 
of the five largest black-owned banks in Chicago received low CRA 
ratings of "needs to improve."34 'While there are reports that the CRA 
has resulted in a sharp increase in lending by banks in inner-city ar-
eas,35 many critics charge that much of this lending has been based on 
below-market rates and less stringent lending standards, which has 
caused some to worry that the default rates for such loans will be rela-
tively high. 36 Some, on the other hand, worry that the CRA is not 
tough enough and should be revised along yet more radical lines, for 
example, "establishing statutory criteria for CRA-approved invest-
ments and ... mandating that a set percentage of the assets or lending 
activity of all financial intermediaries be placed in such invest-
ments,"37 or "through direct subsidies to existing banks and through 
community group assistance with prescreening, technical support, 
and character determination."38 
These proposals attempt to circumvent the undeniably high 
transaction costs that conventional financial institutions face when 
searching for or responding to lending and investment opportunities 
in low-income communities. But if the current market-based frame-
work of conventional banking practices continues to prevail, transac-
tion costs banks face when they make certain types of loans must be 
addressed. 
32 Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination: Economic Theory, 
Econometric Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEo. LJ. 237, 250, 253 
(1996). 
33 See id. ("Conversely, a market in which discrimination is rampant might fail to 
generate the pattern that serves as the primary empirical justification for the CRA."). 
34 See id. at 254 n.75. 
35 See Dennis Hevesi, Giving Credit Where Credit Was Denied, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 
1997, atJ1; David Rohde, Banks Discover the South Bronx, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1997, at 
Bl. 
36 See Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 32, at 245 n.46. 
37 Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Empowerment: 
Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice, 107 
HARv. L. REv. 1465, 1507 (1994); see also id. at 1507-08. 
38 Id. at 1509; see also Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 32, at 282 ("A subsidy ap-
proach would not eliminate administrative costs. However, it would make them a 
matter of choice for lending institutions."). 
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Banks typically rely on a number of lending criteria to assess the 
costs and the benefits associated with making a particular loan, includ-
ing an applicant's "creditworthiness" and other traditional require-
ments, such as evidence of continuous employment history. 39 The 
cost-benefit analysis requires the bank to engage in the process of ac-
quiring accurate information about the applicant, the purpose of the 
loan, and the location of the project which the loan is expected to 
support. 
One of the imbalances in a credit relationship is the informa-
tional asymmetry that inherently exists between the borrower and the 
lender: the borrower usually has more accurate information about the 
borrower's own creditworthiness than does the lender.40 In other 
words, even though there may be "honest" and "dishonest" borrow-
ers,41 lenders do not always have adequate information to accurately 
distinguish one from the other,42 and further, to determine whether 
even "honest" borrowers have the necessary resources to repay. To 
lower their screening costs, banks use techniques to improve their in-
formation. They attempt to draw inferences about the creditworthi-
ness of a loan applicant by analyzing information accumulated from 
similar past loans.43 Information gleaned from such "observationally 
distinguishable"44 groups-in other words, differentiation based on 
age, occupation, or neighborhood-often leads to a phenomenon re-
ferred to as "credit rationing," in which a lender faced with exorbitant 
39 These requirements have been criticized as inherently biased because they 
favor "[w]hite only" borrowers and prevent lower-income applicants who may other-
wise be good credit risks from even meeting the threshold standards imposed by fi-
nancial institutions. See Taibi, supra note 37, at 1479; see also Bob Gnaizda, Loan 
Practice Labeled Discriminatory, SACRAMATENTO OBSERVER, Apr. 29, 1992, at G2. 
40 See Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and 
Credit Rationing, 90 Q.J. EcoN. 651, 664 (1976). 
41 See id. at 651-52 ("Honest borrowers accept only loan contracts that they ex-
pect to repay and under our assumptions, they do in fact repay them. Dishonest 
individuals, in contrast, default on loans whenever the costs of default are sufficiently 
low. Lenders, however, are unable to distinguish between the two types of individuals 
on an a priori basis."). 
42 See RicHARD A PosNER, THE EcoNOMICS OF JuSTICE 362 (1981) ("In recent 
times ... the most important factor responsible for discrimination probably has been 
information costs."). 
43 In the case of home mortgages, for example, to lower the costs of gathering 
information, banks may rely on information already in their possession regarding 
prior appraisals of comparable houses. If a certain neighborhood has not had home 
sales in recent years, and the market value of comparable houses is not available, the 
information costs for lending will increase. 
44 Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Infor-
mation, AM. EcoN. REv., June 1981, at 393, 406. 
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investigative costs excludes certain groups of borrowers from its 
threshold analysis. 45 
Once lenders engage in credit rationing, the economics of their 
cost-benefit analysis may produce the following result. Lenders may 
decide that certain categories or subcategories of loan applicants, 
based on lenders' prior experiences with similarly situated applicants, 
would be a credit risk, and thus applicants from such categories or 
subcategories would simply not be given serious, if any, consideration. 
The alternative, charging a high interest rate to compensate for the 
high possibility of default,46 could result in "adverse selection," that is, 
attracting bad borrowers. 47 Banks would then prefer to offer a lower 
rate and to ration credit instead, resulting in reduced lending and 
eventual deterioration in the economic development of certain lower-
income neighborhoods. 48 
Besides information costs, banks also face other types of transac-
tion costs-for example, monitoring costs that are incurred in all, but 
certainly in marginal, loan transactions. The presence of security be-
hind a debt "enhances the lender's ability to enforce payment .... If 
the lender believes when it makes the loan that these advantages in-
crease the likelihood of repayment, the lender can charge less for the 
45 See An jan V. Thakor & Richard Callaway, Costly lnfrmnation Production Equilibria 
in the Bank Credit Market with Applications to Credit Rationing, 18]. FIN. & QuANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 229, 245 (1983) ("defining credit rationing" as a process in which certain 
types of loan applications are rejected without serious consideration). See generally 
DWIGHT M.jAFFEE, CREDIT RATIONING AND THE CoMMERCIAL LoAN MARKET (1971). 
46 See Luize E. Zubrow, Rethinking Article 9 Remedies: Economic and Fiduciary Perspec-
tives, 42 UCLA L. REv. 445, 541 (1994) ("[N]either an increase in the interest rate or 
the non price terms of the loan (including the collateral provided) is likely to induce 
the lender to extend credit."); see also Stiglitz & Weiss, supra note 44, at 395-402 
(stating that while charging higher interest rates may increase the likelihood that 
banks may extend credit to high-risk borrowers, at some point, banks may determine 
that higher rates will attract a high-risk applicant pool even more likely to default, 
because borrowers who are likely to default will not be deterred by high interest 
rates). 
47 The term "adverse selection" is used primarily in the insurance context, where 
it has been noted that "once a finn offers to insure certain risks, parties that are most 
likely to suffer a loss will be the first to seek insurance." Hylton & Rougeau, supra 
note 32, at 258 n.88. 
48 See generally Dwight Jaffee &Joseph Stiglitz, Credit Rationing, in 2 HANDBOOK OF 
MoNETARY EcoNoMICS 837, 853-60 (Be~amin M. Friedman & Frank H. Hahn eds., 
1990). This assumes, of course, either that banks cannot truly distinguish "honest" 
and low-risk borrowers from "dishonest" and high-risk borrowers in certain neighbor-
hoods, or that the costs of information needed to make such distinction is too high to 
make such lending financially worthwhile. 
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loan, thus lowering the aggregate costs of the transaction."49 The 
grant of collateral is especially desirable "for entities that lend to 
smaller borrowers for whom there is no practical means of monitoring 
compliance" to the terms of the loan. 50 Thus, creditors may demand 
security as a way of containing high risks of default, 51 or as a way of 
lowering monitoring costs. 5 2 Where security or collateral is unavaila-
ble, marginal applicants are likely to be at a disadvantage because the 
lack of security will mean increased monitoring costs for lenders, re-
sulting in an increased unwillingness to lend. 
Thus lenders pe:rforming a rational cost-benefit analysis will likely 
decide against lending to borrowers who lack certain indicia of 
creditworthiness. The market cannot lower transaction costs that are 
themselves caused by econmically rational market behavior. Nor can 
the ECOA or the CRA, because neither is designed to address the cost 
of lending. 
As I demonstrate in Part II, where an impe:rfect market for cer-
tain exchanges cannot be remedied by a public law model, it can be 
supplemented by what I call a "community market" of rotating credit 
associations. Embedded within a contextual framework of affinity and 
shared community norms, rotating credit associations allow members 
who cannot contract in the open market to rely on the norms of com-
munity, lowering the transaction costs of exchanges and building on 
the community's social capital to create economic capital for its low-
income members. 
II. THE CoMMUNITY MARKET 
A. An Economy of Community: The Market Functionality of Community-
Based Lending Circles 
It is generally assumed in market economies that markets, not 
communities, facilitate economic exchanges. Yet, as I discuss below, 
community-based associations such as lending circles can help their 
49 Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, ll 0 HAR.v. L. REv. 625, 
639 (1997). 
50 ld. at 645. 
51 See, e.g., JAMES C. VAN HoRNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND PoLICY 536 (3d ed. 
1974) (Marginal firms cannot obtain credit on an unsecured basis .... In order to 
make a loan, lenders require security so as to reduce their risk of loss."). 
52 It has been suggested that secured financing can be seen as one of the many 
methods in which creditors cope with the costs of monitoring. See, e.g., Thomas H. 
Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 
YALE LJ. ll43, 1158-61 (1979) {stating that creditors who are inefficient monitors 
may take security to reduce monitoring burdens). 
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members overcome market imperfections in the larger society. In 
other words, certain community norms and behaviors can correct in-
formational asymmetries that are responsible for the high transaction 
costs in the open market, thereby creating a community market for 
credit where none could exist before. 
Sociologists have noted the historical evolution from community 
to society. 53 The former is marked by groups bound by ties of kinship, 
ethnic, religious, or other affinities, and the latter by persons who in-
teract on the basis of utilitarian advantage and whose ties with each 
other are looser and more contingent than those forged on the basis 
of community. Familistic relationships and social associations evoke 
community, or "Gemeinschaft," and open contractual relationships 
evoke society, or "Gesellschaft."54 This change from community to so-
ciety has been characterized as an evolution from feudalism to mod-
ernism, from exchanges based on status and "natural will" to those 
based on contract and "rational wi11."55 
When community played a more significant role in its members' 
lives, "[t]he reciprocal ties of social obligation among members of a 
community defined standards of behavior."56 For example, strict 
codes of conduct were enforced by eleventh-century Jewish traders in 
the Mediterranean market by the maintenance of close social ties and 
the use of ostracism57 as a sanctioning device for behavioral 
breaches. 58 The movement away from the binding ties of community, 
however, has allowed people to invoke their freedom of contract to 
enter "a world of independent actors, each of whom should be al-
lowed to pursue his or her own interests without regard for the inter-
ests of others,"59 limited, of course, by the duty not to inflict harm. 
Absent public policy and fraud considerations, modern contract law 
facilitates open market transactions by providing for the enforcement 
53 See THoMAS BENDER, CoMMUNITY AND SociAL CHANGE IN AMERICA (1978); RoB-
ERT A. NISBET, THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION (1966); FERDINAND T6NNIES, COMMUNITY 
AND SociETY [GEMEINSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT] (Charles P. Loomis ed. & trans., 
1957). 
54 T6NNIES, supra note 53, at 18, 33. 
55 HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 99-100 a.M. Dent & Sons 1917) (1861). 
56 Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA. L. REv. 829, 831 
(1983). 
57 For a discussion of the possible collision betw·een community ostracism and 
state law, see infra notes 308-24 and accompanying text. 
58 See Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the 
Maghribi Traders, 49 J. EcoN. HIST. 857 (1989); see alsoAvner Greif, Contract Enforceabil-
ity and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 AM. EcoN. 
REv. 525 (1993). 
59 Feinman, supra note 56, at 839. 
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of exchanges60 that meet the basic requirements of bargain, and in 
the case of Anglo-American law, consideration. 61 The enforcement of 
such exchanges is premised on the assumption that the development 
of an open, transparent market furthers individual freedom of action 
and at the same time constitutes the most efficient means of allocating 
resources, resulting in the maximization of wealth and utility for both 
individuals and society. 62 If markets maximize the wealth of society, 
they can do so most efficiently because "resources are devoted to their 
most advantageous use by individuals acting out of self-interest,"63 or 
to put it another way, because individuals are allowed the greatest 
freedom to form. their own choices and pursue their own seU:interests 
through arms' length and freely negotiated transactions-without be-
ing unduly bound or constrained by the multiple webs of commit-
ments and corresponding burdens exerted by a collectivity of 
premarket ties. 64 
Once economic exchanges are made pursuant to rational calcula-
tions rather than kinship or other personalized relationtionships, the 
economy can progress into "an increasingly separate, differentiated 
sphere in modem society. "65 As Adam Smith suggested, perfect com-
petition is conditioned upon social atomization of individuals in their 
economic interactions. 66 Presumably, the elimination of messy per-
60 The law of contracts provides the means through which one's contract expecta-
tions will be enforced. No longer must a contracting party rely on nonstate mecha-
nisms, such as ostracism, gossip, accusations of witchcraft, and other forms of 
primitive community pressures to produce order. See BRONISlAW MALINowsKI, Cus. 
TOM AND CONFLICT IN A SAVAGE SOCIE'IY (1926). 
61 See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 17, 71 (1981); ~HARLES FRIED, 
CoNTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CoNTRACTUAL 0BUGATION 7-14 (1981). 
62 See generally Richard A Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 103, 132 (1979). 
63 Feinman, supra note 56, at 840. 
64 Indeed, the crisis currently plaguing many Soutlleast Asian economies may be 
located in the overemphasis on long-term, familistic-type relationships among busi-
nesses and banks, so that "[f]irms were insulated from market forces." Frozen Miracle, 
A Survey of East Asian Economies, THE EcoNOMIST, March 7, 1998, at 14. "The long-term 
relationship between government, banks and firms encouraged cronyism and corrup-
tion." Id. 
65 Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embedded-
ness, 91 AM. J. Soc., 481, 482 (1985). 
66 See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH oF NATIONS 232-33 (1776) (Andrew Skinner ed., 
1979); see also 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF EcoNOMICS 334 Uohn Eatwell et 
al. eds., 1987) (describing the Latin American and Caribbean marketplace and noting 
tllat "[a]lthough competition is usually so pronounced tllat price-rigging is impracti-
cable, the frequency of 'regular customer' relationships means tllat it is apt to be 
imperfect"). 
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sonal relations from economic analysis allows transactions to be un-
dertaken primarily on rational and transparent market terms 
uncomplicated by noneconomic obligations. The existence of per-
sonal ties or clannishness may impede entrepreneurship,67 complicate 
economic calculations, and present "enhanced opportunity for mal-
feasance"68 if one party manipulates the other's trust for fraudulent 
ends. 
If the nonformal, nontransparent nature of economic relation-
ships in less developed countries is deemed abnormal, its emergence 
and existence in highly developed economies has been viewed as 
equally, if not more, problematic. This discomfort has been com-
pounded by the fact that many activities not conducted on the open 
market are often summarily presumed to be informal economy activi-
ties-unsavory, parasitic, illegal, exploitative activities. 69 But the infor-
mal economy encompasses a wide range of activities. Some activities 
are conducted outside the view and reach of the formal economy be-
cause they are criminal activities, for example, loan sharking or drug 
dealing. Others "go underground," into the sweatshop industry, for 
example, because it allows them to evade and defy occupational 
health and safety standards and child labor or other labor-related 
laws. 70 There are yet others who favor unrecorded transactions, rang-
ing from informal childcare and housecleaning services to informal 
street vending, to evade state licensing, taxes, and other costs of par-
ticipation in the formal economy. 71 
67 See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, PEDDLARS AND PRINCES: SociAL CHANGE AND EcoNOMIC 
MODERNIZATION IN Two INDONESIAN TOWNS 131-32 (1963). Fukuyama has noted that 
reliance on clannish or familistic networks is helpful for the success of small busi-
nesses but detrimental to the formation oflarge businesses that compete nationally or 
internationally. FuKUYAMA, supra note 6, at 28-29, 62-67. 
68 Granovetter, supra note 65, at 491. 
69 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Moral and Practical Dilemmas of an Underground 
Economy, 103 YALE LJ. 2157, 2158 (1994); Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Expl<Jitable 
Immigrant Workforce and the Need for Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE 
LJ. 2179 (1994). 
70 See Jo Foo, supra note 69; Christian Zlolniski, The Informal Economy in an Ad-
vanced Industrialized Society: Mexican Immigrant Labor in Silicon Valley, 103 YALE LJ. 2305, 
2321 (1994). 
71 See Epstein, supra note 69; Saskia Sassen, The Informal Economy: Between New 
Developments and Old Regulations," 103 YALE LJ. 2289, 2294 (1994) (arguing that infor-
mality is a response to several structural shifts in the economy, such as the high costs 
of commercial space and other factors of production); see id. at 2295 (describing the 
expansion of high-income consumers who desire customized goods and services that 
cannot be mass produced but rather must be subcontracted out into the informal 
economy); see id. at 2296-97 (arguing that the expansion of low-income consumers 
provides a niche for low-cost, low-priced goods and services); Paul Schwartzman, Van 
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For the purpose of this Article, what is important to note is that 
there is a continuum of economic exchanges. Some exchanges are 
conducted in the open market, among buyers and sellers or borrowers 
and lenders who contract with each other on a relatively unfettered, 
arms' length basis, and who subject their transactions to the reach and 
scope of laws and regulations ranging from contract and tax laws to 
safety, labor, and health standards. Other exchanges are hidden in 
the informal economy, either because they violate the criminal laws or 
because they seek to evade the state's regulatory or licensing rules. In 
the latter category, activities such as informal vending have been de-
fended when viewed in reference to the costs and constraints in the 
formal economy72 and the concomitant creation of opportunities for 
certain people, such as "'members of discriminated [sic] ethnic and 
racial groups [who] tend to be overrepresented as workers in informal 
enterprises .... "73 A plausible argument has been made in defense of 
informal vending in Philadelphia and New York by African-American 
street vendors who cannot or choose not to comply with the bureau-
cracy and formality of permits and licenses but who perform a valua-
ble service by providing affordable goods for low-income, African-
American consumers. 74 
Ban a Bust, DAILY NEWs, June 9, 1996, at 27 (describing an efficient "shadow transport 
system" of unlicensed vans competing with inefficient city buses and licensed van own-
ers who had to pay an estimated $7,000 for insurance, permits and plates). 
72 See Sassen, supra note 71 at 2289 ("[T]he 'informal economy' refers to those 
income-generating activities occurring outside the state's regulatory framework that 
have analogs within that framework."). 
Studies of the formal sector in Peru, for example, have found that where the 
establishment of a business entailed compliance with a burdensome, bureaucratic, 
and regulatory system of permits and authorizations, in essence making the conduct 
of private business in the formal economy not just costly but also unreasonably time-
consuming and inefficient, a thriving informal economy has emerged. See HERNANDO 
DESoTo, THE OTHER PATH 133-46 (1989). DeSoto and his group of researchers 
found that it took eighty-three months to navigate Peru's regulatory maze to obtain a 
license to build housing on unused state-owned land, ten months to acquire a license 
costing thirty-two times the monthly minimum wage to start a business, forty-three 
days to open a retail store, and seventeen years to open a market. 
Informal trade by Peruvian street vendors operating without government permits 
provided employment for an estimated 314,000 people and generated sales of $322.2 
million per year. See id. at 60. In the same year in which the Peruvian government's 
investment in public housing equaled $173.6 million, the value of informal housing 
constructed by informal settlers on unused state land totaled $8.32 billion. See id. at 
18. 
73 George L. Priest, The Ambiguous Moral Foundations of the Underground Economy, 
103 YALE LJ. 2259, 2273 (1994) (citation omitted). 
74 See Regina Austin, "An Honest Living": Street Vendcm, Municipal Regulation, and 
the Black Public Sphere, 103 YALE LJ. 2119, 2123 (1994) (Informal street vending by 
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Still other types of activities, however, do not fall neady into 
either the formal or informal economies. Seen against this spectrum 
of economic activities, rotating credit associations can be viewed as a 
particular instance in which community commitment and coopera-
tion intersect with market-enhancing arrangements in a way that re-
sults in the formation of an effective, alternative community 
economy. 75 Thus, even though rotating credit associations are indeed 
"informal" arrangements that exist outside the apparatus of the for-
mal market and state law, they are not similar to many typical, infor-
mal economy activities, for example, those undertaken to hide from 
the formal, regulated market. Indeed, a rotating credit association is 
a community arrangement that allows members to engage in low-cost 
contracting for credit-not to evade the market or to circumvent the 
costs of commercial licensing and governmental regulations, but to 
correct market failures and hence improve the workings of the 
market. 
As I showed in Part I, even without possible race- or class-based 
discrimination, credit rationing, adverse selection, and other barriers 
that have kept banks from lending to low-income borrowers are mar-
ket barriers intrinsic to a market-based, cost-benefit analysis that many 
rational lenders would make. The absence of a market for such loans 
is not caused by state-imposed barriers or state regulation but by mar-
ket imperfections.76 In fact, in its effort to create a more viable mar-
ket for such loans, the state has acted-not to remove or loosen state 
regulations that may make market entry cosdy, but to impose state 
laws-for example, the CRA-to circumvent market forces and to 
prod banks to act in ways that may be contrary to their market-based 
analyses. 
By contrast, an alternative response, and the one I examine, is 
not one that emphasizes state regulation but one that emphasizes 
African American vendors "employs people ... [and] supplies blacks with the goods 
they need and want ... [and] contributes to the maintenance of black culture."). 
Similarly, because public buses and licensed taxi services in New York City, for 
example, under-serve low-income communities in the more inaccessible outer bor-
oughs, a network of unlicensed gypsy cabs or "livery" car services has also emerged. See 
Expensive, But They'll Hack It, NEWSDAY, May 11, 1996, atA2; Sharon Otterman, Queens 
Hails Gypsy Cabs, NEwsnAY, Sept. 17, 1995, at A56. 
75 For an analysis of how rotating credit associations lower transaction costs of 
screening, monitoring, and enforcement, see infra Part III. 
76 The reverse is true for some informal economy activities, such as the operation 
of sweatshops in the garment industry. There, the animating principle is not market 
enhancing but market avoiding. A sweatshop operator goes underground not be-
cause of market barriers but because of state regulation and the costs of compliance 
with, for example, licensing, tax, and labor requirements. 
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community market formation. Rotating credit associations, which 
consist of borrowers who would most likely be considered un-
creditworthy by banks, must be seen as the consumer's or the borrower's 
solution to market imperfections, a consumer-driven arrangement that 
is a solution to an inherent market deficiency soluble neither by state 
regulation nor by open market arrangements. In this instance, the 
constitutive element of a community market, then, is a market-creat-
ing, not a market-evading, spirit combined with the reliance on com-
munity to improve market efficiency. Rather than muddling 
economic rationality or furthering unrestrained self-dealings, in some 
instances community has an efficiency and wealth-producing effect, 
especially, as I discuss below, if community economic exchanges are 
governed by norms that encourage cooperation and deter opportunis-
tic behaviors. 
B. Norms of Community 
Because community contracts are often informal and exist 
outside the framework of both the formal market and public law, they 
call into question traditional thinking about markets law in general 
and economic law in particular, for instance, the relationship between 
top-down law enacted by the state and decentralized, bottom-up law 
that emerges from private or community groups. My discussion of 
community norms in this Section illustrates the extent to which norms 
can guide the behaviors and expectations of community members, 
and in this case, provide an ordered framework in which community 
institutions such as rotating credit associations can regulate member 
activities without resorting to state law. 
Before discussing norms and their capacity to guide social and 
economic exchanges, I should state at the outset that this is a highly 
contested area of scholarship. The conception of norms and the em-
phasis on a nonlegal order as a possible alternative to state regulation 
have made the debate about the nature .and relevance of norms a vola-
tile and political one. As one author has noted, "[T]he rhetoric of 
'norms' has served a ... -dare one say more overtly political?-func-
tion .... Norms help to assure the conservative or anti-collectivists 
that the limited laissez-faire approach of an austere common law re-
gime can achieve the proverbial best of both worlds"77-decentralized 
decisionmaking plus order-in which case one might conclude that 
market failures need not be corrected through legal regulation but 
possibly through an alternative, nonlaw, norm-based system. Conse-
77 David Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: "N07711S" in Contractual Relation-
ships, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1841, 1844 (1996). 
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quently, given this considerable degree of controversy, 78 and given my 
argument that some decentralized community groups such as rotating 
credit associations are capable of maintaining order precisely because 
of the influence norms exert on community members in their social 
and economic exchanges, I will be discussing the concept of norms 
and its relationship to social order in some detail. 
For decades, sociologists have employed the concept of social 
norms79 to examine how social meanings are created80 and how a con-
textual background of thought, understanding, and expectation influ-
ences and shapes individual behavior. Generally speaking, these 
scholars refer to patterns of informal but repeated and obligatory81 
practices and understandings as norms rather than legal rules,82 in 
78 Robert Ellickson called the claim that norms override law "legal peripheralism" 
and conversely, the claim that law overrides norms "legal centralism." See RoBERT C. 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 137-55 (1991). 
79 See, e.g., EMILE DuRKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FoRMs OF RELIGious LIFE (Karen E. 
Fields trans., The Free Press 1995); TALCOTr PARSoNs, THE SoCIAL SYSTEM (1912); 
MAx WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 27 (Talcott Par-
sons trans., Scribner 1958); Alvin W. Gouldner, The Nonn of Reciprocity: A Preliminary 
Statement, 25 AM. Soc. REv. 161 (1960). 
80 See DAVID I. KERTZER, RITUAL, PoLITICS AND PoWER 3-4 (1988) ("Human reality 
is not provided at birth by the physical universe, but rather must be fashioned by 
individuals out of the culture into which they are born and the experiences they have, 
experiences that bring them into contact with other people and with various parts of 
nature."). For other works that study the construction of social meaning, see, for 
example, PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LuCKMANN, THE SociAL CoNSTRUCTION OF REAL. 
ITY: A TREATISE IN THE SociOLOGY oF KNoWLEDGE (1966); RoBERTO MANGABEIRA UN-
GER, SociAL THEORY: ITs SITUATION AND ITs TASK 1 (1987) ("[S]ociety is made and 
imagined ... [to be] a human artifact rather than the expression of an underlying 
natural order."); PIERRE BouRDIEU, SYSTEMS OF EDUCATION AND SYSTEMs OF THouGHT, 
in READINGS IN THE THEORY OF EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS 159, 161 (Earl Hopper ed., 
1971) (describing certain experiments that powerfully demonstrate the concept of 
social construction). 
81 The fact that a practice is regular and repeated does not alone make it a norm. 
To qualify as a norm, the practice must also be undertaken with a sense of obligation. 
"[M]en take off their hats when they enter a furnace room or a church. Taking off 
your hat to escape the heat is different from taking off your hat to satisfy an obliga-
tion. The former is a regularity and the latter is a norm." Cooter, supra note 2, at 
1656. 
82 However, Professor William Jones uses a broader definition of norms. Norms: 
encompass all rules and standards, without regard to their origins or means 
of enforcement. The legal system provides important norms and usually 
stipulates sanctions for deviant behavior. But social norms also may be the 
product of custom and usage, organizational affiliations, consensual under-
takings and individual conscience. The essential feature is that norms con-
strain one person's conduct in deference to the interests of others. 
William K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 545 (1994). 
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the sense that norms are nonlegal obligations enforced by something 
other than legal or governmental sanctions. A norm "tells people 
more than what they must do, under pain of compulsion; it tells them 
in a sense what they also 'ought' to do."83 More recently, economists 
have also begun to study the origin and function of norms.84 While 
neoclassical economics focuses on price or quantity,85 a developing 
literature known as "new institutional economics"86 explores norms 
83 GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, LAw, NoRMs AND AUTHoRITY 2 (1982). 
84 See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, AccoUNTING FOR TASTES, 225-30 (1996); George A. 
Akerlof, A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May Be One Consequence, 94 Q. 
]. EcoN. 749 (1980); Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, An Economist's Perspective on the 
Evolution of Norms, 150 J. INST. & THEORETICAL EcoN. 45 (1994); Kaushik Basu, The 
Role of Norms and Law in Economics: An Essay on Political E<:onomy, Paper 
Presented at the Conference 25 Years: Social Science & Social Change, Institute for 
Advanced Study, Princeton (May 9-11, 1997). 
85 Traditionally, neoclassical theories of exchange had empounded that price 
considerations outweigh other considerations in economic transactions. See, e.g., Axel 
Leijonhufvud, School, Revolution, and Research Programmers in Economic Theory, in METH-
ODS AND APPRAISAL IN ECONOMICS (Spiro J. Latsis ed., 1976), cited in jANET TAI LANDA, 
TRUST, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY 6 (1994) ("[T]ransactors interact in markets on the 
basis of most favorable price and in so doing, ignore relationship of status, kinship, 
caste, and so on."). 
86 See Kaushik Basu et al., The Growth and Decay of Custom: The Role of the New 
Institutional Economics in Economic History, 24 EXPLORATIONS IN EcoN. HIST. 1 (1987). 
These economists are now attempting to understand a custom's origin and its persis-
tence. The term "new institutional economics" was originated by Oliver Williamson 
in a landmark book, MARKETs AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANrrrn.usr IMPUCA-
TIONS (1975). 
New institutional economics is closely associated with Ronald Coase's concept of 
transaction cost economics, see supra note 17, and is premised on the contention that 
most economic actors are not isolated individuals but rather members of organiza-
tions, groups, or institutions, whose behaviors and motivations are influenced by their 
social and institutional settings. It emphasizes transaction costs, rather than produc-
tion costs as used in neoclassical economics, and its focus is on the transaction. 
Briefly, new institutional economics recognizes that transactions are not cost-free and 
that economic actors incur extensive costs before and during the performance of the 
contractual or transactional agreements: information costs about the assets to be sold 
or bought in the transaction, risk allocation and opportunity costs if the transaction is 
not completed, monitoring and other precautions to be undertaken in the event 
other players defect or engage in opportunistic behaviors, and enforcement costs 
should the other party breach. 
Given the existence of transaction costs, the type of institutional arrangements or 
governance structure entered into and adopted by the parties, given under their cir-
cumstances, will play a part in determining the overall cost and benefit associated with 
the transaction. See OLIVER E. WIU.IAMSON, THE EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITAL-
ISM 15-42 (1985). Within this institutional setting, rational decisionmaking and insti-
tutional action will also be influenced by how and to what extent the institution is 
capable of disseminating the necessary information to the relevant actors. See 
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and institutions and their origin and evolution. This new literature 
explores an area that is often ignored in the neoclassical model. The 
neoclassical model, which assumes that efficiency derives from perfect 
competition, also assumes that inefficient institutions will die out be-
cause rational individual actors will not favor inefficient choices. Yet 
some choices are typically beyond the realm of options available to 
individuals. "[I] ndividuals choose in the marketplace, in shops, in la-
bor markets. They do not choose between institutions, customs and 
social norms. These evolve in response to a multitude of individual 
decisions spread over different domains and large stretches of time."87 
Hence the emphasis among institutional economists on the origin 
and evolution of institutions, customs, and social norms. "Social 
meanings act to induce actions in accordance with social norms, and 
thereby impose costs on efforts to transform social norms"88 because 
they "bring along with themselves the very mechanisms necessary to 
preserve their dominance."89 Thus, norms are often powerful enough 
to cause people to act, not merely out of habit, but out of a sense of 
obligation, in accordance with, rather than in contravention of, estab-
lished norms. Although formal rules structure societal choices and 
behavior, "the governing structure is overwhelmingly defined by codes 
of conduct, norms of behavior, and conventions."90 
Using the works of sociologists and institutional economists who 
have studied the concept of social norms, legal scholars have also ex-
plored the function of norms and the interaction of law and norms, 
formal and informal rules. From this burgeoning literature, we know 
that sometimes norms may exert a stronger influence on certain be-
haviors than legal rules. Robert Ellickson, for example, found that the 
formal rules that governed different property regimes in Shasta 
County had little effect on the way neighboring ranchers resolved dis-
putes because the prevailing norms that existed governed their behav-
DouGLASS C. NoRTH, INsTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND EcoNOMIC PERFORM-
ANCE 22-23 (1990). Additionally, new institutional economics also explores how 
norms develop and operate within the institution and how various norms-for exam-
ple, norms of cooperation-influence the institutional environment, the firm's inter-
nal structure, and consequently its economic decisionmaking. See also WILLIAMSON, 
supra, at 1-8 (discussing the development of the field of new institutional 
economics). 
87 Basu et al., supra note 86, at 9. 
88 Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943, 998 
(1995). 
89 ld. at 999. 
90 NoRTH, supra note 86, at 36. See generally EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMER-
GENCE OF NORMS (1977). 
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ior regardless of the legal rule in effect.91 At other times, legal rules, 
rather than being more or less peripheral, may have a significant ef-
fect on norms, either by furthering or impeding a particular norm. 92 
Norms and their relationship to law have thus been studied and 
the fruits of study applied to a wide variety of contexts, 93 ranging from 
dueling94 and beekeeping95 to sumo wrestling in Japan.96 Addition-
ally, as this extensive literature demonstrates, norms may emerge from 
centralized and organized private agencies, for example, the Ameri-
can grain industry or the Japanese products liability system.97 The lat-
91 See ELLICKSON, supra note 78. 
92 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021 
(1996) ("Law might attempt to express a judgment about the underlying activity in 
such a way as to alter social norms .... Through time, place, and manner restrictions 
or flat bans, for example, the law might attempt to portray behavior like smoking, 
using drugs, or engaging in unsafe sex as a sign of individual weakness."); Richard H. 
McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race 
Discrimination, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1003, 1065-85 (1995) (discussing how the passage 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 facilitated the erosion of the social norm that kept 
white business owners from serving or hiring blacks for fear of social stigma, since 
white business owners who now hire or serve blacks could be doing so because dis-
crimination is illegal). 
At the same time, however, while legal rules certainly influence the construction 
of social reality, their influence is often limited. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: 
Toward a Sociology of the juridical Field, 38 HAsTINGs LJ. 805, 840 (1987) ("There is no 
doubt that the law possess a specific efficacy .... Nevertheless, this efficacy, defined by 
its opposition both to pure and simple impotence and to effectiveness based only on 
naked force, is exercised only to the extent that the law is socially recognized and 
meets with agreement, even if only tacit and partial. . . . "). 
93 See generally Symposium, Law, Economics, and Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643 
(1996). 
94 See Lessig, supra note 88, at 968-72, 1019-25. Lessig describes how the law 
banning dueling in the American South failed "in part because it directly challenges 
the norms of loyalty built within the social structure, and these norms can be quite 
strong." I d. at 971. See also Warren F. Schwartz et al., The Duel: Can These Gentlemen Be 
Acting Efficiently?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 335 (1984). 
95 See Steven N. S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J.L. & 
EcoN. 11 (1973). Cheung described the informally enforced norm among apple 
orchard owners regarding beekeeping in rural Washington. Given the fact that bees 
fly from one orchard to another and pollinate trees on neighboring orchards, it 
might make sense for each orchard owner to rely in part on bees from other orchards 
to pollinate trees on his own orchard. However, if everyone we~;e to keep fewer bees 
than is needed to pollinate his own orchard, relying instead on bees from neighbor-
ing orchards, there would be an overall shortage-hence the norm that obligates eve-
ryone to keep his proportionate share of bees during the pollination period. 
96 See Mark D. West, Legal Rules and Social Norms in Japan :S Secret World of Sumo, 26 
J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1997). 
97 It should be noted that nonlegal obligations may be created by centralized or 
decentralized groups. As David Charny pointed out, the term "norms" has been used 
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ter constitutes a particular type of "nonlegal governance regime ... in 
which the parties devise a fairly comprehensive system that includes 
written rules of conduct, sanctions, and procedures for enforce-
ment."98 On the other hand, norms may also emerge from relatively 
informal private groups, for example, "spontaneously" as a result of 
interactions among ranchers in rural California or, as is more relevant 
to this Article, among members of closely knit and ethnically homoge-
neous groups. Without the state to act as mediator of formal rights 
and duties, a community-based market depends not on the establish-
ment of a fixed legal rule but on the existence of guiding principles 
and norms. Repeated interactions over time among members of a 
community, such as those of rotating credit associations, produce 
norms and customs that coordinate community behavior and main-
tain community order without resorting to law. 99 
Repeated, enduring exchanges among groups or networks are 
also likely to produce a commitment toward norms of reciprocity, 
as much "for comprehensive and relatively complex regimes as for more informal and 
diffuse sanctioning systems." Charny, supra note 77, at 1845. Ellickson's work on 
ranching norms in Shasta County, California, describe highly informal norms that 
emerge in a highly informal context outside the framework of any formal or central-
ized, albeit private, organization. See ELLICKSON, supra note 78; Robert Ellickson, Of 
Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv. 
623 (1986). 
By contrast, norms or nonlegal obligations addressed by other scholars are much 
less informal and much less "spontaneous" because they are obligations produced 
and enforced by highly ordered private organizations. Norms that govern the dia-
mond bourse, for example, a relatively centralized private organization, are them-
selves relatively formal ones with written rules. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the 
Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 
115 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, opting Out]. So are product liability norms that 
govern japan's Product Safety Council, termed "strict liability by private ordering," as 
discussed in J. Mark Ramseyer, Products Liability Through Private Ordering: Notes on a 
japanese Experiment, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1823, 1823 (1996). Another example is the set 
of business norms enforced by the American grain industry, the National Grain and 
Feed Association, as described in Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: 
Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765 (1996) 
[hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant Law]. 
98 Charny, supra note 77, at 1841. 
99 Custom emerges from community practice and is not "made" by decree, stat-
ute, or regulation. H.L.A. Hart noted that because custom evolves from practice and 
does not contain an established procedure for change or reform, its evolution may be 
frustrated in certain instances. See HART, supra note 2, at 90-91 (1961). For a discus-
sion of the concept of norms as not simply regularities or inclinations but rather also 
obligations, see infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. 
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high levels of trust, and intragroup cooperation.100 Enduring rela-
tionships, whether in the context of network forms of organization 101 
or homogeneous communities with a history of common cultural ties, 
are more likely to use "voice" and coordination rather than "exit" or 
"tit for tat" behavior to resolve disputes.102 In such communities, 
where members are "repeat players," "[t]here is therefor a constant 
incentive shared by all parties to get the rule right. But there is only a 
short-term interest of one party to get it wrong, and even that tempta-
tion will not dominate his conduct if his private, long-term losses out-
weigh these short-term gains."103 Norms of cooperation which 
generally promote investment might emerge in the following way. In 
an "agency game," in which the player who makes the first move-the 
principal-decides whether to invest or not invest, the player who 
makes the second move-the agent-has the choice of either cooper-
ating and investing or appropriating and defecting-in other words, 
stealing the principal's investment.10 4 With the agent's possible defec-
tion looming in the background, the principal may decide not to in-
vest, causing both parties to lose out on a potentially productive and 
mutually beneficial transaction. By contrast, if the game is repeated 
and norms of cooperation are produced or maintained, a different 
result follows. 
[E]very agent has an incentive to provide signals that induce princi-
pals to invest. Every agent will signal "cooperation," regardless of 
whether his real strategy is cooperation or appropriation. Conse-
100 See Mark Granovetter, Coase Revisited: Business Groups in the Modem Economy, 4 
INDuSTRIAL & CoRP. CHANGE 93-131 (1995). In his analysis of business groups, Pro-
fessor Granovetter argued that one distinctive characteristic of such groups is their 
"moral community" in which trustworthiness is expected and opportunism deterred. 
See also RoBERT M. AxEr.R.on, THE EvoLUTION OF CooPERATION 12-14 (1984) (using 
economic analysis of social norms to explain how efficient solutions can be struck 
when a game is repeated between the same players); MICHAEL TAYLOR, CoMMUNITY, 
.ANARCHY AND LmER'IY 65-90 (1982) (arguing that community is necessary for the 
emergence of a stateless order); ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 90, at 76 (describing 
the types of social interaction in which norms emerge and how norms of small groups 
or communities make coordination possible); Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, The 
Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information, 54 
EcoNOMETRICA 533, 533-36 (1986) (describing inefficient solutions in one-shot 
games versus efficient solutions in repeated games);Joel M. Podolny & Karen L. Page, 
Network Forms of Organization (unpublished paper, Graduate School of Business, 
Stanford University). 
101 See, e.g., Podolny & Page, supra note 100. 
102 See id. at 5; Cooter, supra note 2, at 1658-59. 
103 Richard A Epstein, The Path to T J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in 
the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 (1992). 
104 See Cooter, supra note 2, at 1657-77. 
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quently, a consensus will arise in the community about how agents 
ought to act. Such a consensus will convince some members of the 
community to internalize the norm and to ingrain it in the young. 
Thus a new norm will emerge in the community.105 
According to scholars who have studied the influence of norms, 
norms can be powerful because they guide behavior, not by reference 
to external rules, but by invoking an internalized sense of obliga-
tion 106 and providing a system of enforcement to ensure against non-
compliance. Thus, norms are more than simply established routine, 
habit, or regularities. In other words, norms "are expectations about 
action-one's own action, that of others, or both-which express 
what action is right or what action is wrong."107 Individuals who have 
internalized a norm suffer a psychological penalty-guilt or remorse, 
for instance-if they fail to abide by the norm, whether or not non-
compliance would be detected by others.I08 There is also a "psychic/ 
105 /d. at 1666. 
106 See generally GEORGE H. VoN WRIGHT, NoRM AND ACTION: A LOGICAL INQUIRY 
70-92 (1963); Cooter, supra note 2, at 1656. See also BECKER, supra note 84, at 225 
("Norms are those common values of a group which influence an individual's behav-
ior through being internalized as preferences."). Psychologists have long studied the 
internalization of obligations and the influence of social and cultural norms on be-
havior. See, e.g., JEAN PIAGET, THE MoRAL JuDGMENT OF THE CHILD (Mmjorie Gabain 
trans., 1965); Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of M(JTalDevelopment: M(JTal Stages and 
the Idea of justice, in 1 EssAYS ON MoRAL DEVELOPMENT 1, 409-12 (1981); Lawrence 
Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization, in 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND REsEARCH 84,97-100 (David A. Goslin ed., 
1969). For sources on the process of socializing children into internalizing society's 
cultural norms, see Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of 
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338, 380 n.148 (1997). 
107 James C. Coleman, Norms as Social Capita~ in EcoNOMIC IMPERIALISM: THE EcO-
NOMIC METHOD APPLIED OuTSIDE THE FIELD OF EcoNOMICS 135 (Gerhard Radnitzky & 
Peter Bernholtz eds., 1987). "A norm may prescribe certain actions such as the norm 
that an athlete on a teaill should play his best. Or it may proscribe certain actions, 
such as the norm among observant Jews and Muslims of not eating pork, or the norm 
once held among observant Catholics of not eating meat on Friday." Id. at 135. 
108 See Cooter, supra note 2, at 1662-63 ("[I] nternalization ... can tip the individ-
ual's motivational balance .... From this perspective, internalization attaches a 'guilty 
penalty' to violating a norm, which can change the sign of the net psychological bene-
fits."); Robert D. Cooter, Law and Unified Social Theory, 22 J.L. & Soc'Y. 50 (1995); 
Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actor.s: A Critique of 
Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHr.-KENT L. REv. 23, 45-46 (1989). For a different 
conception of the relationship between internalization of norms and compliance of 
norms-one based not on the psychological cost of guilt or unpleasantness attached 
to breaching an internalized norm-see THOMAS NAGEL, THE PossiBILI'IY OF ALTRUISM 
79-89 (1970) (emphasizing an internalized perception of correctness of behavior 
rather than the desire to avoid guilt). 
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social"109 bond that is derived from the members' internalization of 
community norms, so that one who breaches this bond may experi-
ence "'loss of opportunities for important or pleasurable association 
with others, loss of self-esteem, feelings of guilt, or an unfulfilled de-
sire to think of himself as trustworthy and competent. "'110 
However, even where a norm exists but has not been internalized 
by community members because, for example, "the obligation is 
vaguely defined, what counts as a violation may depend on what 
others think is a violation,"111 not necessarily on one's own internaliza-
tion of the obligation. In this case, when a norm is not internalized in 
a way that may cause a norm violator to suffer internal psychological 
costs such as guilt, external but nonlegal enforcement sanctions-and 
relatively low-cost ones at that-may still exist. "Nonlegal enforce-
ment sytems come in many varieties. The ordinary rules of everyday 
conduct are enforced by the gossip of neighbors112 and the scolding 
of friends; at the other extreme of complexity, investors may comply 
with intricate financial arrangements mainly to preserve their market 
reputation, rather than from fear of lawsuit."113 
In certain communities, especially those that are closely knit, geo-
graphically concentrated, and relatively homogeneous, each member 
has a reputation that is easily known to other members of the commu-
nity, and this "reputational bond"114 maximizes both the individual's 
compliance with established community norms and the community's 
enforcement of its shared norms against rule breakers. In closely knit 
communities especially, a member's act will carry soc.ial meanings that 
are of particular significance to other members of the same commu-
nity. Every act "conveys in its particular context an easily recognized 
109 Bernstein, opting Out, supra note 97, at 139. 
llO Id. (quoting David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 
HARv. L. REv. 393 (1990)). 
ll1 McAdams, supra note 106, at 385. 
ll2 See Philip Pettit, Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives, 100 ETHICS 725 
(1990). Enforcement of group norms and sanctioning wrongdoers can be done 
through gossip. It is assumed under this theory that people are moved by a concern 
that others not think negatively of them. In this way, it is similar to what has been 
called the "esteem theoryofnorms," see McAdams, supra note 106, at377, that norms 
are complied with because noncompliance will result in the withholding of esteem by 
others. According to Pettit, gossip works to sanction perceived wrongdoers because 
"people do not have to discipline violators intentionally, going out of their way for 
example to rebuke them or report them to others; they just have to disapprove of 
them-whether that attitude ever issues in intentional activity." Id. at 739. 
ll3 Charny, supra note 77, at 1841. 
ll4 See Bernstein, opting Out, supra note 97, at ll6. 
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meaning,"115 which is itself contingent "on a particular society or 
group or community within which social meanings occur."116 Thus, a 
passenger who buckles her seatbelt in a taxi in Budapest signals "in-
sult" to the driver.l17 A handshake among diamond buyers and sellers 
in the Orthodox Jewish community may signal "offer and accept-
ance."118 Similarly, an oral agreement and a handshake119 may mean 
agreement to participate in a community rotating credit association 
that includes consent to the association's informal rules-that one 
who has collected her share from the association is obligated to pay 
the amount back by continuing to deposit her contribution until every 
other member of the association has had a chance to collect.120 
If a person acts in a way that is contrary to the community's 
norms, "[that] action creates a stigma [and] that stigma [has] a social 
meaning"121 which may have a negative impact on the violator's repu-
tation. Others in the community may respond by withholding their 
esteem as a means of externally sanctioning the norm violator, 12 2 
which may result in loss of future business with other members of the 
business group, reputational injury, ostracism, and banishment from 
the community.123 When disputes do arise, they are almost exclusively 
115 Lessig, supra note 88, at 954. 
116 Id. at 952. 
117 See id. 
118 See infra note 180. 
119 Jim Szymanski &Jaymes Song, Trust is the Key to "Kye" Investment, TACOMA NEws 
TRIB.,June 16, 1996, at Dl. 
120 See infra Part III. 
121 Lessig, supra note 88, at 951. 
122 This is what Richard McAdams calls the "esteem theory." See McAdams, supra 
note 106, at 377. McAdams examines the "power of esteem sanctions" and discusses 
what he calls the "feedback effect," in which "[p]eople competing to be 'well thought 
of compared to others discover that the cost of their noncompliance-the status loss 
from deviance-increases as compliance increases." Id. at 365-66. For a discussion of 
the importance of peer disapproval to deterrence, see id. at 368 n.ll4. See also jones, 
supra note 82, at 566-67 ("[T]he individual's concern about her standing among her 
peers is the means by which the group's norms are enforced. The ultimate sanction 
for deviance is expulsion, but the simple wish to be well regarded by other members 
of the group may assure conformity."); Pettit, supra note 112, at 739-40 ("[P]eople 
are moved in great part, though not exclusively, by a concern that others not think 
badly of them and, if possible, that they think well of them."). 
123 See McAdams, supra note 106, at 380 n.144, for sources cited therein which 
distinguish, from among nonlegal sanctions, fear of disapproval and internalized 
norms. 
Social norms, however, would not be effective as a means of ordering the behav-
ior of people who prefer defiance to conformity and thrive on incurring social disap-
provals by breaching established norms. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social 
Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 918 (1996). 
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resolved by relying on and applying community norms-"an elabo-
rate, intemal set of rules, complete with distinctive institutions and 
sanctions"124 consisting of trade custom and usage and Jewish law 
outside the realm of "state-created law."I25 
By contrast, conduct that conforms to the norm of the commu-
nity or a business sector is more likely to bestow a range of benefits-
reputational enhancement, social approval, increased standing in the 
community-than conduct that does not. Dealers in the primarily Or-
thodox jewish diamond industry in New York City, for example, con-
duct their business without the expense of formal contracts by relying 
on each others' reputation bonds. Because "the value of an individ-
ual's reputation is a function of the degree to which he possesses 
those attributes that other dealers consider important in business rela-
tionships,"126 reputation has a market value. 
At least two factors that I have explored above deserve further 
emphasis. The ability of private groups to enter into economically ef-
ficient and mutually beneficial relations is influenced as much by an 
institutional setting of common background norms as by the fact that 
their members interact with each other repeatedly. Where businesses 
conduct their activities in accordance with an established and system-
atic panoply of community norms, to the extent that the norms are 
desirable from a societal perspective, the activities are essentially self-
regulated and "frictionless" in the sense that adherence to them does 
not require the imposition of additional rules to ensure compliance. 
In the absence of perfect information, the configuration of nonprice 
mechanisms generated by individual intemalization of community 
norms-the "ought" and the "should," notions of obligation and trust, 
for example-constitutes one of the key factors that can promote reci-
procity and cooperation, facilitate the process of economic exchange, 
and minimize transaction costs. 
Additionally, "Members of a close-knit group develop and main-
tain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare 
that members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another."127 
In agency language, the emergence and acceptance of a business 
norm among repeat players will encourage principals to invest if they 
believe that their agents subscribe to the norm of cooperation rather 
than appropriation, or that those who appropriate will be subject to 
community sanctions, which will in tum create an increase in the 
124 Bernstein, opting Out, supra note 97, at 115. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 ELLICKSON, supra note 78, at 167. 
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levels of production and investment.128 Thus, mutuality of interests 
and repeat play are important factors that will help tip the scale in 
favor of cooperation and away from defection, and as I demonstrate 
below, help explain why the norms that govern rotating credit associa-
tions are capable of providing an effective, private ordering of com-
munity market outside the realm of state law. 
III. RoTATING CREDIT AssociATIONS ANn THE LoGic OF 
SociAL CAPITAL 
A. The Mechanics of Rotating Credit Associations 
Simply defined, a rotating credit association is "a group who pool 
their funds on a regular basis then rotate the pool around the group 
until all members have received it,"l29 essentially functioning as both a 
savings and lending device. The rotating credit association is known 
by a variety of ethnic names-the "kye" in the Korean community, the 
"ekub" in the Ethiopian community, the "esusu" in the West Indies 
community, the "tanamoshi" in the Japanese co~munity, the "hui" in 
the Chinese or Vietnamese. community, the "thong thing" in the 
Cambodian community, and the "cundina" in the Mexican commu-
nity. 130 While businesses have fled inner-city communities in recent 
years, "a new ethnic mercantile class" has moved in.131 The economic 
I28 See Cooter, supra note 2, at I666-69. 
I29 See IvAN LIGHT & EDNA BoNACICH, IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS: KoREANs IN Los 
ANGELES I965-I982, at 244 (1988); see also IvAN H. LIGHT, ETHNIC ENTERPRISE IN 
AMERICA 23 (I972) (defining a rotating credit association as "'an association formed 
upon a core of participants who agree to make regular contributions to a fund which 
is given, in whole or in part, to each contributor in rotation'") (quoting Shirley 
Ardener, The Comparative Study of Rotating Credit Associations, 94]. OF THE RoYAL AN-
THROPOLOGICAL INST. 20I, 20I (I964)). 
I30 See Chris Woodyard, Roadside Revival by the Patels, L.A. TIMES, July I4, I995, at 
AI (describing Indian businesses and Indian credit associations); Lena H. Sun, Tradi-
tional Money Pools Buoy Immigrants' Hopes, WASH. PoST, Feb. I7, I995, at AI (stating 
that Bolivian associations are called "pasanaqu"); David J. Jefferson, Neighborhood Fi-
nancing: Lending Clubs Offer Social Support and Quick Capital to Asian Immigrants, WALL 
ST.j., Feb. 24, I989, at RI3 (describing the Chinese "hui," the Japanese "tanomoshi," 
the Vietnamese "hoi," and the Korean "kye"); John Flinn, Success the Old-Fashioned 
Way, S.F. EXAMINER, April 30, 1995, at D1 (describing the Cambodian "thong thing," 
used by the Cambodian community to finance Cambodian doughnut shops); Stephen 
Magagnini, Tong Ting: Ancient Financing Tactic Finds New Uses, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 
16, I993, at BI (describing the Cambodian tong ting and the Mexican cundina, 
among others); Jamaican Emigres Bring Thrift Clubs to New Yoril, N.Y. TIMES, June I9, 
I988, at A34. (describing Jamaican and other Carribean credit associations). 
I3I See, e.g., Pauline Yoshihashi & Sarah Luhman, American Dreams: How the Byung 
Kim Family of Los Angeles and Other Koreans Have Made It in the U.S., WALL ST. J., June 
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basis for many of these businesses is often found in the ethnic institu-
tions and resources of the community, and newcomers with no credit 
history have resorted to the community credit market to finance their 
businesses.132 
By participating in a rotating credit association, every member, 
except the very last member to draw from the pool, can access a lump 
sum of capital that she would not have been able to access but for the 
association. For example, assume that a credit pool consists of 
$50,000 and ten members, each of whom needs $50,000 to start a busi-
ness, and that each member is able to save $5,000 per year. At that 
rate, unless a commercial bank loan is available, it would take ten 
years for each member to accumulate enough capital to start a busi-
ness. By contrast, it would only take one year for the members to-
gether, through a rotating credit association, to raise $50,000 for one 
loan, resulting in an efficiency gain and a decrease in opportunity 
costs. 
Rotating credit associations have existed in. many cultures and 
originated hundred of years ago to enable members to pool their cash 
to finance businesses, burials, marriages, and other family and social 
obligations.133 The Korean system, for example .. dates back to Korean 
I6, I992, at AI; Sandra Sugawara & Elizabeth Tucker, New Firms Backed by Family, 
Friends, WASH. Posr, Dec. I6, I987, at AI (noting that in the Washington D.C. area 
there are approximately 2,300 Hispanic-owned businesses, 300 owned by Indo-Chi-
nese, 2,000 by Koreans, 500 by Chinese, and 85 to IOO owned by Ethiopians); Matthew 
Schifrin, Horatio Alger Kim, FoRBES, Oct. I7, I988, at 92 (noting that in New York, 
Koreans own 85% of the retail green-grocery business, and in the poorer sections of 
Atlanta, Georgia, Washington D.C., Oakland, California, Newark, New Jersey, Harlem, 
the South Bronx ofNewYork, and the South Side of Chicago, Koreans dominate the 
inner city green-grocery business); Jefferson, supra note I30, at RI3 (discussing the 
role of immigrant credit associations in the revitalization of the Los Angeles metro-
politan area by Chinese immigrants, New York City neighborhoods by Koreans, and 
Westminster, California by Vietnamese); Mark Arax, Pooled Cash of Loan Clubs Key to 
Asian Immigrant Entrepreneurs, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1.988, § 2, at I (explaining that 
pooled cash from loan associations are financing businesses in Chinatown, 
Koreatown, and the Vietnamese business areas of t:Q.e San, Gabriel Valley and Orange 
County, California). 
I32 See LIGHT & BoNACICH, supra note I29, at 26I ("Institutional lenders in the 
United States have never been satisfactory sources of capital for new small busi-
nesses .... Even the Bank of America acknowledged that 'small or embryonic compa-
nies' were 'at the bottom of the financing totem pole' because banks preferred to 
lend to the 'big boys.'"). 
I33 See Christine Gorman, Do-It-Yourself Financing, TIME, July ,25, I988, at 62. Be-
cause rotating credit associations were first observed in less developed economies, it 
was assumed that they were inefficient precursors to full-fledged banks and that with 
economic development, they would be replaced by more sophisticated financial insti-
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farming villages in the sixteenth century.134 Similarly, the Chinese 
hui, which originated in southern China and is founded on kinship, is 
organized by people who come from the same village, lineage, or 
clan.I35 The Japanese system, by contrast, is not based on kinship and 
allows unrelated people from the same district or prefecture in japan 
to participate in the association.l36 The West African esusu has long 
historical roots as well. It was particularly prevalent in the southeast-
ern part of Nigeria, and English-language references to it were made 
as early as 1794.137 
Regardless of cultural origin, rotating credit associations share 
common features. They are designed to serve a social function for 
their members by promoting community cohesiveness, 138 as well as a 
financial function by promoting community economic development. 
Members are organized into a credit group, usually headed by a wo-
man.139 The leader may also act as an organizer and recruiter and 
tutions. See Clifford Geertz, The Rotating Credit Association: A "Middle Rung" in Develop-
ment, 10 EcoN. DEv. & CuLTURAL CHANGE 241, 260 (1962). 
134 See Yoshihashi & Luhman, supra note 131, at A1; see also LIGHT & BoNACICH, 
supra note 129, at 244-45. 
135 See FuKUYAMA, supra note 6, at 300. 
136 See LIGHT, supra note 129, at 27-30. 
137 See id. at 30. Anthgropologists studying the Nigeria's Yoruba people noted: 
There is a society called Esusu. This society deals with monetary matters 
only, and it helps its members to save and raise money thus: Every member 
shall pay a certain fixed sum of money regularly at a fixed time (say every 
fifth or ninth day). And one of the subscribing members shall take the total 
amount subscribed for his or her own personal use. The next subscription 
shall be taken by another member; this shall so continue rotationally until 
every member has taken. 
Id. (quoting A.K. .AjisAFE, LAws AND CusToMs OF THE YoRUBA PEOPLE 48-49 (1924)). 
138 Usually, the person who draws from the pot provides the association members 
with a meal either at her house or at a restaurant. Kye provide more than just finan-
cial bonding; it also provides community bonding, and serves as a netlvork for the 
exchange of business information. See Arax, supra note 131, at 1 (describing a group 
of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam and the group's use of the association for both social 
and investment purposes); Joel Garreau, For Koreans, "Keh" is Key to Success, WASH. 
PoST, Nov. 3, 1991, at B1; Merrill Goozner, Age-Old Tradition Bankrolls Koreans, CHI. 
Trus., July 19, 1987, at C1 (noting the discussion by the president of the Korean-
American Drycleaners Associations of the tlvo objectives of kyes: "' [ t] o obtain capital 
or establish a close intimate friendship among the members'"). 
139 See Garreau, supra note 138, at B1 ("The Keh ... was traditionally a women's 
institution in Korea. This was at least partially because the dirty job of the family 
finance traditionally was perceived as women's work. But it also reflects its traditional 
small-scale use-saving to buy a sewing machine, or stock feed for animals through a 
season."); Gorman, supra note 133, at 62 ("The organizer, who is typically female, 
keeps a record of payments and vouches for newcomers until the club disbands."). 
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selects members, often based on her assessment of their honesty and 
dependability.140 The group decides how much and how often each 
member contributes to the association and the basis on which money 
from the association's pool may be drawn, whether by lottery, need, or 
rotation.141 
Members belong to the association in order to secure a lump sum 
of money from others, all of whom pool resources by paying a stipu-
lated amount into the common pot. The organizer arranges a feast 
for the members and gets the first lump sum, which can be used with-
out restriction or condition. At the next monthly feast given by the 
organizer, the members again contribute the stipulated sum, and de-
pending on how the group has chosen to determine priority or order 
of collection, the person next in line-excluding the organizer who 
has already received the first amount-draws from the pool.142 
There are various methods for determining priority. Members 
may determine priority by lottery143 or simply by need, so that those 
with urgent financial needs may be moved up to the front of the 
line.144 Other credit associations operate on the basis of a bid, and 
members are required to submit sealed bids indicating the interest 
they would be willing to pay. Those willing to pay the highest interest 
would be eligible to receive the lump sum. Under this more competi-
tive system, those who are in financial need would have to compete 
for the cash, while those who have cash surplus would be able to enjoy 
the high interest rates and defer their own collection.145 Among 
Koreans in the United States, for example, the more sophisticated 
k.yes require members to bid for the pool by agreeing to pay a higher 
interest rate in exchange for the right of priority, the right to draw on 
the pool before others.146 Interest payments running as high as 
For an illustrative study of women's moral reasoning as based on connection to 
others and contextual in its moral judgment, see CARoL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT 
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN's DEVELOPMENT (1982). 
140 See Szymanski & Song, supra note 119, at Dl. 
141 See Helen E. Jung, Secret to KOTean Business Success, SEATTI.E TIMES, Dec. 27, 
1992, at All (describing how in rotation kyes, members take turns receiving their 
lump sum, while in bidding kyes members bid and the lowest bidder wins the right to 
draw and the difference between the total amount in the pot and the bid is distrib-
uted to the rest of the members); Sun, supra note 130, at AI. 
142 See LIGHT, supra note 129, at 24. 
143 See, e.g., Goozner, supra note 138, at Cl. 
144 See Gorman, supra note 133, at 62; Sugawara & Tucker, supra note 131, at AI. 
145 See LIGHT, supra note 129, at 24. 
146 See Schifrin, supra note 131, at 92 (noting that members with urgent financial 
needs may bid 15% interest on a $100,000 pool and thus draw only $85,00); Garreau, 
supra note 138 (noting that in the high-stakes business kyes with upper limits of 
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twenty percent would then be deducted from the pool and paid out to 
the other members.147 "Whether by lottery or by bid, under both sce-
narios those who have drawn in the earlier rounds are not qualified to 
draw until every member of the pool has had a chance to collect. Sim-
ilarly, the amount each member contributes, and hence the value of 
the common pool, varies from club to club, depending on the mem-
bers' common understanding. 
From an economic standpoint, rotating credit associations per-
form a valuable dual function. They act not only as a borrowing de-
vice but also as a savings device. In many parts of the world, especially 
the non-Western, noneconomically developed world, rotating credit 
associations have traditionally "served many of the functions of West-
em banks. Such associations are, above all, credit institutions which 
lend lump sums of money to members"148 and have been found to 
"'assist in small scale capital formation.' "149 Those who collect early 
act as borrowers and those who defer borrowing to collect in the later 
rounds act as savers. Thus, rotating credit associations provide credit 
for marginal borrowers150 as well as promote savings by forcing mem-
bers to set aside their monthly contribution. Unlike other nonprofit 
institutions, such as community development banks which are heavily 
subsidized by the public sector, 151 these associations are entirely self-
sustaining and their capital base comes solely from their members' 
$100,000, members may offer to pay more for the right to draw on the pool early); 
Gorman, supra note 133, at 62 (describing associations that operate on an interest 
basis allow bidders who offer the highest interest rate to draw first, although drawers 
may each draw only once, until everyone else has had his or her tum). 
147 See Gorman, supra note 133, at 62. 
148 LIGHT, supra note 129, at 23. A large-scale survey undertaken by the Republic 
of China (Taiwan) Ministry of Justice estimated in 1985 that 85% of the Taiwanese 
population had participated in the "hui." See Jane Kaufman Winn, 25 INT'L LAw 907, 
917 nn.58-59 (citing ROC Ministry of Justice, TaiWan Di Wu MinJian He Hui Xian 
Kuang Zhi YenJiu [Research on the Current Condition of Rotating Credit Clubs in 
Taiwan] (1985)); see also Goozner, supra note 138 ("The Korean kye is a type of rotat-
ing credit system found in many Third World societies with underdeveloped banking 
traditions. Brought to the U.S. by recent immigrants, this cultural tradition-as much 
a social as a business transaction-is helping fuel the remarkable surge of entrepre-
neurship by Asian immigrants, especially Koreans .... "). 
149 LIGHT, supra note 129, at 23 (quoting Shirley Ardenerr, The Comparative Study 
of Rotating Credit Associations, 94J. RoYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 201, 217 (1964)). 
150 Sociologists such as Ivan Light from UCLA have noted the social and economic 
implications of rotating credit associations. "'There is a hole in our financial system 
here at the bottom. Look at the stories in the paper of blacks and Chicanos being 
turned down for mortgages. This shows us how to fill a hole in our system. The poten-
tial implications are very great."' Garreau, supra note 138 (quoting Light). 
151 See infra note 345 and accompanying text. 
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own contributions. In that sense, they promote independence from 
rather than dependence on outside funding. 
Historically, rotating credit associations have been crucial for the 
economic development of immigrant communities in the United 
States, especially because mainstream, majority-owned banks are re-
luctant to lend to low-income communities152 and because minority-
owned banks have had low success rates and, as a result, have been 
undependable sources of credit for minority communities. Although 
134 banks were owned by African-Americans in the United States be-
tween 1884 and 1935, by 1929, only twenty-one had survived, and by 
1945, only eleven, which means a failure rate of approximately ninety-
two percent.I53 Banks owned by Asians in California in the early twen-
tieth century fared even worse, with a failure rate of 100 percent.154 
Mismanagement has been blamed as the predominant reason for the 
recurrent failures of minority-owned banks. A 1910 report of the Cali-
fornia superintendent of banks stated that '"[t]he Japanese banks 
now in liquidation . . . are in very bad condition. . . . Their affairs 
show that they were simply looted.' "155 Banks owned by African-
Americans suffered from similar problems of mismanagement, as well 
as from economic difficulties arising from a lack of investment oppor-
tunities in Mrican-American communities. Banks found themselves 
"in the position of having to stimulate black business in order to de-
velop investment opportunities for themselves,"156 resulting in an in-
terlocking nenvork of cross-ownership by banks in a centrally directed 
"syndicate" of businesses, some of which were unprofitable and re-
quired unsound subsidization by the banks. 
Rotating credit associations, on the other hand, operate on 
wholly different principles. Their social capital base allows them to 
escape the administrative burdens that plague conventional and mi-
nority-based banks, resulting in a decrease in transaction costs in both 
the pre- and post-deal stages. In the United States, both now and in 
the past, these rotating credit associations have been primarily respon-
sible for the proliferation of fledgling small businesses "in cities as 
152 See supra notes 26-31. 
153 See LIGHT, supra note 129, at 46. 
154 See id. Between 1900 and 1920, the Japanese and Chinese opened ten state-
chartered banks in California. By 1910, six had closed, with the remainder closed by 
the mid-1920s. 
155 Id. at 50. Criminal prosecution was hampered by the fact that records were 
incomplete and were in japanese, and by the fact that most of the acts were commit-
ted before the Bank Act of 1910 which made them criminal. See id. 
156 Id. at 53. 
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diverse as Houston, Los Angeles, Chicago and New York."157 In one 
of the earliest references to the practice of relying on informal credit 
mechanisms to capitalize a business, Helen Cather noted, in her 1896 
work on the Chinese in San Francisco, that "' [ t] he Chinese have a 
peculiar method of obtaining funds without going to commercial 
banks. If a responsible Chinaman needs an amount of money, he will 
organize an association, each member of which will promise to pay a 
certain amount on a specified day of each month for a given length of 
time."'I58 Studies of New York's Chinatown revealed that '"[f]ew Chi-
nese utilized American banks' "I59 and that the Chinese routinely used 
rotating credit associations, the membership of which was limited to 
persons from the same village in China, 160 "'to provide capital for fel-
low members who hope to start businesses."'I61 Indeed, "'without 
such societies, very few businesses could be started.' "162 
Surveys conducted from 1965-66 offoreign-bornJapanese in Cal-
ifornia revealed that almost half reported having participated in some 
form of mutual assistance, such as pooling money or drawing from the 
tanomoshi.l63 According to a study published in 1922, mainstream 
financial institutions in California engaged in systematic discrimina-
tion againstJapanese businesspeople and farmers.l 64 The tanomoshi 
became a popular credit device because "'a merchant without security 
[could] thus obtain credit.' "165 "Possibly without a system of coopera-
tive financing," in fact, "the Japanese would not have developed the 
economic structure that they did."166 Similarly, migrants from the 
British West Indies were particularly entrepreneurial when they ar-
rived in the United States in the early 1900s,167 in part because of 
157 Gorman, supra note 133, at 62. 
158 LIGHT, supra note 129, at 25 (quoting Helen F. Clark, The Chinese of New York 
Contrasted with Their Foreign Neighbors, 53 CENTURY llO (1896)). 
159 Id. at 26 (quoting BETIY LEE SuNG, MouNTAIN OF GoLD 141-42 (1967)). 
160 Early on, the Japanese rotating credit association in the United States were 
limited to members who are from the same village in Japan. See id. at 28. 
161 Id. at 26 (quoting Virginia Heyer, Patterns of Social Organization in New York 
City's Chinatown, 60-61 (1953) (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University}). 
162 Id. at 27 (quoting GoR YuN LEONG, CHINATOWN INSIDE OUT 177-78 (1936}). 
163 Id. at 28 (citing John Modell, The Japanese of Los Angeles: A Study on Growth 
and Accommodation, 1900-1946 (1969) (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University}). 
164 See id. at 29 (quoting Schichiro Matsui, Economic Aspects of the Japanese Situ-
ation in California, 86-87 (1922) (M.A. thesis, University of California, Berkeley)). 
165 Id. 
166 I d. (quoting S.F. Miyamoto, Social Solidarity Among the Japanese in Seattle, 11 UNI-
VERSITY OF WASHINGTON PUBLICATIONS IN THE Soc. SCI, 75 (1939)). 
167 West Indians "'are forever launching out in business, and such retail busi-
nesses as are in the hands of Negroes in Harlem are largely in the control of the 
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their reliance on "the traditional susu credit institution as a savings 
device."168 
Although participation in rotating credit associations is wide-
spread among various immigrant communities, few participants are 
willing to discuss their involvement on the record, 169 partly out of fear 
that such associations are either outright illegal or in a dubiously gray 
zone.170 Nonetheless, it has been estimated that eighty percent of Ko-
rean households in the United States belong to at least one kye,171 
with approximately $100 million tied up at any one time in kyes in the 
Washington, D.C., area alone.I72 Seventy-seven percent of the entre-
preneur members of the Korean American Garment Industry Associa-
tion had participated in a kye upon immigrating to the United 
States.173 Kyes in the Washington state region may constitute an ap-
proximately $120 million annual regional economy.l74 Ethiopian im-
migrants without access to formal credit have similarly resorted to the 
foreign-born.'" LIGHT, supra note 129, at 33 (quoting W.A. Domingo, The Tropics in 
New Yoffl, SURVEY, March 1, 1925, at 648-50. 
168 Id. at 33; see also id. at 34-35. The survival of this traditional African institution 
in the West Indies but not in the United States has been partially explained by the fact 
that "[a]ll-black Caribbean islands were hospitable to the perpetuation of African cul-
tural traditions such as the esusu. The outnumbered and subdued blacks in the 
southern portion of the United States confronted much more formidable barriers to 
the perpetuation of African cultural traits." Id. at 38. In other words, the economic 
dependence of whites in the British Caribbean on the economy of the slaves meant 
that the latter were able to maintain economic autonomy in a way not possible in the 
United States. See id. at 38-41. 
169 See, e.g., Szymanski & Song, supra note 119 ("Numerous kye participants in the 
Tacoma area declined to talk about their investments in interviews for this story .... 
[and] shroud their participation from everyone but fellow investors or close family 
members."); Arax, supra note 131, § 2 at 1 ("The subterranean nature of loan clubs 
makes it impossible to quantify their influence. Few members are willing to talk about 
their participation and even fewer want their names used."). 
170 See infra note 301; see also, e.g., Szymanski & Song, supra note 119 (participants 
may not report interest income, if any, from kyes, and fear Internal Revenue Service 
scrutiny). 
171 See Garreau, supra note 138, at Bl ("Koreans are by no means the only immi-
grants whose culture features rotating credit associations. Ethiopians, West Africans, 
Central Americans and Caribbean blacks all have similar popular folk institu-
tions, ... as do Chinese, Vietnamese and Japanese. But no immigrant group in the 
Washington area has so systematically and successfully translated their gains into en-
trepreneurial enterprise."); see also Rhonda Richards, Two Sides of the American Dream, 
USA TODAY, May 12, 1992, at lB. 
172 See Garreau, supra note 138, at Bl. 
173 See jefferson, supra note 130, at Rl3; Arax, supra note 131, § 2 at 1 (citing a 
1987 study by Ivan Light, a sociology professor). 
174 See Szymanski & Song, supra note 119, at Dl. 
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ekub, a "mutual assistance savings plan to which members contribute 
a set amount of money each week. "175 "[W] hile the American saying 
is that lending money to a friend is the most effective way to end a 
friendship, the Ethiopians . . . say that the willingness to lend money 
is, in fact, a test of friendship. "176 The principle of trust around which 
rotating credit associations are organized is itself "faithful to the Latin 
from which 'credit' derives: credere-'to believe."'177 
Trust makes it possible for members of rotating credit association 
to take on the commitment to adhere to group norms, including its 
"no law" understanding. As "informal, small-scale banks organized 
primarily by immigrants to help one another ... , [the associations] 
operate outside regular U.S. banking laws and safeguards."178 The 
groups determine their own rules outside the framework of formal 
laws or regulation. Contracts are not written and there are no loan 
agreements. The associations function strictly on "an unwritten 
honor code."179 Money deposited into the associations is not backed 
by deposit insurance. There are no processing, accounting, or legal 
fees associated with conventional bank loans. Nor are collateral or 
credit checks required. 18o 
Such a high level of trust is possible partly because of "preexisting 
social ties based on kinship or geographic residence in the native 
country"181 and because of a long tradition against subjecting commu-
nity practices to the framework of public law. Studies found that the 
esusu practiced by descendants of West Mrican slaves in the British 
Bahamas in 1910 operated entirely outside the realm of formal laws. 
"These 'Asu' have no written statutes or regulations, no regular of-
ficers, but carry on their affairs without fraud or miscalculation."182 
Norms of trust and reciprocity make cooperation possible and en-
sure that the borrower honors her obligation to repay by continuing 
to contribute regular sums into the pool until every member has had 
175 Sugawara & Tucker, supra note 131, at Al. 
176 /d.; see also Sun, supra note 130, at Al. 
177 David Bornstein, The Barefoot Bank with Cheek, ATLANTIC MoNTHLY, Dec. 1995, 
at 40. 
178 Gorman, supra note 133, at 62. 
179 Szymanski & Song, supra note 119, at Dl. 
180 Garreau, supra note 138, at Bl. The principles that govern these associations 
are not much different from those that govern transactions among jewish merchants 
in New York's diamond industry. Among diamond dealers in the industry, a hand-
shake along with the words "mazel u'broche" constitutes a binding agreement. See 
Bernstein, opting Out, supra note 97, at 121. 
181 FuKUYAMA, supra note 6, at 301. 
182 LIGHT, supra note 129, at 32 (quoting HARRY H. joHNSON, THE NEGRO IN THE 
NEw WoRLD 303 (1910)). 
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an opportunity to draw. Every member of the rotating credit associa-
tion must be secure in the knowledge that all others "will continue to 
show up and pay their share every month, long after they have re-
ceived their own payoff''183-in other words, that a common interest 
in group incentive and deterrence will provide borrowers with the mo-
tivation to repay. 
Additionally, since reputational sanctions represent an important 
source of norm enforcement, 184 shaming has been used as a particu-
larly effective enforcement mechanism in a variety of settings, for ex-
ample, in transactions among Orthodox Jewish dealers in the 
diamond industry of New York City. The Diamond Dealers Club by-
laws provide that '" [a]ll decisions of arbitration panels ... which are 
not complied with within 10 working days, together with the picture of 
the non-complying member, shall be posted in a conspicuous place in 
the Club rooms.' "185 Similarly, members of an Ethiopian ekub claim 
that "'it's easier to commit suicide'" than to renege because loss of 
community standing is "'not like credit. It won't clear after seven 
years.' "186 Because rotating credit associations are embedded in the 
community, default would result in expulsion from the association, 
resulting in "shame on not just the individual, but that person's fam-
ily. It likely would lead to difficulty in getting a job [in the commu-
nity] or even getting a marriage partner."187 When a member who 
has already borrowed can no longer contribute to the pool because of 
financial difficulties, it is understood that the association member 
"will go to great lengths to borrow the money from a friend or relative 
or another member of the keh, or persuade someone else to take his 
183 Garreau, supra note 138, at Bl. 
184 See supra notes 112-23. 
185 Bernstein, opting Out, supra note 97, at 128. Arbitrators who resolve disputes 
among diamond dealers may also invoke a proceeding in Jewish rabbinical courts 
against the party who refuses to comply with the arbitrators' decision. "Because these 
courts have the authority to ban an individual from participation in the Jewish com-
munity, this is a powerful threat against Orthodox members of the diamond indus-
try." ld. at 130. Arguably this level of formality is much greater than the sanctioning 
norms subscribed by less decentralized groups such as rotating credit associations. See 
Chamy, supra note 77, at 1841-42. 
186 Sun, supra note 130, at AI. 
187 Garreau, supra note 138, at Bl. In instances of default, the organizer of the 
club, who is given some rights and privileges-for example, either the right to draw 
first, or the privilege of receiving the loan interest free-is usually held responsible 
for covering the club's losses. See Gorman, supra note 133, at 62. Where individual 
club members do not have personal connections with one another, their decision to 
join the club is based primarily on the organizer's reputation. 
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place in the keh-anything rather than default."188 As a member of 
the Korean Association of Greater Washington remarked, "'If you owe 
to someone personally, you will work the rest of your life to exonerate 
yourself .... It's a matter of face. The family name would go down the 
drain forever.' "189 
Such duty-imposing norms make it possible for systems that oper-
ate outside the framework of the open market and public law to ftmc-
tion effectively. It is often assumed that the market and market 
institutions are determined more by the establishment of legal institu-
tions, such as property and contract laws, than by development and 
"accumulation of social capital."190 Yet, even in robust, well-function-
ing markets, contract law and the open market cannot solve all market 
difficulties.191 Other factors may need to be taken into consideration, 
for example, how certain norms further the production of social capi-
taP92 and what role social capital has in shaping economic behavior 
and in facilitating, with minimal transaction costs, the formation and 
enforcement of other types of socially useful community contracts. As 
I demonstrate below, norms that promote a wealth of social capital 
also translate into a concrete system of group information exchange 
that facilitates mutual screening, monitoring, and enforcement, which 
in turn lowers transaction costs and facilitates the formation of an al-
ternative community market for credit. 
B. Information Asymmetries, Transaction Costs, and Rotating 
Credit Associations 
Through an overarching regime of informal community norms, 
the borrowers that the formal economy has deemed not to be 
creditworthy193 are granted access to credit from lenders who rely on 
188 Garreau, supra note 138, at Bl. 
189 ld. 
190 FuKUYAMA, supra note 6, at 11. 
191 See supra Part I. 
192 One of the main themes of this Article is that the law should not operate in a 
way that results in the destruction of social capital. See infra Part IV. For an analysis of 
how social capital can be destroyed by law, see Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of 
Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2055, 2062-63 (1996). 
193 "For Roscas [rotating savings and credit associations] ... to operate success-
fully it is necessary that individuals keep their commitment to pay into the Rosca after 
they have won the pot. This may appear problematic since Rosca members are often 
not able to borrow in conventional credit markets precisely because they cannot be 
presumed to repay such loans." Timothy Besley et al., The Economics of Rotating 
Savings and Credit Associations, Research Program in Development Studies, Wood-
row Wilson School of Public and Intemational Affairs, Princeton University, Discus-
sion Paper No. 149, May 1990, at 3. 
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custom and usage, not state law, to ensure repayment and to resolve 
disputes among community members. By relying on the borrowers 
themselves to screen, monitor, and enforce group loans, the associa-
tion in essence relies on the actors who have the necessary informa-
tional advantage. Rather than being a perversion or avoidance of the 
open market, rotating credit associations are an instance of private 
ordering or community market that allows members to contract back 
into community-embedded relationships in order to lower transaction 
costs and generate economic exchanges which the open market could 
not rationally accommodate. 
As my discussion demonstrates, seemingly mundane practices, 
such as those adopted by rotating credit association members, impli-
cate major, age-old issues in social and political theory. Since Hobbes 
identified the problem of social disorder, 194 many theories have been 
offered to explain how to avoid the state of nature in which covenants 
are routinely broken and property rights are routinely invaded. Ac-
cording to social contract theory, in a state of nature, whenever two 
people enter into an agreement they always face at least two choices, 
whether to keep or break the agreement. To minimize uncertainty 
and to ensure that contracts entered into will be kept, both parties, 
the theory maintains, will choose to cooperate by entering into a so-
cial contract to establish a state that will maintain order and enforce 
the rules of the game.195 The state thus emerges as an antidote to the 
state of nature and as a central source of law and order. 
Since then, modem social theory has questioned whether social 
order is a product of deliberate design 196 or whether it may also 
194 See THoMAS HoBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard Tucked., 1991) (1651). 
195 See JAMES M. BuCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LmER'IY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIA-
THAN (1975). 
196 See 1 FA HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBER'IY: RuLES AND ORDER 8-34 
(1973). According to Hayek, the "view ... that human institutions will serve human 
purposes only if they have been deliberately designed for these purposes," id. at 8, can 
be traced to Rene Descartes' view of reason and rational action. As Hayek stated, 
[s]ince for Descartes reason was defined as logical deduction from explicit 
premises, rational action also came to mean only such action as was deter-
mined entirely by known and demonstrable truth ... and that therefore 
everything to which man owes his achievements is a product of his reasoning 
thus conceived .... The 'rationalist' approach ... produced a renewed pro-
pensity to ascribe the origin of all institutions of culture to invention or de-
sign. . . . This intentionalist or pragmatic account of history found its fullest 
expression in the conception of the formation of society by a social contract, 
first in Hobbes and then in Rousseau, who in many respects was a direct 
follower of Descartes. 
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emerge by social evolution197 through decentralized but loosely coor-
dinated and repeated interactions among individuals and groups. 
Given the high cost of protecting against opportunistic behavior, busi-
nesses have resorted to vertical integration and long-term contracts to 
protect against opportunism and to lower transaction costs.198 As Part 
II demonstrates, it is also possible for order to arise spontaneously 
from repeated and cooperative interactions among private groups. 
Where exchanges are personalized, "the costs of contracting are em-
bedded within repeat dealings and personal knowledge of the per-
formers; and as a consequence, the costs of contracting and 
enforcement are lower than in impersonal exchange, when one must 
specify as precisely as possible the nature of the exchange and the 
enforcement procedures."199 Thus, order is maintained via a private 
ordering of cooperative interactions that in tum minimizes opportu-
nistic behaviors. 
Under conditions of high uncertainty, such as information asym-
metry and enforcement difficulties involved in lending to marginal 
Id. at 10. For a discussion of Cartesian rationalism, see G. DE RuGIERO, HISTORY OF 
EuROPEAN LIBERALISM 21 (R.G. Collingw·ood trans., 1927); HJ. LAsKI, STUDIES IN LAw 
AND POLITICS 20 (1922). 
197 See 1 HAYEK, supra note 196, at 146-47. Hayek attributes the evolutionary ap-
proach to the English common law tradition as expounded by Matthew Hale. Under 
this view, 
orderliness of society which greatly increased the effectiveness of individual 
action was not due solely to institutions and practices which had been in-
vented or designed for that purpose, but was largely due to a process de-
scribed at first as 'growth' and later as "evolution," a process in which 
practices which had first been adopted for other reasons, or even purely 
accidentally, were preserved because they enabled the group in which they 
had arisen to prevail over others. 
. . . . It came increasingly to be seen that the formation of regular patterns 
in human relations that were not the conscious aim of human actions raised 
a problem which required the development of a systematic social theory .... 
Id. at 9, 22. Such theory was provided by Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson in the 
field of economics and Edmund Burke in political theory. Wilhelm von Humboldt 
and F.C. von Savigny systematically applied the evolutionary approach to social phe-
nomena, and Savigny's follower, Sir Henry Maine, applied it to the social sciences. 
198 See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, supra note 86. Oliver Williamson and Douglass North are 
some of the leading proponents of new institutional economics, see supra note 86, 
termed "new" to distinguish it from an earlier school of economics led by John R. 
Commons and Thorstein Veblen which had also analyzed institutions. See, e.g., JOHN 
R. COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: ITs PLACE IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1934); 
THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (1912). 
199 Douglass North, The New Institutional Economics, 142 J. OF INSTITUTIONAL & THE-
ORETICAL ECON. 230, 230-37 (1986). 
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borrowers, trust, identity, and "social and ethical behavioral norms in-
fluence the costs of contracting,"200 and are especially important de-
vices for overcoming information costs201 that impair the 
performance of markets. 
The dissemination of information "has important public goods 
attributes"2°2 and "reduces the transactions costs attributable to asym-
metric information."203 Norms "embody and convey information,"204 
including information about community expectations and community 
sanctions. Members of the association have access to the community's 
reservoir of information, share a common understanding of the com-
munity's social meanings, and rely on the ~ommunity's interpretive 
traditions to facilitate their individual and collective ends. In these 
closely knit communities, both predeal information gathering and 
postdeal enforcement will be relatively friction-free and cheap. Con-
sequently, this bottom-up, decentralized approach to lending is partic-
ularly effective for small loans, especially uncollateralized ones, that 
formal lenders find inefficient to lend and administer. 205 
200 Id. 
201 See NEIL K KoMESAR, CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAw, EcoNOMICS, AND PUBuc 
PouCY 101-03, 115-21 (1994). Professor Komesar singles out information costs as a 
particularly significant cause of problems in decisionmaking, in the market, in the 
political and judicial processes. See George A Akerlof, The Market far 'Lemon': Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcoN. 488 (1970). Information asymme-
tries between buyer and seller may produce a "lemons" problem with dangerous prod-
ucts, driving safe ones out of the market. If safe products sell for a higher price 
because they are more expensive to produce and if consumers cannot tell the differ-
ence bet\Veen safe and unsafe products, safe products will be priced out of the mar-
ket. Information asymmetry between the producer and the consumer, in which the 
former has information while the latter does not, lets "lemons" dominate the market. 
For an analysis of the negative impact information on economic actors in this case, 
see generally Steve Salop, Informatirm and Market Structure: Informatirm and Mrmopolistic 
Competition, 66 AM. EcoN. REv. 240 (1976). 
202 Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Efficient Scope of Private Transactions-Cost-Reducing 
Institutions: The Successes and Failures of Commodity Exchanges, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 229, 241 
(1995). 
203 Id. at 242. 
204 Katz, supra note 19, at 1749. 
205 Mutual screening and monitoring are easier and more cost-effective in smaller 
groups than in larger groups. See] oseph Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Peer Mrmitoring and 
Credit Markets, 4 WoRLD BANK EcoN. REv., 351, 351-66 (1990). 
There is a rise in what has been called "affinity fraud," that is, con artists using 
commonality of ethnic, religious, career, or community-based groups to swindle vic-
tims out of their savings by pitching, often through the telephone, nonexisting busi-
ness opportunities or selling unregistered securities to unsophisticated buyers. See 
Affinity Fraud: Beware of Swindlers Who Claim Loyalty to Your Group, <http:/ I 
www.nasaa.org/investoredu/investoralerts/ethnicaffinity.html>; Susan,Antilla, 'Affin-
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By virtue of their structure and operational norms, rotating 
credit associations contain certain built-in mechanisms that provide 
informational remedies to lower screening costs that have constrained 
banks in the formal sector. Rather than rely on the formal market as 
the site of rational economic behavior, rotating credit associations rely 
on social norms and personalistic transactions embedded within the 
community itself to act as built-in information-gathering devices, thus 
bypassing informational hurdles in the open market. 206 
Little, if any, information asymmetry exists between the rotating 
credit association and its members. The group has ample information 
concerning the identity, history, and background of its members at its 
disposal. Indeed, perhaps even more so than formal banking institu-
tions, because the effectiveness of rotating credit associations is espe-
cially dependent on extralegal norms, access to information on the 
identity and trustworthiness of its members is crucial. "In a market 
where enforcement depends on social ostracism or reputational dam-
age, the formation of an extralegal contract depends on information 
about reputation"2°7 and functions essentially as a very low-cost substi-
tute for the formality of legally sanctioned contracts. 
In addition to lowering screening costs, the same social and cul-
tural factors, such as ethnicity, identity, and community, also allow the 
association to monitor borrowers; in this case, more perfect informa-
tion serves as a substitute for traditional collateral and other security 
devices required by formal lenders. Principal-agent literature is re-
plete with observations about the costs that principals must assume in 
order to monitor the actions of their agents. 2os However, while it may 
ity' Scamsters Betray Trust Based on Ethnic, Religious Links, N.Y. OBSERVER, Dec. 29, 1997 
at 1; David R. Sands, In the Land of the Free: Con Artists Show Affinity for Ripping of their 
Own, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1991, at A13. The issues that make such incidents of 
fraud possible, however, are not present in rotating credit associations. The latter are 
based not just on a general and abstract claim of common ethnicity, but rather on 
personalized trust founded on membership in a small circle of common culture and 
ethnicity. 
206 See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text. 
207 Bernstein, opting Out, supra note 97, at 133. 
208 The separation of ownership and control in a large firm creates agency 
problems because the modern corporation is run not by the owners and shareholders 
but by their agents and managers, whose goals may not coincide with those of the 
owners and shareholders. See ADoLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANs, THE MoD-
ERN CoRPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPER'IY (1932). This principal-agent problem cre-
ates various agency costs. According to Jensen and Meckling, agency costs are the 
totality of "1) the monitoring expenditures of the principal, 2) the bonding expendi-
tures by the agent, and 3) the residual loss." Michael C. Jensen & William Meckling, 
Theory of the Finn: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. OF FIN. 
EcoN., 305, 308 (1976). Residual loss is loss resulting from potentials not realized due 
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be costly for principals to monitor the actions of their agents, other 
monitoring mechanisms allow the agents to monitor themselves or 
each other at comparatively lower costs. 209 Rotating credit associa-
tions directly address and alleviate the high costs of monitoring 
caused by asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. 
Bottom-up peer monitoring, one of the' key features of rotating credit 
associations, allows those in the best position to monitor the borrower 
to do this monitoring themselves. 
This concept is essentially based on one of joint liability. In rotat-
ing credit associations, there are two layers of monitoring, first from 
the organizer and second from the members themselves. The associa-
tion's organizer, who is also a member of the group, acts as the guar-
antor for the group and monitors the group as a whole, as well as each 
rotating borrower. When members of a rotating credit association do 
not all know each other, they rely on the organizer, who has the infor-
mational advantage, to testify to the t:Iustworthiness of those invited to 
participate in the association. The organizer acts to screen members, 
as well as to monitor their performance. 210 The organizer is liable if a 
member who has collected from the pool defects from the group and 
refuses to deposit her share in the next round of contribution, or ad-
ditionally, if a member who has not borrowed yet cannot come up 
with her share on time for another to draw on. 211 
to the inability of principals to provide the correct incentives for agents because the 
agents' actions cannot be observable. See also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, 
Separation of Ownership and Contra~ 26 J.L. & EcoN. 301, at 301 (1983); R. Rees, The 
Theory of Principal and Agent, Part I, 37 BULL. EcoN. REs., 1, 3-26 (1985). 
209 See Hal R. Varian, Monitoring Agents with Other Agents, 146 J. INSTITUTIONAL AND 
THEORETICAL ECON. 153, at 153 (1990). 
210 The organizer may select members based on their reputation for honesty and 
dependability. See Szymanski & Song, supra note 119, at Dl. ("The kyejoo [orga-
nizer] has heavy responsibility for the kye's success. He or she keeps any records, 
collects monthly payments and distributes the monthly pot."). A similar concept is 
also used in the heavily Orthodoxjewish diamond industry in New York, where bro-
kers are used "to gather information about individuals' reputations for trustworthi-
ness at a lower effective cost than individual buyers and sellers because a broker's 
investment is less transaction specific." Bernstein, opting Out, supra note 97, at 133. 
211 SeeArax, supra note 131, § 2, at 1 ("The master picks or clears all members and 
therefore must cover all defaults."); Gorman, supra note 133, at 62 (organizer held 
responsible for covering club's losses in cases of default). Similar principles also gov-
ern the extralegal contractual relations in the diamond industry. The New York Dia-
mond Dealers Club, for example, which has its own private regime of rules to govern 
relationships among its members, requires out of town dealers to be "sponsored" by 
members before admission to the trading hall. A member in good standing must 
agree "to assume 'full financial responsibility (guarantee) for the out of town dealer's 
890 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW (VOL. 74:3 
Consequently, the organizer performs the role of information 
gatherer and processor before including potential members in the 
pool and continues to monitor the member during the economic life 
of the pool. The joint liability rules of the association induce the orga-
nizer to utilize community knowledge to ascertain each member's 
creditworthiness, social assets, and social traits; in other words, the 
member's social collateral.212 Because identity and trust matter and 
act as low-cost signals for minimizing risks in exchange relations, the 
screening and monitoring costs incurred by the organizer, herself a 
member of the community, are relatively lower than the costs that 
conventional banks would incur to assess lending risk and borrowers' 
creditworthiness. "Trust is an important lubricant of a social sys-
tem"213 and is itself a "commodit[y] [with] ... real, practical, eco-
nomic value."214 
The second layer of monitoring comes from the group itself 
which, by its selection or approval of members, functions on the basis 
of mutual accountability and acts as an internal monitoring mecha-
nism of itself and its members. The group will have better informa-
tion about its members than a financial institution. The fact that the 
group itself is composed of members from the same community allows 
the group to resort to "group incentive mechanisms"215 to engage in 
mutual monitoring. Presumably, on the basis of self-selection, mem-
bers would agree to form a rotating credit association with other 
members only if they are satisfied that others are relatively good credit 
risks and thus would require relatively minimal monitoring. That any 
member who has drawn from the pool could theoretically stop her 
own contribution to the pool means that members choose to interact 
with each other only on the assumption that each member's internal-
ization of community norms and/ or community constraints, such as 
reputational sanctions, are sufficient to minimize opportunistic behav-
ior. In other words, each person agrees to participate only if she can 
trust that the other person-as each others' and the group's agent-
acts and liabilities, incurred while on the premises of the DDC.'" Bernstein, opting 
Out, supra note 97, at 119 n.5 (quoting the Diamond Dealers Club Bylaws). 
212 See, for example, Magagnini, supra note 130, at B1, for an interview of a 
Cambodian immigrant who said many Cambodians belong to the credit association 
"'because we cannot go to the bank. We don't have anything (as collateral). But 
there has to be trust. If someone cannot pay, my dad (as the dealer) has to come up 
with the money. You must play with people in business where their word is good as 
gold.'" 
213 KENNETH]. ARRow, THE LIMITS oF ORGANIZATION 23 (1974). 
214 !d. 
215 Varian, supra note 209, at 155. 
Iggg) LOOKING AT COMMUNITIES AND MARKETS 8gl 
will act as good agents. "If there is no cost to locating good 
agents ... , then the agents will certainly find it in their interest to 
only group themselves with good agents."2I6 
The high costs of enforcement have also posed a significant barrier 
to the development of a formal capital market for low-income borrow-
ers and low-income communities. The institutional arrangements 
supporting rotating credit, however, are markedly different from 
those that underlie conventional banking practices because they rely 
on both internal compliance as well as group-based, self-enforcement 
schemes to ensure repayment by borrowers. First, a group member, 
more likely than not, has internalized the group's norms and hence is 
more likely to comply with the rules of the game. Second; that the 
"lender" is the group of which the borrower is a member also in-
creases compliance and hence the likelihood of repayment because the 
loan commitment is not to an outsider or an impersonal, distant 
lender such as a bank, but to a member of the community and the 
group. Although it is essentially a business institution designed to 
provide credit to members in need of capital, the rotating credit asso-
ciation is also a community-based endeavor that functions in the same 
way that the Diamond Dealers Club in New York functions-as "an 
old-fashioned mutual-aid society."217 If loan delinquency occurs, it 
would not be merely an instance of external loan delinquency but 
rather delinquency against the entire group, and consequently against 
the social fabric of the group and the community of which the group 
is a part, in which case the group as well £1$ the larger community 
could sanction delinquent borrowers by imposing social penalties, 
such as moral persuasion and ostracism. 
By relying on the logic of norms and the claims of community, 
rotating credit associations are able to correct informational asymme-
tries21S inherent in standard lender-borrower relationships and thus 
minimize the high transaction costs inherent in formal lending to re-
solve the central paradox that the formal sector has yet to resolve: 
216 ld. at 160. 
217 Bernstein, opting Out, supra note 97, at 139 (The club "provides kosher restau-
rants for its members. A Jewish health organization provides emergency medical serv-
ices, and social committees are organized by neighborhood to visit sick members and 
their families. There is a synagogue on the premises, and contributions to a benevo-
lent fund are required."). 
218 But correcting informational asymmetries through the provision of informa-
tion may not be possible or worthwhile if, as Professor Sunstein noted, it is too costly. 
See Cass R Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REv. 653, 665-67 (1993). High cost would not be an issue in the case of 
rotating credit associations. 
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establishing a market for loans to borrowers who possess none of the 
conventional criteria used by banks to determine creditworthiness. 
IV. OPEN MARKETs AND CoMMUNITY MARKETs 
If social capital is related to economic efficiency and if social soli-
darity lowers the cost of borrowing for rotating credit association 
members, the next question is how to preserve a community lawmak-
ing system that produces a significant social benefit with little, if any, 
social cost. 
In Part A, I examine the role of the state in general and courts in 
particular in furthering or enforcing community norms. My argu-
ment is that the state should refrain from interfering with the func-
tion of rotating credit associations. In this respect, I argue for a 
judicial policy of "community nonjusticiability"219 favoring dismissal of 
cases involving disputes between or among community members. In 
the alternative, if and when, in certain limited circumstances, judicial 
resolution is appropriate, the court should decide the dispute under 
standard contract law by enforcing the parties' understanding of com-
munity norms and custom. Part A examines rotating credit associa-
tions and argues that an incentive structure arising from an 
aggregation of interests among members serves to maximize group 
welfare and minimize group abuse, making the case for judicial appli-
cation of group norms most persuasive. 
In Part B, beyond the issue of exploring whether, under what cir-
cumstances, and to what extent the state should defer to and enforce 
private custom, I also examine how socially efficient and wealth-maxi-
mizing norms that emerge from a community market can be pro-
moted. For example, how can banks incorporate some of the 
efficiency benefits of rotating credit associations? And can state-pro-
moted entities, such as community development banks, replicate the 
structural benefits of rotating credit associations? 
A. Community Nonjusticiability and Community Norms 
It is not uncommon for private groups to insist on the exclusivity 
of their own dispute resolution mechanisms by prohibiting members 
from resorting to formallitigation.220 Perhaps due to the strength of 
219 See infra note 228 and accompanying text. 
220 See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 97, at 1788; see also Bernstein, opting 
Out, supra note 97, at 124-27, 134 ("Rational transactors might deliberately leave as-
pects of their contracting relationship to be governed, in whole or in part, by extrale-
gal commitments and sanctions."). An analogous situation can be drawn to certain 
business sectors-the securities industry, for example-that require members to sub-
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community norms against resorting to judicial resolution of disputes, 
there have been very few reported lawsuits brought by rotating credit 
association members. 221 In addition, enforcement of private arrange-
ments is rarely accomplished by litigation because of high costs and 
because "parties are rarely willing to pay the reputational price of vio-
lating [the] norm [of secrecy] simply to gain access to the courts."222 
Nonetheless, there have been some disputes where the plaintiff has 
ignored the group's "no law'' understanding and asked the court for 
relief. 
One of the factors to be considered by judges and other deci-
sionmakers in evaluating whether to use formal laws and their own 
cost-benefit analysis, or defer to the community's informal norms in 
resolving community-based disputes, is the normative component of 
the community custom at issue. A business norm may emerge from 
an industry and govem solely the relations among members within 
the community. At some point, however, community rules may push 
beyond the boundaries of the private order and intersect with public 
law, for example, when insiders look to the apparatus of the state to 
resolve their disputes. Then it is appropriate to ask what the response 
of the state should be. On the one hand, one may question whether 
certain behaviors that may constitute norms, for example, norms of 
racial discrimination223 or price-fixing, should be encouraged and en-
mit to arbitration and the industry's arbitration rules as the exclusive mode of dispute 
resolution. As a general rule, courts have upheld the parties' forum selection clauses. 
See, e.g., MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. I (1972); Carnival Cruise 
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); see also Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (upholding arbitration clauses). For a discussion of 
how norms are relied upon by merchants in industries that ordinarily shun formal 
adjudication, see Robert Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. 
L. REv. 2005, 2040-42 (1987). 
Some industries such as the grain industry even prefer that courts enforce formal 
rules and do not attempt to discern and enforce the business norms of grain 
merchants, for fear that courts will be unable to understand the norms they seek to 
enforce. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 97, at 1796-1807. 
221 A search through the state and federal court databases reveals one reported 
case in 1928 in Honolulu. See Choi Hey lin v. Shin Sung Yil, 30 Haw. 606 (Haw. 1928). 
There are discussions of and references to disputes and law suits among rotating 
credit associations members in the popular press. See, e.g., Szymanski & Song, supra 
note 119, at Dl. However, none of the suits has resulted in any reported decision 
except one in Los Angeles. 
222 Bernstein, opting Out, supra note 97, at 135. 
223 The issues surrounding possible claims of racial discrimination arising out of 
rotating credit associations are complex. They are derived from community cohesive-
ness and to a large extent, homogeneity. Inclusion of insiders often involve exclusion 
of outsiders. Suppose a non-Vietnamese sued under the civil rights laws, such as 
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forced by the state.224 Custom, therefore, cannot be decisive at all 
times. 
On the other hand, when private communities have a compara-
tive advantage over both formal markets and governmental institu-
tions and produce rules that are both wealth-maximizing and 
efficient, the social capital base of such communities should be pre-
served. In that case, when disputes arise between community mem-
bers over community norms and members tum to neutral third-party 
arbiters, such as courts, for resolution, what courts should not do is 
engage in decisionmaking that destroys the community's social capital 
base. A recent court decision dismissing a case on the basis that a 
Korean kye was an illegal lottery225 and that the participant's debt 
therefore could not be collected in an American court is an example 
of ill-considered judicial action that shapes economic preferences in a 
way that may lead to the distortion of community markets. Although 
the result is defensible, the reasoning is starkly misconceived. My pro-
posal is as follows. As a general rule, a court should abstain by adopt-
ing a "hands-off, nonjusticiability" posture. Or alternatively, under 
exceptional circumstances when it decides to hear the case, it should 
attempt to locate or discover group norms-find the law, in other 
words-and defer to such norms in the resolution of group dis-
putes,226 especially when "the gain from better enforcement exceeds 
the cost of formalization."227 
Under the first possible scenario, a court should abstain from en-
tertaining the case pursuant to a "community nonjusticiability" ap-
proach. "Community nonjusticiability" makes sense because it is 
§ 1981, claiming a race-based exclusion from a Vietnamese rotating credit associa-
tion? Besides the statutory and constitutional issues, one may also ask how a liberal 
society that promotes liberal values of inclusion and heterogeneity should accomo-
date community enclaves that are premised upon nonliberal values of exclusion and 
homogeneity? These issues will be addressed in a forthcoming article. 
224 See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 2, at 1694-96. For a discussion of how law should 
treat private preferences, when to ratify preferences and when to reject preferences, 
see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 1129 (1986); Robin L. West, Taking Preferences Seriously, 64 TuL. L. REv. 659 
(1990). 
Nor are all norms efficient in all cases. Examples include norms of honesty 
which "interfere with efficiency by preventing people from exploiting their invest-
ments in private information." Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 
144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697, 1705 (1996) (citing AnthonyT. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, 
Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17-18 (1978) ). 
225 See infra note 302 and accompanying text. 
226 See ELUCKSON, supra note 78, at 283; Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 
YALE LJ. 1315, 1320-21 (1993). 
227 Cooter, supra note 2, at 1684. 
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worse for courts to apply the wrong norms than not to hear the case at 
all, as the former could result in a distortion of efficient community 
norms228 and hence endanger the community's repository of social 
capital. 229 
Superimposing formal adjudicatory devices on informal commu-
nity devices would undermine the very community norms that give 
community-based exchanges certain comparative advantages over 
open market exchanges. The possibility that the entire panoply of law 
backed by a formal judicial process lurks behind every rotating credit 
association will result in the transformation of its very essence-
founded on a commitment to informality, community, and flexibility. 
As Professor Walter Weyrauch has observed in his study of the law of 
small groups, every small group produces its own background norms 
of operating principles and, through its own group dynamics, gener-
ates rules of conduct for its members. 230 Professor Weyrauch found in 
his study that the rules of the group are not to be articulated and 
indeed that if a rule is articulated, either accidentally or deliberately, 
it will be discarded. Thus, "If the new rules are formally articulated as 
changes, so that participants become fully conscious of the fact that 
changes are taking place, then those changes might be rejected."231 
The act of articulation itself effects a change in group behavior. 
Similarly, the act of formalizing an informal norm, through the 
introduction of rights language, will effect a change in community in-
teraction, as formalization of informality through the force of state law 
will destroy the social capital base of trust that makes informality possi-
228 Not all norms are fair or efficient. Fairness and efficiency are strong reasons 
for judicial deference to norms. For a discussion of a "structural approach" where 
courts would decide whether to enforce a social norm by inquiring into its underlying 
incentives, see Cooter, supra note 2. 
229 See infra notes 288-303 and accompanying text. Judge Edward M. Ross's deci-
sion in the Superior Court of California holding that a kye is a lottery demonstrates a 
complete misunderstanding of the workings of a kye. As noted by Ivan Light, the 
decision "highlights the difficulty that American law encounters when attempting to 
digest foreign savings and credit institutions like the kye." Ivan Light, Lending Support 
to Kyes, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993, at 22. 
230 See Walter 0. Weyrauch, The 'Basic Law' or 'Constitution' of a SmaU Group,]. Soc. 
IssUES, Mar. 1971, at 49, 53, 59, reprinted in LAw, juSTICE AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN Socr-
E'IY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL IssUES Uune L. Tapp & Felice J. Levine eds., 1977). 
231 Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 2, at 375. For a critique, see W. Michael Reisman, 
Autonomy, Interdependence, and Responsihility, 103 YALE LJ. 401 (1993). Reisman argues 
that this insight should be limited only to certain circumstances: "[t]he notion that 
new rules should not be articulated because articulation would slow the process of 
change may hold true in the context of rules that are inconsistent with the myth 
system .... " Id. at 411. 
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ble.232 "Once the language of rights gets started, we do think of our 
moral relations in a different way .... It is as if a different 'game' were 
being played, whose elements have functions that are different from 
those they previously had."233 There are different types of relation-
ships and communities, ranging from personal to impersonal and 
long-term to short-term, and different types of language may be more 
applicable to some communities and relationships than to others. My 
argument is that "rights and rights language are more appropriate to 
some of the forms of community than to others"234 and, specifically, 
absent extraordinary circumstances, not as appropriate for communi-
ties constituted by close ties founded on norms of trust, cooperation, 
and reciprocity. 
Besides declining a case at the outset pursuant to "community 
nonjusticiability," the court may also, in exceptional circumstances, ac-
cept it and, pursuant to the group's "no law" agreement, enforce the 
group's understanding and dismiss the case. This second approach 
may be termed the "contract" approach, as opposed to the "commu-
nity nonjusticiability" approach, because judicial deference to commu-
nity understandings accords with basic principles of contract law.235 
When the court enforces the parties' "no law" understanding, it is, in 
fact, holding the group and its members to their own reasonable ex-
pectations: that theirs was a "gentleman's agreement" which, as de-
fined in the Oxford English Dictionary, is an "agreement which is not 
enforceable at law and which is only binding as a matter of hon-
our."236 Assuming that "[t]he parties have capacity and competence, 
act in good faith, and suffer no lack of information or defect of con-
232 In the movie "The Magnificent Seven," the hero was told that his promise to 
protect the village against pillage by bandits would never be enforceable in court. His 
reply: "That's the sort of promise that you have to keep." See Bernard Rudden, The 
Gentleman's Agreement in Legal Theory and in Modern Practice, General Report of 
the Comparative Law Conference, 15th Congress, in Bristol, England, 1998, at 1. 
233 Martin G. Golding, The Significance of Rights Language, PHIL. TOPICS, Spring 
1990, at 59-60. 
234 Id. at 61. 
235 First, all members knew of and favored community informality, including the 
norm against judicial resolution of disputes, when they joined the group. An analo-
gous concept can be located in tort law. The parties have, in effect, knowingly as-
sumed the risk that should the bargain not work out as they had hoped and expected, 
they could only resort to internal means of dispute resolution and would be left with-
out external, judicial recourse. 
236 THE OXFORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY 453 (2d ed. 1989), cited in Rudden, supra 
note 232, at 1. See also Herbert Bernstein &Joachim Zekoll, The Gentleman's Agreement 
in Legal Theory and in Modern Practice: United States, 36 AM.]. CoMP. L. 87, 87 n.l 
(1988). ("A gentleman's agreement is an agreement which is not an agreement, 
made between avo persons, neither of whom is a gentleman, whereby each expects 
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sent,"237 and that they have assented with each other to enter into a 
"gentleman's agreement" which is to have no legal consequence, 
then, under the consent theory of contracts, no legally enforceable 
obligations can follow.238 According to the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, "Parties to what would otherwise be a bargain and a con-
tract sometimes agree that their relations are not to be affected. In 
the absence of any invalidating clause, such a term is represented by 
the law like any other term .... "239 In other words, "the freedom of 
contract carrie[s] with it the freedom not to contract."24° Other na-
tional jurisdictions also support this approach, 241 believing that if the 
parties can subject their agreement to a certain law through a choice 
of law clause, they should also be free to choose no law. 242 
On the other hand, countervailing issues may cause a court to 
ignore the parties' "no law'' understanding and consider some other 
the other to be strictly bound without himself being bound at all.") (quoting Bloom v. 
Kinder [1958] T.R91) 
237 Rudden, supra note 232, at 2. 
238 See Wendell H. Holmes, The Freedom Not to Contract, 60 TUL. L. REv. 751, 753 
n.5 (1986) (listing sources discussing the approach of the United States and England 
which favors the right of the parties to agree not to subject their agreement to law). It 
is beyond the scope of this Article to delve into the general case law or into select 
individual cases that address this complex issue. My argument that courts should 
honor these particular types of "gentleman's agreements" is one made with the part-
ticular context of rotating credit associations in mind. 
239 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 21 (1981). See also 1 E. FARNSWORTH, 
CoNTRAcrs § 3.7, at 116 (1982) ("The easiest way for a party to make clear his inten-
tion not to be legally bound is to say so. In a number of commercial contexts, parties 
enter into 'gentlemen's agreements that state that they are not legally binding, and it 
is beyond question that the parties can in this way turn an otherwise enforceable 
agreement into an uneforceable one."). Whether or not the participants in rotating 
credit associations expressly and verbally state their agreements to perform their obli-
gations and settle their differences outside the realm oflaw, there is little doubt that 
the norms of the associations call for "no law." See supra notes at 169-89. There are 
exceptions, as the Restatement itself anticipates, "where a bargain has been fully or 
partly performed on one side, a failure on the other side may result in unjust enrich-
ment .... " REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 21 (1981). 
240 Holmes, supra note 238, at 752. 
241 The German reporter to the 15th Congress Comparative Law Conference 
noted that" 'the legal order can intervene only where the parties have expressly stated 
that their declarations of intention shall produce the legal consequences." Rudden, 
supra note 232, at 3. The Japanese report noted that" 'gentleman's agreements oper-
ate through a tacit understanding of the parties, rather than by express disclaimer .... 
Japanese doctrine agrees that there are many instances of contextual no-law in social 
relations among friends and family." See id. at 2. 
242 Using the same analogy, if the parties can choose arbitration through an arbi-
tration clause and exclude the courts, they should be able to choose an "honors only" 
option and exclude legal order. See id. at 3. 
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legal principle or relation,243 for example, notions of fairness and un-
just enrichment as between the parties244 or notions of market effi-
ciency and socialjustice.245 There is an element of paternalism in the 
law that may be proper-though as I argue, paternalism is not appro-
priate in judicial resolution of most rotating credit disputes. 246 Pater-
nalistic interventions have been justified on the basis that the actors' 
volitional faculties are limited because they are minors, mentally dis-
abled, or intoxicated at the time of their agreement; that private 
choices, under some circumstances, are not really private and endoge-
nous but rather, to a large extent, socially constructed;247 that the 
parties' choices derive from an overly narrow set of options and are 
not truly informed, but instead are misconceived;248 that people's cog-
nitive abilities are limited in a number of important ways, leading 
them to make erroneous choices;249 that their actual preferences may 
243 The law in some national jurisdictions concerns itself with the question of 
whether private parties can agree to strip courts of their authority to decide cases. 
Some jurisdictions-Japan, for example-are uncomfortable with a generalized no-
law agreement or clause "which does not specify any particular dispute [as] that 
would not accord with public order." Rudden, supra note 232, at 5. The Spanish 
position is "'that the parties cannot determine for themselves when a given relation-
ship will or will not be legally binding.'" /d. (citation omitted). According to the 
Italian reporter, "'the Italian legal tradition is not completely ready to accept the idea 
that the parties themselves can decide on the nature of their commitment, be it legal 
or only moral.'" /d. (citation omitted). 
244 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS§ 21 (1981). 
245 A court faced with a private agreement that might result in some unfair re-
straint of trade but that also contains a "no-law" understanding between the parties 
may ignore the "no-law" understanding in order to enforce other concerns such as 
market efficiency. Similarly, the court may also ignore a "no-law" understanding 
among the parties to perform an agreement to discriminate on the basis of race. 
These are examples of private preferences, the gratification of which might cause 
harm to others. See generally Sunstein, supra note 224, at 1129. 
246 Some of the examples of legal paternalism are: mandatory seatbelt use while 
driving, mandatory safety measures in high-risk work environments, mandatory social 
security arrangements, compulsory elementary schooling, the doctrines of unconscio-
nability and undue influence, and the limited enforceability of some contract terms 
such as liquidated damages and forfeiture clauses. See Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of 
Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REv. 229, 230 (1998). 
247 See id. at 236. 
248 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 224, at 1138-41 (1986); see also Zamir, supra note 
246, at 237 ("[T]here seems to be no reason why frustrating one's actual preferences 
cannot, in appropriate circumstances, maximize her overall happiness. A person's 
belief that a certain course of action will yield the greatest happiness for herself may 
be misconceived. Obstructing an action rooted in such a misconception may increase 
the person's happiness despite the displeasure involved in having one's preferences 
frustrated."). 
249 See Zamir, supra note 246, at 237. 
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conflict with their second-order preferences, so that while they may 
choose to engage in certain conduct, they in fact wish to have their 
choices paternalistically frustrated;250 or that their private preferences 
inflict harm on others. 251 
On the other hand, personal freedom and autonomy are them-
selves important. Should the parties enter into an agreement that is 
subject to a "no law" understanding, "freedom from contract, if re-
garded as of benefit to society, also needs to be protected, lest the 
increasing concern for fairness and good faith develop into a pater-
nalistic imposition that in the end will prove deleterious to com-
merce"252-or, as in this case, to the very incentive structure that 
makes rotating credit associations the unique entities that they are. 
Paternalistic intervention is unnecessary unless there is clear evidence 
that the plaintiff lacks the necessary mental condition to understand 
the norms that govern rotating credit associations, or that force, du-
ress, or fraud was involved. If, for example, the organizer made delib-
erate misrepresentations to the plaintiff by telling the plaintiff that she 
would be joining a kye and the plaintiff later discovered, after several 
rounds of "contributions," that the organizer and the other members 
had set her up only to take her money, there would be no reason for a 
court to abstain from a civil suit or for the prosecutor to abstain from 
initiating criminal prosecution as well. 253 Otherwise, paternalistic in-
terventions are more difficult to justify under most circumstances. For 
example, while it is true that the parties' choice to participate in a 
credit association is itself the result of a lack of choice in the formal, 
open market, paternalistic intervention that results in the distortion of 
community markets will only result in a further contraction, not max-
imization, of available options. 
The question of judicial enforcement of, and deference to, pri-
vate understandings has been explored in a slightly different although 
250 See Sunstein, supra note 224, at 1129, for the argument that second order 
preferences justify paternalism. For example, a person who acts recklessly and prefers 
not to use seatbelt may herself wish she were more prudent. Such a person may also 
approve of paternalistic intervention designed to frustrate her first-order preferences. 
251 See id. at 1131 
252 Bernstein & Zekoll, supra note 236, at 95. 
253 As reported in the Tacoma, Washington press in 1996, a woman, Ms. Kyung 
Hee Yi, organized multiple, separate kyes that totaled 100 investors. For reasons pub-
licly unknown, she did not make payments to investors as required. When some inves-
tors, many of whom had not met each other, confronted Ms. Yi, she told them kye 
funds were not available. The sherriff's office was called. Ms. Yi was arrested. How-
ever, she was not charged with a crime because "investigators found so little 
paperwork associated with Yi's kyes that they doubted they could mount a successful 
prosecution." Szymanski & Song, supra note 119, at Dl. 
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sufficiently analogous context.254 The understandings and bylaws 
adopted by voluntary, private associations, for example, generally set 
forth not only the benefits to be conferred upon members, but also 
the association's rules regarding how disputes among members and 
the association will be resolved. 255 Major League Baseball, a self-gov-
eming private association of baseball clubs, grants the Commissioner 
broad powers to sanction any act not in the best interests of base-
ball. 256 The Major League and the constituent clubs also severally 
agree "'to be finally and unappealably bound by such actions and sev-
erally waive such right of recourse to the courts as would otherwise 
have existed in their favor.' "257 
When challenges to the Commissioner's authority have been 
brought, the Commissioner's power to impose remedial or punitive 
sanctions without judicial interference has been upheld by the courts. 
In a case challenging the Commissioner's "best interests of baseball" 
clause, the Seventh Circuit held that the parties had voluntarily con-
tracted to grant the Commissioner authority to forbid recourse to the 
courts. 258 The court also found that even in the absence of a "waiver 
of judicial recourse" provision, "'it is generally held that courts ... will 
not intervene in questions involving the enforcement of bylaws and 
matters of discipline in voluntary associations.' "259 Thus, the "no judi-
254 I thank Professor William Van Alstyne for suggesting the comparison with the 
law of private associations. 
255 Private voluntary associations usually have internal disciplinary codes and are 
governed by rules agreed to by the members. For example, Major League Baseball 
has its own disciplinary process independent from judicial interference. See jeffrey A. 
Durney, Fair ()I" Foul? The Commissioner and Maj(ff League BasebaU's Disciplinary Process, 41 
EMORY LJ. 581 (1992). 
256 My discussion of Major League Baseball as an example of private associations 
that enjoy a high degree of autonomy and noninterference by courts is drawn from 
Jeffrey A. Durney. See id. 
257 Id. at 587. 
258 See Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
439 u.s. 876 (1978). 
259 American Fed. of Tech. Eng'rs v. Lajeunesse, 347 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ill. 1976) 
(cited in Kuhn, 569 F.2d at 545 (Fairchild,]., concurring)). See also Van Daele v. Vinci, 
282 N.E.2d 728, 731 (Ill. 1972); Engel v. Walsh, 101 N.E. 222, 223 (Ill. 1913). 
In a separate concurring opinion, Chief judge Fairchild disagreed with the ma-
jority's "sweeping holding that the waiver of recourse to the courts provision, unless 
narrow exceptions exist, is 'valid and binding on the parties and the courts.'" Kuhn, 
569 F.2d at 545. Citing to an Illinois case which held that agreements designed to 
oust the courts of jurisdiction are void as contrary to public policy, see In re Streck's 
Estate, 183 N.E.2d 26, 31 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962),Judge Fairchild noted that although the 
scope of judicial review of the Commissioner's decision is extremely narrow, the Com-
missioner's decision could be overturned if the owner could establish that the Com-
missioner acted with bias or malice. 
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cial recourse" clause "can be upheld as coinciding with the common 
law standard disallowing court interference."26o 
Indeed, courts have long recognized that private associations may 
select their own system of self-governance and self-discipline. 261 "[I] t 
is well-established that a voluntary association may, without direction 
or interference by the courts, draw up for its government and adopt 
rules, regulations and by-laws which will be controlling as to all ques-
tions of ... doctrine or internal policy."262 Absent compelling circum-
stances, such as abuse of discretion or arbitrary invasion of private 
rights, courts will not interfere with questions concerning the associa-
tion's "'policy, doctrine, or discipline .... Courts will compel adher-
ence to the charter and to the purpose for which the society was 
organized, but they will not do more.' "263 The only rights and duties 
courts need to address are those "created by the private law of the 
parties, insofar as such contract rights did not exceed statutory 
bounds or conscionable reaches."264 Generally speaking, then, "there 
should be no judicial interference with the internal affairs, rules and 
by-laws of a voluntary association unless their enforcement would be 
arbitrary, capricious or constitute an abuse of discretion."265 Indeed, 
"Only the most abusive and obnoxious by-law provision could prop-
260 Kuhn, 569 F.2d at 543. 
261 See Durney, supra note 255, at 596 ("'[T]he courts have been very hesitant to 
intervene in any self-governing private organization. Othenvise there would be a 
flood of lawsuits every time some woman didn't win the presidency of the local flower 
club.'") (quoting Professor Gary Roberts whose comments can be found in Tom Ver-
ducci, Appeal? Forget It Boss, NEWSDAY,july 26, 1990, at 125). 
262 6 AM.juR. 2d, Associations and Cluhs, § 5, at 433 (1963) (citations omitted). 
263 Orchard Ridge Country Club, Inc. v. Schrey, 470 N.E.2d 780, 783 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1984) (quoting Supreme Lodge, Knites of Pythias v. Knight, 117 Ind. 489, 
496-97 (1889). See, e.g., Hebert v. Ventetuolo, 480 A2d 403 (R.I. 1984) (upholding 
Rhode Island Interscholastic League's suspension of students based on the league's 
rules governing eligibility of transfer students to participate in interscholastic athletics 
against the claim that such participation is a constitutionally protected right); Caso v. 
New York State Pub. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 78 AD.2d 41 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) 
(refusing to interfere \vith the association's internal affairs upon finding that the vol-
untary association of schools adhered to its own rules and that the plaintiff had vio-
lated the rules, resulting in his ineligibility to participate in certain sports 
competitions); Crandall v. North Dakota High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 261 N.W.2d 921, 
926 (N.D. 1978) (finding that the association's eligibility rules are not arbitrary or 
unreasonable and refusing to "determine the wisdom of such rules when they are 
reasonable"). 
264 Leon v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 358 F. Supp. 877, 886 (D.NJ. 1973), afj'd 474 
F.2d 1340 (3rd Cir. 1973). 
265 Hebert, 480 A2d at 407 (citations omitted). The Rhode Island court found that 
the defendant Rhode Island Interscholastic League may promulgate rules governing 
the eligibility of transfer students to participate in interscholastic sports. 
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erly invite a court's intrusion into what is essentially a business 
thicket. "266 
As a general and relatively clear-cut proposition, rotating credit 
associations, like other private voluntary associations, should be al-
lowed to promote and enforce norms that govern the group's internal 
affairs. Although there are no express written rules and regulations 
similar to those in the Major League Agreement, or those in the by-
laws and articles of incorporation that typically govern many associa-
tions, the norms adhered to by members of rotating credit associa-
tions are as much an expression of community self-governance as the 
rules and regulations enacted by the more formal associations. Addi-
tionally, that the norms of rotating credit associations emerge rather 
"spontaneously" from a normative system characterized more by the 
evolving nature of the parties' interactions than by a "centralized 
agency for formulating or enforcing rules"267-whether it be written 
contractual rules that make up the nonlegal but comprehensive gov-
ernance regime of Major League baseball, the American grain indus-
try, or the Japanese products liability system268-should not matter for 
the purpose of the present inquiry. 
The defining issue as far as judicial enforcement of an associa-
tion's private law is concerned is not whether the understandings 
adopted by a private association consist of written rules of conduct 
and comprehensive procedures of enforcement, but rather whether 
or not the private association operates within an "institutional envi-
ronment" with its own background constraints or "rules of the game," 
so to speak, that guide individual behavior. "Institutional environ-
ment," as used by Professors Lance Davis and Douglass North, refers 
to background rules which can be either formal, explicit rules or in-
formal, implicit ones, such as social conventions and norms.269 
266 Leon, 358 F. Supp. at 885. 
267 Charny, supra note 77, at 1845. 
268 See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of norms that 
evolve via informal but regularized interactions among members of groups versus 
norms that arise from a centralized, "state-like" agency. In the former scenario, the 
nonlegal regime-for example, of ranchers in Shasta County, California or of partici-
pants in rotating credit associations-consists of norms that derive from rather "infor-
mal and diffuse sanctioning systems." Charny, supra note 77, at 1845. In the latter 
scenario, as Professor David Charny noted, the nonlegal governance regime is "estab-
lished in a two-step process: first, norms evolve as a result of transactors' dealings (as 
in the grain industry) or industry consensus (standards identifying 'design defects'); 
second, the centralized agency selects among, codifies, and enforces these norms." 
ld. at 1841. 
269 Peter G. Klein, New Institutional Economics, at 3 (July 1998) (unpublished 
paper on file with author) (citing LANCE E. DAVIS & DouGLASS C. NoRTH, INSTITU· 
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While these background rules [the institutional environment] are 
the product of.-and can be explained in terms of.-the goals, be-
liefs, and choices of individual actors, the social result (the rule it-
self) is typically not known or "designed" by anyone. Institutional 
arrangements, by contrast, are specific guidelines ... designed by 
trading partners to mediate particular economic relationships. Busi-
ness firms, long-term contracts, public bureaucracies, nonprofit or-
ganizations, and other contractual agreements are examples of 
institutional arrangements. 270 
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To the extent that courts routinely defer to the "institutional ar-
rangements"-the specific rules, regulations, or guidelines established 
by private voluntary associations-the same deference should be ac-
corded to the "institutional environment"-the norms, social conven-
tions, or "rules of the game" that structure social conduct within 
rotating credit associations. 
In some circumstances, which I discuss below, it may be appropri-
ate for a court to hear the case, although again, judicial resolution 
should be the exception rather than the rule. 271 In such cases, as I 
have argued, the court should look to community norm and practice, 
custom, and usage, rather than perform a traditional cost-benefit anal-
ysis, which calls for judges to choose among alternative rules by com-
paring and contrasting their costs and their benefits.272 "[P]rivate 
parties are apt to have better information about their own positions 
than the state, even if their information is . . . itself highly 
imperfect. "273 
TIONAL CHANGE AND AMERICAN EcoNOMIC GROWTH (Cambridge University Press 
1971)). 
270 See id. 
271 See infra notes 301-07 and accompanying text. 
272 See Epstein, supra note 103, at 5-6. 
I d. 
Although championed by Landes and Posner, Steven Shavell, and other con-
servative economists, the cost-benefit formula is, when generally applied, far 
more interventionist than the standard of care based on custom. The cost-
benefit tests are used to challenge the rationality of markets, while formulas 
based on custom accept and rely on some level of implicit rationality in mar-
ket bahavior. 
273 Richard A. Epstein, Issues in Tort Refarm: The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO ST. 
LJ. 469, 471 (1987); see also Epstein, supra note 103, at 24 ("The substantive differ-
ences between the two approaches-custom and cost benefit-are enormous. When 
custom is used, the courts can, in effect, function in a reactive fashion, relying on the 
practices formulated by those who have powerful incentives to get things right be-
cause of the daily peril in which they labor."). 
Others have adopted a pragmatic approach: "if public policymakers have good 
reason to think that a given private norm is efficient, based on their own independent 
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Although the issues in this Article concern the law of contracts 
rather than the law of torts, the controversy over methodology-the 
relevance of custom versus an independent cost-benefit approach-
has been especially pronounced in tort cases. In a standard cost-bene-
fit approach, for example, courts use the Learned Hand rule es-
poused in the landmark case United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 274 to 
determine negligence, that is, to assess if "the burden of adequate pre-
cautions"275 undertaken by a defendant would be less than expected 
savings in liability. 276 In that case, a barge which broke loose from a 
mooring collided with other vessels. Because there was no community 
standard to govern the duty of the bargee, Judge Hand applied his 
own cost-benefit analysis to determine whether or not the defendant 
should be found negligent and hence liable for damages to other ves-
sel owners. 
But where custom exists and is discernible, and where a person 
behaves as others in like circumstances, one may infer that she is act-
ing in conformity with community standards of reasonableness. 277 "In 
particular instances, where there is nothing in the situation or in com-
mon experience to lead to the contrary conclusion, this inference may 
be so strong as to call for a directed verdict .... "278 As Judge Posner 
noted in Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. National Marine, Inc.,279 "the focus of 
the ... court's inquiry should be on the parties' respective compliance 
with and departures from the customs ... ,"280 especially because of 
the parties' "reasonable expectations that the firms with which they 
deal are complying with the standard of care customary in the indus-
analysis, they should defer to it, and if they have good reason to think it inefficient, 
they should not defer." Katz, supra note 19, at 1752. 
274 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
275 Id. at 173. 
276 My discussion relies on Professor Robert Cooter's comparative evaluation of a 
cost-benefit analysis versus a deference to custom analysis in tort law. See Cooter, 
supra note 2, at 1678-82. 
277 But seeThe TJ. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). This case, also decided by 
Judge Hand, denies any conclusive weight to custom and complements the cost-bene-
fit formula he later adopted in United States v. CarroU Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 
1947). Judge Hand's view has received widespread acceptance among courts and 
commentators. See, e.g., Bimberg v. Northern Pac. Ry., 14 N.W.2d 410, 413 (Minn. 
1944) ("Local usage and general custom, either singly or in combination, will not 
justify or excuse negligence. They are merely foxholes in one of the battlefields of 
law, providing shelter, but not complete protection against charges of negligence."). 
278 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 295A cmt. b (1974). 
279 984 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that compliance with custom is a de-
fense to a tort claim in a case where a barge broke loose and caused damage to other 
vessels.). 
280 Id. at 888-89. 
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try ... [and because] these customs appear to reflect an undistorted 
market determination of the best way to minimize" costs. 281 
It has been suggested that an approach that favors deference to 
custom is analogous to the English model of adjudication and accom-
modation which arose in the eighteenth century when the formal 
legal system found itself increasingly in contact with the practices of 
merchants who had developed their own norms to regulate trade. 282 
Medieval law merchants, enforced by the threat of ostracism, devel-
oped out of a system of private courts established by English 
merchants to resolve disputes among themselves. As the English legal 
system came into increasing contact with cases involving general 
merchant practice, English judges faced commercial disputes which 
had once been handled privately. 283 Rather than make new rules or 
substitute their own for the merchants, English judges "tried to dis-
cover those rules that already existed among the merchants, and then 
selectively enforced them,"284 deferring, in other words, to merchant 
custom. 
There are efficiency benefits to this. approach because, where ap-
propriate, deference to custom is cost-effective. "[M] ost situations are 
not distinctive or novel but fall into certain repetitive patterns,"285 and 
thus most business communities have developed "simple rules of 
thumb and standard practices to guide them in their daily work."286 
Someone who relies on existing custom for his interactions 
can now rest in relative comfort on the knowledge that others with 
greater experience and knowledge have adopted a pattern of doing 
business on which he can sensibly free ride. Custom is a socially 
desirable form of free riding that offers a cheap and reliable source 
of information about a form of agreement that is worthy of use be-
cause of the impersonality and universality of its origins.287 
The customary norms of rotating credit associations are precisely 
the type of norms to which the state should defer.288 They arise out of 
281 ld. at 809. Of course, whether or not a market decision is efficient may be 
determined by a cost-benefit analysis. Economists, however, understand that the in-
formation required to conduct a complete analysis may not be available and thus 
"answer the question indirectly, by discussing market structure and firm behavior." 
Cooter, supra note 2, at 1680. 
282 See Cooter, supra note 2, at 1648. 
283 See generally Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. 
EcoN.J. 644, 644-61 (1989). 
284 Cooter, supra note 2, at 1648. 
285 Epstein, supra note 143, at 6. 
286 ld. 
287 ld. at 10. 
288 See Katz, supra note 19, at 1752. 
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consensual arrangements among willing participants and are contract, 
not tort, cases. Thus, these norms register the preferences of parties 
to the custom, not strangers or third parties who are victimized by it. 
Unlike tort cases, no victims are injured by acts arising from credit 
arrangements who are not already members of the community and 
already insiders party to the custom. 289 Additionally, as Part III of this 
Article demonstrates, a rotating credit association represents a healthy 
instance of private ordering governed both by norms of the market 
and norms of community ethics. First, there is a long and rich history 
of immigrant participation in such associations, which has played a 
crucial role not only in the financial viability of immigrant communi-
ties, but also in their social and cultural cohesiveness. Second, these 
associations have survived and continue to be relied upon, especially 
by new immigrants who lack credit histories and collateral, precisely 
because the formal financial market is incapable of transcending the 
high transaction costs due to informational asymmetry between bor-
rowers and lenders in the open market. Third, the associations must 
be seen, therefore, as a rational and efficient community response to 
open market imperfections through community market formation. 
Here, the market preference for efficiency and wealth maximiza-
tion is consonant with, rather than detrimental to, the values of com-
munity reciprocity and commitment that market critics claim are 
devalued by market behaviors. 290 The market, it has often been 
charged, presumes and takes as self-evident individual autonomy and 
thus atomizes the individual from his larger society "by tangibly re-
warding narrowly self-interested behavior, by penalizing altruism, and 
by devaluing commitment."291 Furthermore, there has been a rising 
sense of concern that the dominance of the global economy will result 
in an economic hegemony that "wipes out" local markets and possibly 
"erases" local culture and local communities.292 Wal-Mart, one of the 
largest retailers in the United States, for example, has been facing sig-
nificant opposition to its expansion into certain communities and 
neighborhoods because of the fear that its overwhelming economic 
prowess will result in the decimation of smaller stores owned by local, 
289 But see supra note 223. 
290 See, e.g., MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY's DisCONTENT (1996). 
291 Allen E. Buchanan, Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 99 ETHICS 
852, 866 (1989). 
292 See genereally Taibi, supra note 5, at 961 (analyzing the ways in which transac-
tional capital and the global economy "undermin[e] the economic, cultural, and so-
cial foundations of non-elite communities"). 
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independent merchants.293 In a highly competitive age, markets in 
general, and capital markets in particular, whether they be global or 
national, 294 are driven by concerns that transcend local interests in 
ways that may be detrimental to community concerns. 295 It is thus all 
the more important that the decentralized exercise of community ini-
tiatives and the utilization of local institutional resources, which result 
in local market economic investment in ways that are inclusive of un-
derrepresented groups, be supported rather th,an impeded. 
The norms that govern rotating credit associations and guide the 
behaviors of members maximize cooperation and commitment for 
the purpose of creating economic value for their economically 
marginalized members. Members interact with each other not as at-
omized individuals but as community members who utilize and mar-
shal their community membership to maximize individual as well as 
group interests. In other words, economic value is dependent not on 
disaggregation but instead on an aggregation of interests.296 
While formal institutional lending operates on the premise that 
lenders and borrowers are disaggregated entities likely resulting in 
high transaction costs for lenders, rotating credit associations work 
only if "lenders" and "borrowers" constitute a single entity with con-
vergent commitments. The "lender" in a rotating credit association is 
itself the borrower and vice-versa; stated another way, a member func-
293 See Ellen Neubome, David Beats Goliath in Wal-Mart Pricing War, USA TODAY, 
Oct. 13, 1993, at B1; Fran Silverman, State's Communities Put up a Wall of Resistance to 
Wal-Mart, HARTFORD CoURANT, Nov. 28, 1994, at A3. 
294 See Enrique Carrasco & Randall Thomas, Encouraging Relational Investment and 
Controlling Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries in the Aftermath of the Mexican Fi-
nancial Crisis, 34 CoLUM. J. TRANsN'L L. 539 (1996) (analyzing the impact of highly 
mobile capital investment, as opposed to more long-term investments such as foreign 
direct investment, on the national economies of less developed countries in general 
and that of Mexico in particular). 
295 By now there is a voluminous amount of criticism directed at the global corpo-
ration and its encroachment in and destruction- of the local market. For recent popu-
lar articles that address this issue, see, for example, Richard J. Barnet, Lords of the 
Global Economy, NATION, Dec. 19, 1994, at 754; Richard J. Barnet, The End of Jobs, 
HARPER's, Sept. 1993, at 47; Jeremy Brechner & Tim Costello, Taking on the Multina-
tionals, NATION, Dec. 19, 1994, at 757; Noam Chomsky, Notes on NAFTA: 'The Masters of 
Mankind,' NATION, March. 29, 1993, at 412. 
296 One can also make the case that trust is necessary to restrain force or fraud. 
See Granovetter, supra note 65, at 489. But it is also true that "networks of social 
relations penetrate irregularly and in differing degrees in different sectors of eco-
nomic life, thus allowing for ... distrust, opportunism, and disorder .... " Id. at 491. 
While trust is certainly an important element in a rotating credit association, it is the 
aggregation of the interests of the group and its members that most effectively curbs 
abuse, coercion, or force against group members by the group. 
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tions both as a "lender" and as a "borrower,"297 resulting in a conflu-
ence of interests between "lender" and "borrower." The "lender" is 
capitalized by its members. Membership in the association aligns the 
interests of "lender" with "borrower" and those of "borrowers" with 
other "borrowers," so that there are fewer problems of information 
asymmetry and hence a minimization of screening, monitoring, and 
enforcement costs.298 The group plays both the role of the market 
and the community. Default by one member represents a wrong com-
mitted against not just the other members but against the association 
itself. 
This aggregation of interests produces an institutional structure 
that acts as a disincentive against defection or default and also against 
abuse, specifically abuse by the group against its individual members. 
Membership is voluntary, and members are selected because the orga-
nizer, as the guarantor, and the other members, as participants, have 
mutually screened each other. Information that governs group ex-
changes is symmetrical rather than asymmetrical, and thus members 
are not uninformed "lenders" or "borrowers." The terms and condi-
tions of participation derive from mutual agreement, and the enforce-
ment mechanisms are founded on community norms that emerge 
from the bottom up, not from the top down. This aggregation of in-
terests and the incentive structure derived therefrom distinguishes ro-
tating credit associations from other coercive institutions, such as the 
loan shark. The difference is not simply the most obvious one, that 
shaming is different from physical beating and murder. Even in those 
rare instances when interest on a rotating credit association loan rises 
to a level of twenty percent299 or more, a rotating credit association is 
still different from a loan shark-precisely because the aggregation of 
interests between the group and its members acts as a significant built-
in check against impulses toward group exploitation and abuse. 300 
I have thus far argued that courts should either decline a case 
that involves a rotating credit dispute under "community nonjusti-
297 When member A contributes to a pool and member B draws, A can be deemed 
a lender and B a borrower. When A draws in the next round, A is then the borrower 
and B, who has drawn and can no longer draw until everyone has drawn, is then the 
lender. If analyzed from a group rather than an individual level, one also can say that 
the group is the lender and the members are the borrowers. 
298 See supra notes 206-18 and accompanying text. 
299 See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
300 See Eric Posner, The Regulation of Groups, 133 U. CHI. L. REv. 133, 170 (1996) 
("One doubts the importance of usury laws and corporate laws, which are designed to 
protect uninformed borrowers and investors, when the members share ties of kinship, 
friendship, and community."). 
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iciability" or else take the case but, guided by the law of voluntary 
associations, adopt a "contract" approach and defer to private norms. 
I have also argued that norm deference is appropriate because the 
norms of rotating credit associations are consonant with values worth 
promoting: wealth maximization, efficiency, community reciprocity, 
and trust. If the norm of the group is one of "no law," then a court 
should "enforce" this norm and defer to it, that is, resolve the case by 
"finding" the law of the group and applying it to the dispute at hand. 
My argument that community norms should be controlling in ju-
dicial resolution of disputes can be illustrated in the following case. 
Currently, it is unclear whether rotating credit associations are legal 
or illegal, and a recent California case only muddles the picture fur-
ther.soi In 1993, a dispute began when the Songs, a Los Angeles 
couple whose relative had declared bankruptcy and stopped making 
his own monthly payment into another kye, were asked by the or-
ganizers to supply collateral to secure future payments into the pot 
before the couple would be allowed to collect.302 No other kye mem-
ber had been asked to provide security. When the couple refused and 
were told by the organizers that. they could not collect from the pot, 
they refused to make further contributions. The organizers sued in 
the Superior Court of Los Angeles for the amount the Songs were 
obligated to contribute as their monthly sum. The judge dismissed 
the case upon finding that the kye is itself an illegal lottery and also a 
form of security which was being sold without prior permission from 
the proper authorities. 
While the state has interests in protecting entities that deliver a 
collective good as well as in preventing fraud or violations of state law, 
the judge's decision accomplishes neither objective. First, as Eric Pos-
ner suggested in a recent article, the assumption that 
the kye [was] a lottery was erroneous. Lotteries appeal only to risk 
takers because the cost of the ticket exceeds the expected payout. A 
share in a kye, however, like a savings account with a bank or a loan 
from a bank, appeals to anyone who seeks to flatten out his con-
301 See Robert Reinhold, The Koreans' Big Entry into Business, N.Y. TIMES., Sept. 24, 
1g3g, atA4 ("The k.ye ... is fast, efficient, effective-and quite illegal under American 
law."). Under California law, rotating credit associations like the k.ye are not regu-
lated. See Kenneth Howe, Lending Clubs Collapse Amid Fraud Charges, S.F. Bus. TIMES, 
June 2g, 1g87, § 1, at 1; see also Douglas Frantz, Hanmi Bank Uses Ancient Asian Lending 
Practice To Help Koreans, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1g88, § 1, at 1 (discussing whether or not 
the failure ofk.ye members to report interest income on their tax returns constitutes a 
violation of the tax codes). 
302 See Kenneth Reich, Private Investment Pools Dealt Blow, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 
1g93, at Bl. 
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sumption over time; the member's contributions, adjusted for inter-
est, equal his expected payout.sos 
Second, although it is unclear whether this particular kye had vio-
lated tax or usury laws, it is also questionable whether or not such laws 
are necessary or effective against the communal background norms of 
kyes. "One doubts the importance of usury laws and corporate laws, 
which are designed to protect uninformed borrowers and investors, 
when the members share ties of kinship, friendship, and commu-
nity."304 And third, there is no functional difference between kyes ver-
sus the many instances in which "'friends put money in, make a pool 
and give personal loans for educational expenses or a business with-
out the paperwork, collateral, credit checks and high rate of rejection 
involved with bank loans."305 
It should be emphasized that the decision to file a complaint is 
itself an anomaly, as the norm against resorting to formal judicial pro-
cess to resolve community disputes is usually quite strong.306 Under 
normal circumstances, nonlegal sanctions would likely have been suf-
ficient to force both the organizers and the Songs to come to an ac-
ceptable resolution of the dispute. The suit, however, arose in the 
aftermath of the Los Angeles riots, when the devastation of the Ko-
rean-American community made the threat of nonlegal sanctions 
such as community ostracism less effective, and hence defection from 
community norms more attractive. One could view the riots as the 
equivalent of a force majeure event justifying the institution of a lawsuit 
in contravention of community norms in order to enforce those 
norms. 
In ruling that the organizers had no legal recourse to collect 
debts from those who participated in kyes because the kye was itself an 
illegal entity and the entire arrangement was presumably null-and-
void, the judge failed to recognize the social function of kyes in com-
munity development and, by his threshold decision, kept the court 
from looking beneath the veil of formality and state regulation to the 
303 Posner, supra note 300, at 174-75 n.ll8. See alw Ivan Light, Lending Support to 
Kyes, L.A. Times, Oct. 24, 1993, § 1, at 22 ("The associations are not lotteries in any 
ordinary meaning of the term, so they cannot be illegal lotteries. Lotteries afford 
players only a slim probability of recouping even their original investment. In con-
trast, the associations guarantee all participants the return of their principal. The 
only uncertainty concerns how soon they get their money back."). 
304 Posner, supra note 300, at 170. 
305 Jake Doherty, An American Wrinkle in Korean Loans, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1993, 
§ 1, at 3 (quoting Benjamin B. Hong, Chief Executive Officer of Harris Bank). 
306 See ELLICKSON, supra note 78, at 60-64; Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Rela-
tions in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55, 61 (1963). 
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underlying custom that governs the activities of such credit associa-
tions. Assuming that the court would have been correct in hearing 
the case-in other words, assuming that the case constituted a legiti-
mate, though rare, instance in which judicial resolution was appropri-
ate-the question should have been recast to allow the court to 
examine whether fraud or bad faith was involved. 
Once it took the case, the court should have located the law that 
governs the expectations and behavior of kye members in the same 
way that courts do when faced with an issue of industry custom or 
usage among merchants.307 Some of the questions the court could 
and should have asked include: was there a norm that allowed the 
organizers to demand collateral of kye members? If such a norm did 
not exist among kye members, was it nonetheless an expectation 
among members of this particular kye? Was the couple that asked to 
produce collateral justified in refusing to make additional payments? 
Was it understood that collateral could be demanded under certain 
limited circumstances to protect the security of the kye, if relatives of 
kye members were discovered to experience financial difficulty? In 
other words, was it the accepted custom that the respective social capi-
tal bases of the participants consisted not just of their own but also 
that of their relatives? If so, were the organizers justified in demand-
ing economic security, ifkyes function well only in the context offam-
ily as well as community stability and cohesiveness? 
Judicial nonintervention-or in exceptional cases warranting in-
tervention, the application of the group's own norms as I have advo-
cated-should work unproblematically in nearly all cases. However, 
there might still be some potentially disturbing issues to be addressed. 
Although it is clear that the parties involved in a kye have explicitly or 
implicitly agreed to subject themselves to the rules of the association, 
one still wonders about the extent to which courts should enforce the 
"no law" norm, especially when an act performed by a group's mem-
bers in accordance with group norms causes ancillary harm to one or 
more of the members. Should the court still enforce the "no law" 
norm by deferring to it, effectively declaring Plat it will not hear a 
common law claim for restitution? 
For example, suppose that someone defaults on her contribu-
tions "without cause," so that the defaulter has in essenc.e defected 
307 For an analogue, see The Uniform Commercial Code, which allows course of 
dealing, usage of trade, or course of performance to be considered in the interpreta-
tion of express contract terms. See U.C.C. § 1-205(1) (1991). "[T]hese sources may 
not only supplement or qualify express terms, but in appropriate circumstances, may 
even override express terms." 1 JAMES]. WHITE & RoBERT SUMMERS, UNIFORM CoM-
MERCIAL CODE, § 3-3, at 121 (4th ed. 1995). 
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from the group after having drawn her contribution from the com-
mon pool.3°8 The group as a whole, or an individual member of the 
group who would have been the next eligible drawer, takes the neces-
sary enforcement action against the defector, designed to heap shame 
upon the defector and deter others from defecting. An ad is placed in 
the local paper identifying the person as an untrustworthy person who 
has failed to meet her obligation to the association. As a result, her 
reputation is damaged and her business (assume she owns a small, 
service-oriented business) suffers. Group members telephone her 
persistently to berate her. Her children are accosted and told of their 
mother's disgraceful behavior. The defector, in other words, is alter-
nately harassed and shunned from the community.309 She sues for 
invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
tortious interference with her business. Should the court decline to 
hear the case, in essence ratifying the group's sanctions against a way-
ward member in deference to its norms of shunning and shaming? 
The answer depends on the facts of the case, and courts should, as I 
propose below, balance the norms and needs of the community with 
other areas of paramount state concern. 
Shunning has been used by religious groups such as the Amish, 
the Mennonites, and the jehovah's Witnesses to maintain and enforce 
religious unity and cohesiveness.310 Shunning can cause a shunned 
person to lose her spouse,311 children,312 business,313 and overall 
standing in the community. 
308 I thank Professor William Van Alstyne for posing the following hypotheticals 
and for suggesting comparisons with religious shunning cases. 
309 For a general discussion of various theories of ostracism, see OSTRACISM: A So-
CIAL AND BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON (Margaret Gruter & Roger D. Masters eds., 1986). 
See also Margaret Gruter, Ostracism on Trial: The Limits of Individual Rights, 7 ETHOLOGY 
& SociOBIOLOGY 271 (1986). 
310 In the Amish community, Bann und Meidung, which means excommunication 
and shunning, require "that members receive no favors from the excommunicated 
person, that they do not buy from or sell to an excommunicated person, that no 
member shall eat at the same table with an excommunicated person, and if the case 
involves husband or wife, they are to suspend their usual marital relations." Justin K. 
Miller, Comment, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: Religious Shunning and the 
Free Exercise Clause, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 271,272 n.5 (1988) (citing]. HOSTETLER, AMISH 
SOCIE1Y 63 (1963)). 
311 See generally id. at 273 n.6, for a discussion of cases in which the spouse of the 
shunned person is encouraged to leave or shun the latter in accordance with church 
doctrine. 
312 See Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 341 A.2d 105, 106 (Pa. 1975). 
313 See generally Miller, supra note 310, at 273 n.8, for a discussion of cases in 
which shunning caused damage to the shunned person's reputation and business 
relationships. 
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For communities that operate outside the framework of main-
stream society, the threat of ostracism functions as the equivalent of 
state law. Without this threat, the group's ability to discipline its mem-
bers would be rendered ineffective. At the same time, however, the 
norm of shunning, 'if excessively practiced, may collide with some 
other legitimate state interest. Courts faced with a collision of com-
peting norms have had to balance the state's interests against the free 
exercise claims of the religious group. 314 In Paul v. Watchtower Bible & 
Tract Society of New York, 315 the Ninth Circuit upheld the right of J eho-
vah's Witnesses to engage in the practice of shunning ex-members 
against an ex-member's common law claims of defamation, fraud, and 
outrageous conduct because of the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment and because "the practice of shunning, [did] 
not ... constitute a sufficient threat to the peace, safety, or morality of 
the community as to warrant state intervention."316 
A different conclusion was reached in Bear v. Reformed Mennonite 
Church.317 The plaintiff alleged that after his excommunication from 
the church for criticizing church teachings and practices, he was se-
verely shunned by the church. As a result, his business, as well as his 
marriage, suffered because shunning, as practiced by the church, in-
volved complete boycotting by church members, including his busi-
ness associates and his wife and children. The court found that the 
complaint presented sufficient facts to raise the question of whether 
shunning as practiced by the church could be considered "an exces-
sive interference within areas of 'paramount state concern,' i.e. the 
maintenance of marriage and family relationship, alienation of affec-
tion, and the tortious interference with a business relation-
ship . . . even in light of the 'Establishment' and 'Free Exercise' 
clauses of the First Amendment."31s 
The relevant interests, of course, are not the same in rotating 
credit associations or other nonreligious communities. 319 There is no 
constitutional privilege to balance against the state's interest in pro-
314 For a discussion and analysis of cases dealing with religious shunning, see id. 
315 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1987). 
316 Id. at 883. 
317 341 A2d 105 (Pa. 1975). 
318 Id. at 107. 
319 Professor Cooter pointed out that religious communities such as the Amish are 
"ultimate communities" whereas business people form "instrumental communities." 
See Cooter, supra note 2, at 1686. Rotating credit associations fall somewhere between 
the two. The associations themselves are not insular "ultimate" communities but are 
community markets embedded within culturally homogenous communities. For 
purely business communities, "two natural limits on coercion of individuals by com-
munities" exist: the exit option and the mobility option. See id. 
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vi ding a cause of action, if its underlying elements are met, for a given 
tort. But there is, nonetheless, a case of competing interests between 
the claims of community and state. On the one hand, the existence 
and viability of any community that is marginal-culturally, relig-
iously, or economically-vis-a-vis society at large depend to a signifi-
cant degree on its cohesiveness. Cohesiveness depends in tum on the 
community's ability to foster a group-based sense of unity balanced 
against the individual's fear of being forced outside the embrace of 
the group. The possibility that sanctions will be meted out for con-
duct that breaches community norms must be real enough to deter 
actual breaches; at the same time, the costs inflicted on those who 
deviate must be sufficiently severe to counteract defection. 
Without the threat of state law, the threat of shunning-the sev-
erance of social and economic ties with the community-plays an im-
portant part in keeping members within the bounds of community 
norms. While shunning is not the only means of ensuring compliance 
(shame and guilt also play a part), it is an effective one. In some Ko-
rean-American communities, "defaulting would make it nearly impos-
sible to get a job among Korean Americans or even a marriage 
partner."320 This may be so not because of any orchestrated campaign 
by community leaders to shun or to pressure others into shunning the 
defaulting person. It may be so simply because a person who defaults 
is judged by others to be untrustworthy, and an untrustworthy person 
is not anyone's first choice for a business or marriage partner.321 
Through mobility, an individual can escape coercion by one community and 
find another community that is more congenial. In contrast, the creation of 
a mass society through the destruction of communities reduces the alterna-
tives available to everyone. The limits of self-help should be assessed before a 
court grants a legal remedy to an individual who feels repressed by his 
community. 
Id. The option of exit for a shunned member of a rotating credit association will 
depend on the insularity of an ethnic community and the extent to which a member 
feels culturally, economically, and psychologically bound to that particular ethnic 
community. 
320 Jordan Rappaport, The Korean Example, NEw DEMOCRAT, May 1992, at 22. 
321 See Gruter, supra note 309, at 271-79. "Ostracism" may exist even without the 
affirmative practice of active shunning. Andrew Yoder, who had left the Amish 
church and purchased a car, sued several officials of the Amish Church for violating 
his right of religious freedom and exacerbating his stomach ulcers when it ordered its 
members to shun him. The jury awarded him monetary damages, and the judge or-
dered church officials to lift the shunning order. To satisfy the monetary judgment in 
Yoder's favor, the sheriff seized the property of one of the church officials. Eventu-
ally, church officials removed the ban. Yoder remained isolated from the community, 
however, even after the removal and reversal of the church's shunning order. See id. 
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It is unlikely that the latter instance would give rise to any cause 
of action. On the other hand, activities, even those motivated by reli-
gious beliefs, that rise to the level of harassment, intimidation, or 
threats may be sufficiently excessive or outrageous to provide the 
plaintiff with a cause of action under the relevant state law.322 In 
those cases, the court would have to make a case-by-case determina-
tion, balancing the particular norms of the community against other 
areas of paramount state concern. In Lide v. Miller,323 a dentist sued 
church elders for libel, slander, and tortious interference with his 
business relations when the elders proclaimed the plaintiff's miscon-
duct to the congregation, causing harm to his reputation and dental 
practice. The court of appeals overturned a lower court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the church and remanded the case for 
trial upon the merits on the grounds that, although "civil courts have 
no jurisdiction over and no concern with, purely ecclesiastical ques-
tions and controversies, they do have jurisdiction as to civil, contract 
and property rights even though such rights are involved in, or arise 
from, a church controversy."324 According to the court, the alleged 
libelous and slanderous communications should have been subject to 
more scrutiny at the trial level. 
This approach, if transposed into the rotating credit association 
context, may be a workable middle ground that allows the court to 
enforce the parties' "no law" understanding and defer to the group's 
norms on matters directly within the core of the association's activi-
ties, for example, those involving how much or when contributions 
should be made, how priority drawings are determined by the 
group-whether by lottery, by rotation, or by interest bidding-
whether and under what circumstances collateral may be required, 
and whether and to what extent the organizer is or is not jointly and 
severally liable in a case of default by a participant. Other matters that 
are not directly related to the issues of saving and lending, even if they 
arise from the association's activities, may be examined by the court if 
they touch upon some area of paramount state concern, such as the 
state's interest in providing a cause of action for common law 
defamation. 
322 See Carrieri v. Bush, 419 P.2d 132, 137 (Wash. 1966) (holding that although 
the church members' acts, done in furtherance of their religious belief, would be 
constitutionally privileged under the facts of the case, the privilege was nullified when 
the church caused ill will, intimidation, and threats to be issued agcunst the plaintiff 
and caused plaintifPs wife to leave him becatise she was persistently told her husband 
was a devil). 
323 573 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978, no writ). 
324 ld. at 615 (citations omitted). 
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In sum, my proposal for this Part of the Article can be restated in 
the following way: for reasons discussed above, where norms are so-
cially beneficial-for example, norms that advance the virtues of com-
munity as well as the production of social capital and further the 
economic viability of marginal groups-the state should respect and 
promote them. Rotating credit associations represent one instance of 
community market formation and community participation and em-
powerment despite impediments caused by open market imperfec-
tions. The norms of trust and reciprocity that further community 
exchanges and allow transaction costs to be lowered can best be pro-
moted by a "hands off'' posture described above. Judicial interference 
in most instances will result in the erosion of community and infor-
mality in favor of a more formal contractual regime. Imposing a con-
tractual regime of formal transactions on informal credit associations 
would be too costly, from both a transaction and a litigation stand-
point, given the costs of gathering information, screening potential 
applicants, drafting contracts, monitoring the performance of borrow-
ers, and litigation costs, as well as the uncertainty ofrecovery.325 Addi-
tionally, requiring adherence to formality would simply replicate the 
concomitant costs that already deter financial institutions in the for-
mal economy from providing credit to low-income communities. 
Additionally, and perhaps most significantly, open market alter-
natives are not available, which is why it is all the more important for 
courts to allow the community to operate on and draw from commu-
nity norms without the threat that the formality of state law will infect 
the community's social capital base. While certain private regimes of 
trade, for example, the predominantly OrthodoxJewish diamond in-
dustry in New York, "ha[ve] systematically rejected state-created 
law"326 by subjecting all transactions to a private order of industry 
norms and usage, rotating credit associations have emerged not by 
choice but by necessity-not only to lower costs behind a transaction 
but also to remove barriers that discourage actors acting from a ra-
tional cost-benefit basis from entering into the transaction in the first 
place. In other words, rotating credit associations exist not simply to 
lower the transaction costs of an existing market. They represent, 
rather, an example of a community market that emerges precisely be-
cause the transaction at issue-lending to lower-income borrowers-is 
in many instances not viable on the open market. The situation they 
present, then, is not only one of lowering transaction costs in order to 
325 See generally Bernstein, opting Out, supra note 97, at 132-38. 
326 Id. at 115. 
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make transactions more efficient, but rather one of lowering transac-
tion costs in order to allow a market to emerge. 
B. Linkages Between Markets 
Aside from whether courts or legislators should defer to private 
norms, there is also the issue of private lawmaking by rotating credit 
associations and whether and to what extent it can be replicated in the 
open market.327 In this Section, I examine whether or not linkages 
between the open market and the community market can or should 
be introduced. For example, which structural features of rotating 
credit associations provide their comparative advantage, and how can 
they be transferred to and simulated by the formal lending sector? 
Spurred by the high success rate of rotating credit associations, 
ethnic bankS, in fact, have been more willing to evaluate creditworthi-
ness by resorting to criteria other than mere credit history. Korean-
owned banks are beginning to adopt some of the criteria used by ro-
tating credit associations and emphasize social rather than economic 
collateral-for example, peer pressure, family connections, commu-
nity, and identity328-as a low-cost screening and monitoring mecha-
nism. Also, banks in Los Angeles' Koreatown, in particular, have 
begun to emulate the structural incentives of rotating credit associa-
tions. Hanmi Bank, a Korean-owned bank, allows depositors who 
enter into a ten- or twelve-month $10,000 savings plan to be eligible 
for a lump sum advance of the entire $10,000 after three or four 
months of savings. 329 
327 Professor Avery Katz noted that not enough investment has been placed on the 
study of "trade association rules, not for the purpose of advising courts and legislators 
whether to defer to such rules, but for the purpose of helping other trade associa-
tions decide whether to imitate them or instead to draft their own new forms." Katz, 
supra note 19, at 1757. 
328 According to Benjamin Hong, Chief Executive Officer of Hanmi Bank, a Ko-
rean-owned, state-chartered bank, Hanmi Bank considers the applicant's "brothers, 
his uncles, his parents, and his families, of course, and ... what kind of church he 
goes to, what kind of association he belongs to." ABC News (ABC television broadcast, 
Sept. 13, 1992) (transcript on file with Notre Dame Law Review). 
329 See Schifrin, supra note 131, at 92; see also Frantz, supra note 301, at 1 ("Under 
a plan introduced ... by Hanmi Bank, a customer who agrees to save $1,000 a month 
for 10 months can borrow $10,000 from the bank at the end of three months. The 
customer continues to collect interest on the savings while paying off the loan's prin-
cipal and interest."); Reinhold, supra note 301, at 4 ("The would-be borrower agrees 
to deposit, for example, $100,000 over 24 months. Mter three or four months, he 
becomes eligible to borrow the full $100,000 at 2.5 points above the prime rate .... "); 
Arax, supra note 131, at 1 (noting that Hanmi bank allows customers who agree to 
save $1,000 a month for 10 months to borrow $10,000 after the end of the third 
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Under such a kye-like program, depositors typically determine 
their total savings plan amount and are permitted to take out a loan 
up to that amount once deposits equal one-third of the total plan.330 
Hanmi's kye-like Business Installment Plan, in addition, allows busi-
ness customers who have deposited their full amount to take out addi-
tional loans for the total plan amount, even if money set aside under 
the plan has been withdrawn.331 
Entities similar to a rotating credit association may be organized 
directly by a bank. As Michael Cunningham, president of Creative 
Investment Research described it, "[m] embers from inner-city neigh-
borhoods would contribute to a bank account each month until the 
pool reached sufficient size. Then the bank would lend to one of the 
members, using the pool as collateral. If the borrower defaulted, the 
remaining members would have to cover the short fall."332 Presuma-
bly, for the arrangement to benefit the borrower, the loan amount 
extended by the bank would have to be greater than the members' 
aggregate savings account. Like the traditional rotating credit associa-
tion, the size of each credit pool would also be commensurate with 
the credit needs of the individual members.333 Hanmi Bank also 
planned to institute other plans modeled even more closely after the 
kye. Under these plans, groups of up to ten members could obtain 
loans from the bank, based on joint guarantees from members of the 
group.334 Like a kye, the group members would function as mutual 
monitors, screeners, and enforcers and thus allow the bank to signifi-
cantly reduce its transaction costs. Hanmi Bank "is trying to tap the 
more traditional needs of its customers by bringing the kyes out of the 
month). Hanmi Bank was founded in 1982 by Korean businesspeople to serve the 
Korean American population whom the bank's founders believed were not getting 
adequate services from conventional, mainstream banks. See Community Bank's Hard 
Work Raises CRA Grade, THE REGULATORY CoMPLIANCE WATCH, july 25, 1994, at 2. 
330 See Appeal of Savings Plans is Growing, A.B.A. BANKING J., Sept. 1991, at 51. 
331 See id. Other forced savings plans also operate under principles modeled after 
the kye. Peterson Bank of Chicago allows customers to determine the total plan 
amount and the increments for each installment. Once half of the planned amount 
has been deposited, customers are allowed to withdraw from their accounts without 
penalty. See id. 
332 Elyssa Getreu, Taking a Lesson from Korea for Lending in the Inner City, AM. 
BANKER,June 29, 1992, at 7. 
333 However, according to Michael Cunningham, while the "kye concept works for 
Koreans because they 'have a strong cash flow to begin with,' ... [t]he savings habits 
of other minorities might be an impediment to his version of the program." Id. (cita-
tion omitted). 
334 See Franz, supra note 301, at Al. 
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restaurants and into the bank,"335 in other words, through linkages 
between the open and the community markets. 
Concepts such as mutual monitoring and joint liability that gov-
ern rotating credit associations can be introduced to increase the like-
lihood of repayment in other contexts as well. Under this concept, 
the pool may be guaranteed by a third party entity such as the Small 
Business Administration. 336 This structure would allow the bank to 
sell the loan portfolio on the secondary market and hence increase its 
capital pool for additionallending,337 and it would at the same time 
encourage microloans-small loans to borrowers who cannot meet 
the collateral requirement and other criteria of creditworthiness de-
manded by banks. 
Another way of introducing the concept of mutual monitoring so 
crucial to the success of rotating credit associations is to adopt a lend-
ing method used by the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh. 338 Grameen 
Bank's "lending circle," which uses joint liability to ensure mutual 
monitoring among the circle's members, is similar in concept to that 
used in rotating credit associations. The circle consists of five mem-
bers, and lending is made on the basis of a "two, two, one" scheme. 
The bank lends to two members of the group first. Then, upon satis-
faction of the loan, the bank lends to two additional members, and 
finally the fifth. The group's members act as coguarantors. Addition-
ally, should one member prove to be delinquent, her action would 
jeopardize the entire group's eligibility for loans from the bank.339 As 
a result, "because it is the group-not the bank-that initially evalu-
335 Id. 
336 Although once a record of creditworthiness is established, the pool itself, 
rather than a government entity, can serve as security for additional loans by the 
bank. 
337 See Getreu, supra note 332, at 7; see also Lewis D. Solomon, Microenterprise: 
Human Reconstruction in America's Inner Cities, 15 HAR.v. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 191, 217 
(1992). For a discussion of microenterprises, see id. 
338 The Grameen Bank was founded for the express purpose of offering "poor 
people credit without collateral." Mohammad A. Auwal, Promoting Microcapitalism in 
the Service of the Poor: The Grameen Model and Its Cross-Cultural Adaptation, 33 J. Bus. 
CoMM. 27 (1996). See also THE GRAMEEN READER: TRAINING MATERIALS FOR THE INTER-
NATIONAL REPUCATION OF THE GRAMEEN BANK FINANCIAL SYsTEM FOR REoucriON OF 
RuRAL PoVER'IY (DavidS. Gibbons ed., 1992). 
339 The difference between the Grameen Bank or other similar lending circles 
and rotating credit associations is that in the former, borrowers borrow from a third-
party entity-a bank-whereas in the latter, borrowers in essence borrow from them-
selves and must rely on their own savings. 
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ates loan proposals,"340 and because "[d]efaulters spoil things for eve-
rybody else, ... group members choose their partners wisely."341 
These approaches would reduce the problem of information 
asymmetry and would allow banks to lower the transaction costs of 
screening, monitoring, and enforcement. They would also introduce 
the concept of joint liability described in Part 111342 and make it possi-
ble for banks to rely on the bottom-up mutual monitoring and en-
forcement mechanisms of the rotating credit associations. 
One can argue that preferences for rotating credit associations 
are unnecessary because they are merely variants of existing institu-
tions, such as community development banks.343 The latter, however, 
cannot act as substitutes for rotating credit associations. They are too 
institutionalized and too formal to achieve the comparative advantage 
offered by community rotating credit associations. The forty or so 
micro banker funds344 in the United States, heavily supported by foun-
dations, 345 "have yet to develop a systematic, self-sustaining methodol-
ogy."346 Due to the prevalence of below-market-rate loans to poor 
340 Bomstein, supra note 177, at 40. 
341 ld. 
342 See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text. 
343 JuLIA ANN PARZEN & MICHAEL HALL KIEsCHNICK, CREDIT WHERE IT's DuE 15 
(1992) ("Financial institutions created primarily to foster economic development are 
development banks. As financial institutions, they work to conserve their capital; as 
development vehicles, they seek to contribute to economic development."). Commu-
nity development banks have sought to emulate rotating credit associations by adopt-
ing the informal peer-group "lending circle" approach to lower their risk of lending. 
Like commercial banks, they are chartered and regulated as insured depository insti-
tutions and at the same time are designed to fulfill social and development objectives 
in addition to commercial objectives. 
344 Microenterprise programs, which provide small loans from $500 to $25,000, 
are usually accessed through community development banks. See Susan R. Jones, 
Small Business and Community Economic Development: Transactional Lawyering for Social 
Change and Economic justice, 4 CUNICAL L. REv. 195, 197 (1997). A microenterprise is 
defined as "'a sole proprietorship, partnership or family business that has fewer than 
five employees, does not generally have access to the commercial banking sector and 
can initially utilize a loan under $15,000." Id. at 197 n.3 (citation omitted). 
345 See Kenneth H. Bacon, Clinton Looks to a Bank in Bangladesh for Model to Help 
U.S. Poor Get Loans, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1993, at A2. 
346 Bomstein, supra note 177, at 40. Other studies have claimed approximately 
one hundred microloan funds in the United States. Most use the peer monitoring 
method and substitute traditional collateral requirement with social collateral. Such 
funds include the Southern Development Bankcorp, a community development bank 
in Arkansas which operates the Good Faith Fund, the Lakota Fund on the Pine Ridge 
Indian Reservation in South Dakota, the Women's Self-Employment Project in Chi-
cago. The success rates of the microloan funds have been mixed. Administrative 
costs of counseling and educating potential borrowers, as well as training the banks' 
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borrowers, the high administrative costs-namely operating costs, em-
ployee salaries, office space, travel, training, promotion, and other 
professional services, as well as costs of processing small loans-"no 
microenterprise lender in the United States has come close to break-
ing even, and only a handful have more than a few hundred borrow-
ers."347 Profits earned by South Shore Bank in Chicago, for example, 
are used to support activities by other developmental agencies associ-
ated with the Shorebank Corporation, and even though such activities 
may be socially useful, they may also be "littered with barriers and 
risks."348 Even the most ardent supporters admit that "[s] elf-suffi-
ciency in development banking . . . is the exception rather than the 
rule. Development banks whose goal it is to redistribute wealth or to 
address problems in very-low-income communities have generally re-
lied on large and ongoing subsidies to continue."349 
By contrast, rotating credit associations, which operate on a much 
smaller scale than development banks, provide an additional benefit 
for members by acting as community deposit institutions that are com-
pletely self-sustaining and self-funding. Because capitalization for the 
association comes from the members themselves, rotating credit as-
sociations perform the necessary function of community savings mo-
bilization. Loans come only from the members' own contributions 
and, as a result, rotating credit associations "force people who aren't 
too disciplined into saving the money."sso 
In many ways, then, while the formal public sector can promote 
and preserve the community in which rotating credit associations op-
erate-by adopting an adjudicative philosophy that defers to commu-
nity norms when appropriate-there are also limits to the kinds of 
linkages that can be forged between the formal and the community 
economies of credit. Although state-subsidized entities, such as com-
staff in community development, are high. The amount required to run the Women's 
Self.Employment Group, for example, is greater than the amount actually loaned to 
borrowers. See Aruna Srinivasan, Intervention in Credit Markets and Development Lending, 
FED. REsERVE BANK OF ATLANTA EcoN. REv., May-June 1994, at 13, 22. 
347 Borstein, supra note 177, at 40; PARZEN & KIESCHNICK, supra note 343, at 
115-29. 
348 PARZEN & KIEScHNICK, supra note 343, at 116. The Shorebank Corporation in 
Chicago, for example, is an umbrella organization that includes a community devel-
opment bank, a for-profit real estate subsidiary, and a nonprofit training company. 
Most development banks, however, cannot survive on its members' savings alone but 
rather must be funded by grants from religious organizations, foundations, corpora-
tions, and state or local governments. These shareholders have not received nor do 
they expect to receive dividends. 
349 Id. 
350 Reich, supra note 302, at 1 
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munity development banks, may succeed in emulating some of the 
benefits of rotating credit associations, the very involvement of the 
state itself may result in a distortion of the particular mix of commu-
nity, informality, and flexibility that gives such entities their greatest 
comparative advantage. 
CONCLUSION 
It is now commonplace for market proponents to defend the mo-
rality and efficiency of markets by reference to individual freedom 
and allocative efficiency. At the top of the list of the market's virtues 
is its respect for individual freedom through market interactions "to 
affirm existing values, to contribute to their further growth and to 
earn moral merit."351 Economic freedom is "an indispensable condi-
tion of all other freedom, and free enterprise both a necessary condi-
tion and a consequence of personal freedom."352 Markets are also 
defensible because they maximize the efficient allocation of resources. 
Each individual's freedom to further her own materialist impulses re-
sults in the maximization of individual and societal wealth.353 
In recent years, however, the reascendant interest in community 
has led to an intense examination of the social values and virtues that 
are not easily produced by the market or, as some communitarian crit-
ics of the market claim, are even crowded out and harmed by the 
market. 354 These critics question the claim of market advocates that 
the market is nonjudgmental because it allocates goods and services 
only in accordance with consumer demand without questioning or de-
fining such preferences. Indeed, market goals of wealth maximization 
and economic efficiency, critics argue, are tautological: the market 
produces whatever consumers value, but the very production of con-
sumer value is itself determined by the market. 355 At least three con-
clusions can be drawn from this critique of the market. First, the 
market is not simply a neutral mechanism for maximizing ends whose 
natures and origins are exogenous to the market. Second, the teleol-
ogy of the market has led to the triumph of market values that glorify 
self-interested behaviors and market competition over other 
nonmarket values that promote civic virtues and the collective good. 
351 F.A. Hayek, The Moral Element in Free Enterprise, in STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, PoLI-
TICS AND ECONOMICS 229-30 (1967). 
352 ld. at 229. 
353 See generally Posner, supra note 62. 
354 See SANDEL, supra note 290. 
355 See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the 
Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 669 (1979); Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of 
Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451 (1974). 
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And third, market ideology itself is detrimental to the maintenance 
and promotion of community because it promotes a naked view of the 
individual as autonomous and socially atomized. 
This Article has looked at the intersection of market and commu-
nity to explore how both converge without one promoting prefer-
ences that run counter to the other's. Rather, I have shown that 
community norms of cooperation and commitment to the common 
good deter naked self-interested behaviors and can produce the very 
efficiency and wealth-producing effect that the market favors. In this 
respect, the interaction of market and community reinforces the 
wealth maximization potential of markets and the collective bonds of 
community by aggregating, through the community market, the inter-
ests of the individual and the group to remedy imperfections neither 
the state nor the open market could solve. 
As I have demonstrated, while laws against discri.ill.inating and 
redlining exist, they cannot fully address the problem of rational dis-
crimination and, in particular, rational redlining, as banks believe that 
the economic costs of lending in low-income communities far out-
weigh the benefits. Given the screening, monitoring, and enforce-
ment costs incurred, the administrative burden of overseeing 
relatively small loans that may come without collateral and other usual 
indicia of creditworthiness is often too costly to make traditional lend-
ing economically worthwhile. Without the information exchange 
mechanisms available to rotating credit associations to lower the costs 
of screening, monitoring, and enforcing loans, banks subscribe in-
stead to wholly different standards in their evaluation of creditworthi-
ness. Despite the pressure exerted on banks by the passage of the 
ECOA and the CRA, the public law model faces limitations that are 
difficult to overcome without more radical inte.rvention by the state. 
From a rational, cost-benefit perspective, the open market is not capa-
ble of solving the problem of credit rationing and adverse selection 
that banks face. 
I have argued in this Article that formal public lawmaking should 
be supplemented by informal private lawmaking and that the state 
should favor supplementation of open market contracts with commu-
nity market contracts, where people opt into relational and status ar-
rangements. In rotating credit associations, communities rely on self-
enforcing norms to regulate and solve their community credit prob-
lem. By subscribing to the community's production of norms and 
practices to enforce credit contracts, .rotating credit associations draw 
on their members' social capital base of identity and trust and their 
respective "reputational bonds" to create a systematic but private or-
dering of economic relations that manage to overcome the informa-
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tiona! and incentive barriers facing financial institutions in the formal 
sector. 
Largely outside the formal, state-created legal system, rotating 
credit associations nonetheless induce a high level of compliance 
from members whose internalization of community norms allows the 
associations to engage in low-cost screening, monitoring, and enforce-
ment of the community's credit terms. This Article draws from and 
builds on works in psychology and sociology to investigate how con-
structs of identity, community, and trust affect rational economic be-
haviors, and in the process perform a welfare-enhancing role by 
expanding the availability of credit for those borrowers ineligible for 
credit in the formal economy. In this respect, the Article demon-
strates that a community of shared vocabulary about rights and expec-
tations facilitates economic exchanges among members. To this 
extent, the discourse on communitarian values has an economic effi-
ciency benefit that has been neglected in the debate on 
communitarianism. 
At the same time, however, I recognize that not all norms are 
wealth-maximizing or socially beneficial, and thus not all norms 
should be enforced or promoted by the state. Members of a rotating 
credit association and the association itself share a common aggrega-
tion of interests so that the incentive structure of the group contains 
built-in institutional arrangements that serve to stem force and coer-
cion. When the production of norms emerges from an incentive 
structure that promotes cooperation, minimizes the risk of appropria-
tion, and produces, without negative economic spillover, economic ef-
ficiency by correcting the deficiencies of the open market, a strong 
argument exists that the state should have the discretion to support 
such norms and the entities that promote them. 
"The accumulation of social capital ... is a complicated and in 
many ways mysterious cultural process. While governments can enact 
policies that have the effect of depleting social capital, they have great 
difficulties understanding how to build it up again."356 The key is to 
forge the right balance needed to induce and maintain linkages be-
tween the public, open market and the community-based market in a 
way that promotes norms that are economically efficient, socially ben-
eficial, and thus worth preserving. 
356 FuKUYAMA, supra note 6, at 11. 
